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ABSTRACT  
   
Employing an interdisciplinary approach with a grounding in new institutional 
economics, this dissertation investigates how institutions, as shared rules, norms, and 
strategies, mediate social-ecological outcomes in a system exposed to a novel threat in 
the form of a rapidly growing and especially destructive invasive plant, Mikania 
micrantha (Mikania). I explore whether and how communities (largely part of 
community forest user groups in the buffer zone of Chitwan National Park in Chitwan, 
Nepal) collectively act in the face of Mikania invasion. Collective action is vital to 
successful natural resource governance in a variety of contexts and systems globally. 
Understanding collective action and the role of institutions is especially important in the 
face of continued and amplifying global environmental changes impacting social-
ecological systems, such as climate change and invasive species. Contributing to efforts 
to bolster knowledge of the role of collective action and institutions in social-ecological 
systems, this research first establishes that community forest governance and institutional 
arrangements are heterogeneous. I subsequently utilize content and institutional analyses 
to identify and address themes and norms related to Mikania management. The content 
analysis contributes an empirical study of the influence of trust in collective natural 
resource management efforts. Using two complementary econometric analyses of survey 
data from 1235 households, I additionally assess equity in access to community forest 
resources, an understudied area in the institutional literature, and the factors affecting 
collective action related to Mikania removal. Finally, an agent-based model of 
institutional change facilitates the comparison of two perspectives, rational choice and 
cultural diffusion, of how shared norms and strategies for Mikania management change 
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over time, providing insight into institutional change generally. Results highlight the 
importance of trust and understanding the de facto, or on-the-ground institutions; the 
influence of perception on collective action; that integrating equity into institutional 
analyses may strengthen sustainable resource management efforts; and that rational 
choice is an unlikely mechanism of institutional change. The mixed-methods approach 
contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the role of institutions and 
collective action in invasive species management and broadly to the scientific 
understanding of the role of institutions in mediating global environmental changes.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, terms such as social-ecological, coupled human-natural, and 
human-environment systems have become increasingly popular in scientific research 
stemming from a wide variety of disciplines (Berkes, Colding, & Folke, 2008). Similar 
terminology has been in use for much longer than the previous decade, but the recent 
surge in social-ecological systems research (as such systems are referred to throughout 
this dissertation) is recognition of the frequent separation of humans and the environment 
in past research and an acknowledgement of the importance of studying humans as a part 
of the environment, where each component influences the other. It is now common, and 
somewhat expected, to study environmental issues from a human-environment 
perspective. Social-ecological systems research can be accomplished by multi-
disciplinary teams, with scientists each contributing their expertise from a traditional 
social or natural science discipline. This research can also be accomplished by scientists 
trained in an interdisciplinary manner, with blended knowledge from natural and/or social 
science fields. This dissertation is an example of the latter, written by a scholar trained in 
the interdisciplinary field of environmental social science. While traditional disciplines 
remain vital to science, interdisciplinary scholarship has been steadily increasing and has 
the opportunity to provide unique insights (Van Noorden, 2015), especially with regard to 
scientific understanding of social-ecological systems which are inherently 
interdisciplinary. This dissertation explores a specific social-ecological system located in 
Nepal, but uses a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to explore the 
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broader implications of the findings and advance the interdisciplinary field of 
environmental governance more generally.  
Study Site and Problem Overview 
Chitwan, Nepal is a rapidly urbanizing region adjacent to the internationally 
important Chitwan National Park located in Nepal’s southern Terai region (figures 1.1, 
1.2, 1.3 and 1.4). Locally governed community forests were formally established around 
the park (known as the buffer zone community forests, as they are in the buffer zone 
around the national park) in the mid-1990s in order to provide residents opportunities to 
collect forest products and timber in forests that were largely self-governed (Acharya, 
2002; Baral & Subedi, 2000; Jones, 2007). The establishment of community forests aided 
in reducing illegal harvesting of resources and was intended to support sustainable 
resource management to bolster local agricultural livelihoods. A more detailed 
examination of the creation of community forests in Nepal and the buffer zone 
community forests is presented in chapters 2 and 3.  
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Figure 1.2 Map of study site. Location of Chitwan, Chitwan National Park, and the buffer 
zone community forests within Nepal. Note that Chitwan National Park and the buffer 
zone overlap Chitwan.  
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Figure 1.3. This map is located at the entrance of Chitwan National Park. Note the 
location of the park between two prominent rivers, the Narayani in the north and the 
Rapti in the south.  
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Figure 1.4. Views of Chitwan during fieldwork in 2014, ranging from forests, to rivers, to 
households. 
 
In the past, increasing population pressure has affected the community forests, but 
a newer social-ecological threat looms with the invasion of the “mile-a-minute weed,” 
Mikania micrantha (Mikania) (Rai, Sandilya, & Subedi, 2012; Sapkota, 2009). Mikania 
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is a creeping vine native to South America that favors humid, warm environments, such 
as the sub-tropical Terai region of Chitwan in southern Nepal (Barreto & Evans, 1995). 
As its moniker indicates, Mikania is rapidly growing and problematic for several reasons, 
ranging from its ability to quickly kill trees and cover grasses, to the implications this has 
for biodiversity and degradation of community forest resources. The detrimental effects 
of Mikania on the biodiversity of the Chitwan region have been well established. These 
include significantly harming the vulnerable (Lahkar, Talukdar, & Sarma, 2011) one-
horned rhinoceros’ food and habitat sources (Murphy et al., 2013); Mikania’s impact on 
the one-horned rhino is second only to poaching (Ram, 2008) (figure 1.5). Research on 
human factors influencing Mikania’s spread has focused on resource harvesting and 
collection activities (such as gathering and transporting grasses and fodder). These 
activities correspond to an increased risk of spreading Mikania (Murphy et al., 2013). 
Annual burning activities, related to traditional agricultural practices, in and around 
Chitwan National Park additionally pose a high risk of increasing the spread of Mikania 
and burning contributes more significantly to spreading Mikania than resource collection 
activities. Mikania is an important issue as it has invaded the buffer zone community 
forests (Clark et al. 2016) and is a threat to livelihoods in Chitwan (chapters 2 and 3 will 
elaborate on this issue).    
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Figure 1.5. Tribute to one of Chitwan National Park’s most prominent animals, the 
previously endangered (now vulnerable) one-horned rhinoceros. Rhinos are commonly 
sighted in the park. 
  
A Note about Political Conditions in Nepal  
Nepal recently faced the conclusion of a ten-year civil war in 2006. The war was 
an escalation of conflict between Maoist groups (labeled People’s War by the Maoist 
fighters) and the government (at the time a monarchy), and the impacts of the conflict are 
ongoing in many respects. A formal democracy was established in 2006 with the election 
of a Constituent Assembly to draft the new constitution. However, the First Constituent 
Assembly failed in their task and the Second Constituent Assembly only very recently 
(September 20, 2015) promulgated the new Constitution of Nepal. The new constitution 
immediately garnered protests from human rights organizations regarding citizenship 
clauses that were perceived as unfair and discriminatory towards certain ethnic groups 
and women.  
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The civil war impacted community forestry in multiple ways, including soldiers 
from both sides exploiting forests as hiding places in preparation for combat (Karna, 
Shivakoti, & Webb, 2010). Interestingly, Karna et al.’s (2010) study of seven community 
forests with similar governance structures found the armed conflict did not erode the 
ecological condition of the community forests. Additionally, in community forests where 
the members rated themselves as facing severe armed conflict, characteristics like trust 
and reciprocity were improved, though more research is necessary to fully understand 
this outcome. Although this dissertation does not focus on the impacts of the civil war on 
community forestry or interpersonal relationships in Chitwan, it is important to remember 
the political context of the country and future work may more explicitly address this 
element. 
Background on Mikania 
Mikania is a vine that both grows and reproduces rapidly (figure 1.6). It is native 
to South America and was most likely intentionally transferred to India and the Pacific 
Islands around the 1940s for use as a cover crop for airfields (IUCN, 2005) and was also 
utilized by soldiers in India during World War II as a type of camouflage (IUCN, 2005). 
From its initial introduction, Mikania quickly spread to warm, humid places in Asia 
(including parts of China, India, and Nepal) and North America (including parts of the 
southeastern United States). In addition to Mikania, there are several other invasive plant 
species in Nepal harming the buffer zone community forests’ productivity and potentially 
the livelihoods of communities that rely on the buffer zone (Rai et al., 2012). This 
dissertation will focus only on Mikania micrantha. More information on Mikania cover 
in the buffer zone community forests is provided in chapter 2.  
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Figure 1.6. Mikania micrantha in Chitwan (climbing the tree near the front center and 
several in the background).  
 
 Yang et al. (2005) noted that Mikania is one of the top 100 invasive plant threats 
in the world. As it is a creeping vine, it climbs small trees and covers grasses, often 
depriving them of sunlight and smothering them to death (Siwakoti, 2008). Dazhi et al. 
(1999) suggested that Mikania is a heliophylic species, meaning that it is adapted to and 
thrives in sunlight. Considering this, Mikania often covers and inhibits the growth of 
other plants in its search for sunlight, but although it dislikes deep shade, it can tolerate 
shaded areas such as those found on forest floors (Kuo, 2003). Mikania growth 
introduces a variety of ecological changes that impact the abilities of native plant and 
microbial systems to thrive. Ecosystems that are partially invaded by Mikania have 
served as experimental systems to researchers seeking to understand its effects. Li et al. 
(2006) discovered areas of a forest ecosystem in Shenzhen, China invaded by Mikania 
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had a significantly increased aerobic soil microbial community and different microbial 
phospholipid fatty acid profiles and enzyme activity compared to areas where Mikania 
was absent. It was concluded that it is important to consider the influence of Mikania on 
the soil system when removing it.  
Mikania primarily reproduces sexually via seed dispersal, with one plant able to 
disperse up to 40,000 seeds per year, but also reproduces vegetatively where parts of the 
stem placed in moist soil will result in a new plant. This has important implications for its 
spread in Chitwan, as resource collection activities have resulted in people accidentally 
transporting pieces of Mikania plants. These pieces are often deposited as people are 
walking with large bundles of grasses or fodder and the plant may reproduce even in the 
absence of a seed. Mikania has been found to have difficulty reproducing when seeds are 
buried deeper than 1.5 centimeters in either clay or sandy soils (Yang et al., 2005).  
There are several ways to remove Mikania ranging from pulling or cutting the 
plant, to burning, chemical herbicides, and a predatory rust fungus (Ellison, Evans, & 
Ineson, 2004). These methods are examined in more detail in the following chapters. The 
removal of Mikania around Chitwan National Park has been explored by Sandilya 
(2011). It was concluded that Mikania can be successfully managed through repeated 
cycles of manual cutting. However, this study was limited as it was conducted in only 
one buffer zone community forest, it was not long term, and as such there is no evidence 
this will work in the long run for Mikania management. Additionally, this study did not 
distribute this information to community members to sustain the cutting necessary to 
mitigate Mikania. Currently, the removal method thought to be most successful in 
Chitwan is mechanical removal, bagging the removed Mikania, and burning the bags.  
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A Foundation in New Institutional Economics 
As people make decisions about how to interact in settings involving choices with 
others, they form norms, rules, and shared values that guide their decision making 
processes. These sets of rules, norms, and values are jointly defined as institutions 
(Ostrom, 2005). Social-ecological systems are recognized as places where people and the 
environment reciprocally influence each other; studying a system holistically enables 
researchers to better understand outcomes from changes in the system (Berkes, Colding, 
& Folke, 2003). New institutional economics recognizes information constraints, the 
costs of interactions, and the limits of the rational, self-interested actor as portrayed in 
classical economics (Menard & Shirley, 2008). This dissertation research combines this 
institutional lens with social-ecological modeling to better understand how institutions 
influence the management of an invasive plant. Each component of the proposed research 
is situated, at least partially, in the frameworks and theories of new institutional 
economics. As such, it seems important to provide a brief overview of the field of new 
institutional economics.  
New institutional economics (NIE) was established in 1975 and its body of 
research incorporates a wide variety of topics dealing with rules ranging from federal 
prisons to fisheries. Institutions include both formal rules, such as regulations and laws, 
and informal rules and norms that are often unwritten, such as social norms.1 The field 
has expanded both classical economics and earlier institutional studies to focus on the 
                                                 
1
 Although not discussed in detail here, it should be noted Ostrom (2005) advocated for the use of 
institutional grammar over terms like “formal” or “informal.” The institutional grammar tools allow for a 
precise analysis that may be more easily replicated by scholars less familiar with institutional analysis. For 
a detailed discussion of institutional grammar and the attribute, deontic, aim, condition, or else (ADICO) 
syntax, refer to Crawford and Ostrom, chapter 5 in Ostrom (2005).  
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social norms aspect of the effects of institutions in the world. The field of new 
institutional economics is largely based on classical economic theory with one major 
modification (Coase, 1984). The assumption that people are rational and utility 
maximizing was eventually modified to recognize that people are boundedly rational, or 
rational within cognitive limitations and information asymmetries (Coase, 1984; Ostrom, 
2005). The scholarship of Douglas North is foundational in NIE theory and North (1990) 
was one of the first works to clearly articulate the difference between organizations and 
institutions in the scholarly literature, noting that organizations are groups of people with 
a common purpose and can range from political bodies to corporations. Distinctly, 
institutions are the “rules of the game” that shape human decision making. While 
research studying institutions is often conducted by economists or political scientists, Nee 
and Swedberg (2005) and Moe (2005), are examples supporting that NIE and institutions 
have been explored from an array of alternative perspectives. NIE complements 
disciplines including political science, political economy, psychology, sociology, 
economic sociology and other interdisciplinary scholarship. For instance, Moe (2005) 
discussed the role of power in NIE and Nee and Swedberg (2005) propose to restart the 
conversation between NIE and sociology. Ostrom (2008) acknowledges that the study of 
institutions from a variety of disciplines offers fresh insights and is important for growth 
of the field.  
Ostrom, with the contributions of many other scholars, developed the institutional 
analysis and development (IAD) framework in an effort to systematically analyze 
institutions in any scientific study, regardless of geographic location or content (natural 
resources, technology, etc.) (Ostrom, 2005). The framework has been widely applied and 
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it has been used extensively to explore natural resource management. The focal point of 
the IAD framework is the action arena, where participants involved in a specific action 
situation interact. Exogenous biophysical variables, community attributes, and rules 
(along with norms and strategies) influence the participants and the outcomes of action 
situations (see chapters 2 and 3 for use of the IAD). The IAD framework has been 
utilized to explore the governance of a variety of common pool resources (e.g. 
Andersson, 2006; Ostrom, 1995, 2010b) and scholars utilizing the framework for 
institutional analysis typically focus on portions in detail rather than assessing the 
framework in its entirety.  
Social-Ecological Systems, New Institutional Economics, and Research Gaps  
Common pool resources are non-excludable, meaning it is very difficult to 
prevent their usage, and rivalrous/subtractable, meaning usage reduces the availability 
and supply for others. In the case of common pool resource management, collective 
action (voluntary action to achieve a common goal) and successful governance have been 
important areas of study. Ostrom’s (1990) seminal book Governing the Commons 
presented a set of institutional principles that were found to be vital to successful 
governance of common pool resources, ranging from the importance of well-defined 
boundaries to graduated sanctions for breaking established management or use rules. 
These principles were later adapted more generally to address resilience and robustness 
of social-ecological systems (Anderies et al., 2004).  
Institutions play an important role in mediating the relationship between 
communities and the environment in social-ecological systems (Agrawal & Chhatre, 
2006; Berkes et al., 2003; Ostrom, 2005). This dissertation will explore how institutions 
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impact the sustainability of a social-ecological system by increasing researchers’ 
understanding of how institutions influence Mikania management. Informed by both 
social and ecological data, this research contributes to addressing the often missing link 
between institutions and the biophysical world (Ostrom, 2005). While the literature on 
managing invasive species in a social-ecological systems framework is growing, studies 
seeking to understand both the social and ecological impacts and outcomes of invasive 
species are needed (Schuettler, Rozzi, & Jax, 2011), and institutional components of 
invasive plant management have rarely been considered.  
In community forestry globally, decentralization and the transfer of forest use and 
management rights to local communities from state or federal control has often been 
disappointing and incomplete. Community forestry in practice frequently seems to 
produce greater ecological compared to social and economic benefits (Charnley & Poe, 
2007; Nightingale, 2005; Thoms, 2008; Tinker, 1994). More research is needed to bridge 
the gap between community forestry in theory and practice. Particularly, further 
empirical work is necessary to either support or reject hypotheses related to whether (1) 
use rights of forests are actually transferred to local communities, (2) whether there are 
truly social and economic benefits related to community forestry, and (3) a more detailed 
understanding of community forestry outcomes (Charnley & Poe, 2007). Embracing a 
mixed methods approach, this study contributes to the need to better understand the 
outcomes of community forestry in the context of Mikania in Chitwan.  
The impacts of Mikania on biodiversity in Chitwan have been explored (Murphy 
et al. 2013), but less is understood regarding: (1) the role that Mikania plays in affecting 
the everyday lives of the community forest residents, (2) how governance relationships in 
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the region operate, (3) the influences on collective action for managing Mikania, (4) how 
norms and strategies for Mikania management change over time and how this influences 
Mikania spread in the community forests, and (5) the broader lessons from Mikania and 
Chitwan that will contribute to scientific understanding of the role of institutions in 
mediating social-ecological challenges (figure 1.7).  
 
Figure 1.7. Systems diagram of the Chitwan social-ecological system, adapted from 
Yabiku, Hall, An, York, and Ghimire (2012). This dissertation will focus on 
understanding how governance relationships fit into the dynamics of the system.  
 
Broader Implications: People and Mikania  
The rapid spread of Mikania has tangible consequences for community forests 
and the remainder of the ecosystem, including diminishing biodiversity and damaging 
resources vital to the vulnerable one-horned rhinoceros. The forests along the urban-rural 
gradient in Chitwan provide communities with often indispensable timber, fuel wood, 
fodder, and thatch resources. The fieldwork conducted for this dissertation revealed that 
Mikania is perceived as impacting resource collectors’ daily time budgets, increasing the 
time it takes to gather grasses and fodder from the community forests and exposing 
people, particularly women, to greater risk of encountering wildlife, such as tigers and 
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rhinos (figure 1.8). Thus, this research additionally seeks to provide information relevant 
to improving human welfare via a better understanding of factors impacting the spread of 
Mikania and roadblocks to successful management. I hope the models and approach 
developed in this research will eventually provide an additional source of information for 
stakeholders to use in evaluating risk management strategies related to improving human 
welfare and protecting wildlife habitat impacted by Mikania.  
 
Figure 1.8. A group of women after collection of grasses and fodder from their 
community forest in Chitwan. Mikania is entangled in the grasses the middle woman had 
collected. Women reported having to spend increased amounts of time collecting grasses 
necessary for their livestock and having to venture farther into the forest, amplifying their 
vulnerability to wildlife attacks (primarily from rhinos, tigers, and wild boar).  
 
Research Questions and Format of the Dissertation 
This dissertation will investigate the following questions in an article dissertation 
format, with each chapter contributing to a more complete understanding of the social-
ecological elements of Mikania management. Although each chapter is intended to be a 
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standalone piece, together they tell the complex story of the role of institutions in 
Chitwan community forests and are meant to be read in order. The overarching question 
that this dissertation investigates is: How do institutions mediate outcomes in social-
ecological systems facing rapid changes? Specifically: How do institutions mediate 
Mikania management and outcomes in Chitwan community forests? The following 
questions guide this dissertation and aid in addressing the principal question in more 
detail.  
1. Based upon the de jure, or formal, institutional arrangements, what actors should 
be involved in Mikania management and what does Mikania management 
resemble de facto, or on-the-ground? How do norms alter the de jure institutional 
arrangements and influence community forests’ collective Mikania management 
activities? What lessons can be learned from this case study of Mikania 
management to inform the role of institutions in mediating collective action 
problems involving social-ecological challenges?  
2. Who has access to community forest resources? What factors influence 
community forest membership?  
3. What factors are affecting collective action related to Mikania? How does 
perception of Mikania as a problem at multiple levels influence collective action? 
4. How do empirically observed and theoretically hypothesized management norms 
and strategies in Chitwan impact patterns of Mikania distribution? How does the 
adoption of norms and strategies change over time and which theory of 
institutional change, rational choice or cultural diffusion, better fits empirical 
observations in the system? What are the implications for managing social-
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ecological challenges in the future, including when current institutions do not fit 
new social-ecological challenges?  
Figure 1.9 summarizes the methodological framework that will be utilized to address 
these research questions.  
  
Figure 1.9. Methodological framework and main contribution of this dissertation.  
First, chapter 2 establishes that community forest governance in the buffer zone is 
heterogeneous and subsequently utilizes content and institutional analyses to identify and 
explore themes and norms in relationships relevant to Mikania management.  
The institutional literature, and arguably studies of sustainable resource 
management, has seldom considered equity in past research. Chapter 3 contributes to this 
important and growing area of institutional research via a statistical analysis of the factors 
that influence access to community forest resources in Chitwan.  
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Collective action has played a vital role in managing common pool resources in 
numerous global contexts (Ostrom, 2005). Thus, in a statistical analysis complementary 
to chapter 3, chapter 4 explores the factors affecting collective action related to Mikania 
removal in depth, using both household survey data and more nuanced qualitative 
interview data.  
Chapter 5 presents an agent-based model (Grimm et al., 2006) to explore two 
theoretical perspectives of how institutions change over time, with the goals of 
understanding patterns of institutional change and Mikania distribution and exploring 
competing theories of institutional change.   
The mixed-methods qualitative and quantitative approach outlined here facilitates 
a thorough exploration of the overarching question regarding the role of institutions in 
mediating outcomes in a social-ecological system facing rapid changes. 
A Description of the Data Used in this Dissertation 
This dissertation assesses and is informed by a range of data types, including 
interview, participant observation, survey, and ecological data. Here I provide an 
overview of each data source; the data employed in each chapter are also explained 
briefly in the chapter’s respective methods section.  
Ethics note.   
This project, and all of the data collected, has been granted Institutional Review 
Board Human Subjects approval by Arizona State University (approval can be viewed in 
Appendix A). The names of the five community forests explored as case studies in this 
dissertation are and will remain anonymous. As the communities are small, identifying 
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them would increase the possibility of linking interviewee comments and concerns with 
individuals or households.  
Case study interviews and participant observation. 
There are 21 buffer zone community forests included in the household survey and 
ecological datasets. Five of these 21 community forests were selected for detailed 
qualitative fieldwork in summer 2014. The five community forests were selected to 
represent the diversity of financial and social resources (like partnerships with other 
government agencies or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that provide services 
including toilets and wells) historically available within the 21 communities. Financial 
and social resources influence the ability of a community forest governance committee2 
to govern its forest resources and members, so I refer to levels of these resources and 
others collectively as the governance capacity of a community forest. Using historic data 
on each community forest’s income and resources from previous projects in the buffer 
zone, five community forest case studies were selected, with historic governance 
capacities ranging from high to very low.  
Interviews were conducted in Nepali in the interviewees’ homes and surrounding 
forests with the translation assistance and guidance of Rajendra Ghimire from the 
Institute for Social and Environmental Research-Nepal (ISER-N). In addition to 
interviewing governance committee and regular user group members in each community 
forest, officials at two NGOs, Chitwan National Park, and the buffer zone committee 
                                                 
2
 Each community forest in the buffer zone has a locally elected governance committee that is responsible 
for administrative activities related to the forest user groups, such as collecting fees for resource collection 
(if present), hiring and overseeing guards for the forest, administering related educational programs, and 
generally enforcing and monitoring the rules outlined in the specific community forest’s management plan 
(see chapter 2).  
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were interviewed. In total, 29 interviews with 87 people were conducted. Detailed 
information on the interviewees can be found in Appendix B.  
Participant observation was conducted in each of the five case studies in order to 
better understand activities such as fodder/grass/thatch collection, forest cleaning, 
livestock care, farming, and household chores such as well water collection.  
Household and community forest management surveys. 
The survey data analyzed in this dissertation was collected by ISER-N as part of 
the Chitwan National Science Foundation Coupled Natural Human systems project 
(http://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1211498). The household 
survey included 1235 households in the catchment areas of the 21 buffer zone community 
forests. A catchment area includes all of the households eligible for membership in a 
given community forest which are determined by the district government in conjunction 
with village development committees (local level governance) and community forest 
governance committees. Thus, the survey included both non-members and members, 
allowing assessment of a model of the factors influencing membership (which is the 
subject of chapter 3). The survey included demographic information and sections on 
household farming, livestock and fish farming, household relationship to community 
forest governance, household relationship to invasive species (including Mikania), 
ownership of household items, and household consumption. The survey was conducted in 
2014 and the response rate for the survey was 98.6%. Variables used in each of the 
analyses are described in their respective chapters. The community forest management 
survey was conducted with one member of each of the 21 community forest governance 
committees and included sections on general background information, local plant species 
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and their uses, governance committee activities, rules and enforcement, user groups, and 
perceptions of community forest issues. The survey was conducted in 2014 and the 
response rate was 100%.  
Ecological survey.  
Plot-level ecological data from the 21 community forests were collected over 
three years (2013-2015; one set of data from each community forest). The dataset 
includes over 2000 plots total and information on percent Mikania cover, common plant 
species (including other invasives), forest type, and evidence of disturbance (including 
fire). The ecological data generally inform the understanding of the extent and location of 
Mikania throughout Chitwan as well as the creation of the agent-based model presented 
in chapter 5.  
The goal of employing this variety of data is to add depth to the analyses 
presented in this dissertation and to increase the accuracy of investigating the overarching 
research question, which I hope the reader will keep in mind: How do institutions 
mediate outcomes in a social-ecological system facing rapid changes?  
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CHAPTER 2 
DE JURE VERSUS DE FACTO INSTITUTIONS: TRUST, INFORMATION, AND 
COLLECTIVE EFFORTS TO MANAGE THE INVASIVE MILE-A-MINUTE 
WEED (MIKANIA MICRANTHA) 
Chapter Overview 
Differences in governance relationships and community efforts to remove an 
exotic, rapidly spreading invasive plant, the-mile-a-minute weed (Mikania micrantha), 
are explored in five case study community forests in the subtropical region of Chitwan, 
Nepal. An institutional analysis informs an examination of the de jure (formal) versus de 
facto (on-the-ground) institutions and actor relationships relevant to Mikania removal 
efforts. Contrary to the expectations set by the de jure situation, governance relationships 
and norms related to Mikania management are heterogeneous across community forests. 
Content analysis of interview data illuminate reoccurring themes and their implications 
for social and ecological outcomes in the communities. Complex governance 
relationships and regular discussion of distrust of government and non-government 
officials help explain collective action efforts and management decisions. The content 
analysis suggests that Mikania is impacting people’s daily lives but the perceived degree 
of severity and the response to the disruption varies substantially and is heavily affected 
by other problems experienced by community forest members. The results indicate that 
understanding how the de facto, or on-the-ground, situation differs from the de jure 
institutions may be vital in structuring successful efforts to manage invasive species and 
understanding collective action problems related to other social-ecological threats. Data-
informed propositions about common pool resource management and invasive species are 
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presented. This study contributes to a better scientific understanding of how institutions 
mediate social-ecological challenges influencing common pool resources more broadly. 
Chitwan National Park, Buffer Zone Community Forests, and the Mile-a-Minute 
Weed 
Chitwan is a rapidly urbanizing district in Nepal’s subtropical Terai region 
containing the internationally-important Chitwan National Park. Chitwan National Park 
was founded as Nepal’s first national park in 1973 (Straede & Helles, 2000) and is home 
to high-profile species such as the Bengal tiger and one-horned rhinoceros. The park’s 
area is approximately 932 square kilometers (Nepal & Weber, 1994) and in 1996 a 
formally recognized buffer zone of approximately 750 square kilometers surrounding the 
park was created (Straede & Treue, 2006). The purpose of establishing the buffer zone 
was to decrease the impact of human activity on the park ecosystem by creating rules on 
resource collection and use for people who live in these areas (Nepal & Weber, 1994). 
Human impacts on the park are substantial: it is heavily visited, having hosted 115,181 
visitors in fiscal year 2009-2010 (Pandit, Dhakal, & Polyakov, 2015). Furthermore, the 
buffer zone area saw a net decrease of 62 square kilometers of forest and a net increase of 
67 square kilometers of agricultural land between 1978 and 1999 (Baidya, Bhuju, & 
Kandel, 2010). 
Community forestry is a type of decentralized, local forest resource governance 
system. Community forest user groups were formally established in Nepal in 1993 
through the Forest Act and were designed to address the challenges of people, natural 
resources, and protected areas (Iversen et al., 2006; also see Gilmour, 2003 for an 
overview of community forestry and associated policies in Nepal). In the mid-1990s, 
Chitwan gained its first formally-recognized community forests, most in the buffer zone. 
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These community forests provided residents opportunities to collect forest products and 
timber in forests that are largely self-governed. The community forestry program also 
intended to reduce people’s reliance on often illegally harvested forest resources within 
the national park, while simultaneously supporting livelihoods through sustainable 
management of the buffer zone forests. However, novel social-ecological changes such as 
increasing rates of urbanization and biological invasions now threaten the success of the 
community forestry program in increasing and maintaining forest health. This research 
explores how institutions influence community forest members’ collective efforts to 
manage a rapidly spreading invasive plant, known informally as the mile-a-minute weed 
(Mikania micrantha: hereafter referred to as Mikania), that is disrupting social-ecological 
processes in this region. Institutions are defined in this research as the shared rules, 
norms, and strategies that shape human decision making and are inherently intertwined in 
efforts to govern common pool resources, such as community forests (Ostrom, 2005).  
This research addresses a gap in analyses of community forestry outcomes 
(Charnley & Poe, 2007; Lachapelle, Smith, & McCool, 2004) by elucidating the impacts 
of governance relationships, or their absence, on collective action in a common pool 
resource facing social-ecological changes. Thus, this study contributes to social scientific 
understanding of the relationship between institutional diversity and management efforts 
and illuminates the importance of learning the on-the-ground conditions, as opposed to 
solely studying the formal situation. This research has practical significance as the 
findings can improve collective natural resources management, leading to enhanced 
efforts to mitigate the negative impacts of invasive species on ecologically significant 
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species, such as the Bengal tiger and one-horned rhinoceros, and socially and 
economically important protected areas.  
Mikania micrantha invasion as a social-ecological challenge. 
Mikania micrantha is a fast-growing plant native to South America that favors 
humid, warm (tropical and subtropical) environments (figure 2.1). Mikania is believed to 
have been intentionally transferred to India and the Pacific Islands around the 1940s for 
use as a cover crop for airfields (IUCN, 2005). Since then it has negatively impacted 
agricultural and forest resources in parts of India, China, and Nepal, among other regions. 
Mikania spreads rapidly across landscapes through both vegetative growth from dropped 
stems and wind-borne seeds; it is fire-adapted and contains allelopathic compounds in its 
roots that inhibit growth of other plants. Household resource collection activities often 
result in unintentional exacerbation of Mikania. Mikania is often entangled in collected 
grasses and grows where pieces are dropped along resource collection routes. For these 
reasons, it has proved to be extremely difficult to eradicate. In Chitwan, Mikania was 
present in 20 percent of Chitwan National Park in 2010 (Khadka, 2010) but the buffer 
zone community forests have been invaded to differing degrees of severity (Clark et al., 
2016). Recent work has shown that Mikania invasion causes significant ecological harm 
to local resources, including food and habitat for the vulnerable one-horned rhinoceros 
(Murphy et al., 2013; Ram, 2008). By covering and killing vegetation, Mikania further 
represents a threat to the livelihoods of Chitwan households dependent on collecting 
grasses and fodder (Rai & Scarborough, 2014). Many invasive plants globally have 
become useful to local communities after their invasion. Unfortunately, Mikania is not a 
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viable substitute for the grasses it covers, which are often used as livestock feed by many 
Chitwan households, as Mikania is indigestible to livestock.  
  
Figure 2.1. Mikania micrantha climbing a tree in Chitwan.   
 
Efforts to manage Mikania in the buffer zone community forests have been 
largely unsuccessful. “Mikania management” refers to efforts by actors to address the 
Mikania invasion, primarily involving different removal attempts and discussion of or 
planning for such efforts. Removal attempts often include pulling, cutting, or burning the 
plant. To strengthen Mikania management, researchers and stakeholders first need a clear 
understanding of the governance relationships across the buffer zone community forests. 
Without information about the actors involved in Mikania management efforts on-the- 
ground, stakeholders will continue to lack the information necessary to successfully 
design or influence collective Mikania management efforts in Chitwan and elsewhere.    
Definitions and research questions. 
The term de jure (“by law”) is used to reflect the actors theoretically involved in 
Mikania management in the buffer zone, or the situation as it formally exists via laws, 
policies, and records. The term de facto (“in fact”) is used to reflect the actors truly 
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involved in Mikania management, explored in my fieldwork. To understand the de facto 
situation, case studies in five community forests are employed to explore the connections 
between the perceived effects of Mikania on livelihoods, the diversity in current Mikania 
management practices, and the relationship between these factors and existing institutions 
and governance relationships. The term “governance relationship” refers to interactions 
between different actors (including government agencies at different levels, non-
governmental organizations, community forest governance officials, and local 
community members) involved in a collective issue that results in the creation or 
reinforcement of institutions (Hufty, 2011).  
In general, little is understood about the role that Mikania plays in affecting the 
everyday lives of the buffer zone community forest residents, how the buffer zone 
community forest members interact with other actors regarding Mikania management, 
and the role of institutions in mediating threats to social-ecological systems. To address 
these scientific and management gaps, I focus on the following:   
1. Based upon the de jure institutional arrangements, what actors should be 
involved in Mikania management and what does Mikania management 
resemble de facto, or on-the-ground?    
2. How do norms alter the de jure institutional arrangements and influence 
community forests’ collective Mikania management activities? 
3. What lessons can be learned from this case study of Mikania management to 
inform the role of institutions in mediating collective action problems 
involving social-ecological challenges?  
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Community forestry and institutional heterogeneity.      
Recent research from around the globe has focused on the various factors that 
lead to successful community forestry outcomes, including common property 
management, power, and accountability (Agrawal & Chhatre, 2006; Behera & Engel, 
2006). Despite this prior work in Nepal (Ojha, 2006; Ojha, Cameron, & Kumar, 2009; 
Pokharel, 1997; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001), little is known 
about how different governance relationships between community forestry groups may 
mediate social-ecological challenges like invasive species management or what this 
means for how institutional analysis may be most effectively conducted (i.e. exploring 
the on-the-ground situation versus the formal situation)  
Community forestry often introduces decentralized, democratic governance where 
people within a given community contribute to decision making processes (Lachapelle, 
Smith, & McCool, 2004). However, heterogeneity exists among these institutions; some 
community forests target specific groups (including women or disadvantaged caste and 
ethnic groups) in an effort to correct long-enduring discrimination, inequality, and 
injustice, and there are substantial differences in community forest management practices 
or goals. Different institutional arrangements within Nepal appear to reflect underlying 
heterogeneity of the communities including the variation in biophysical condition of the 
forest (forest degradation/forest health), dominant labor occupation (community 
dependence on the forest resources and employment opportunities in nearby markets), 
and community dynamics and population size (Acharya, 2002).  
Institutional heterogeneity related to governance practices and management norms 
often exists within community forests in the same geographic region. Heterogeneity in 
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caste, education, gender, and other factors influence which households benefit the most 
from community forestry and who participates in collective resource management 
(Adhikari, 2005). Contrary to previous studies, richer households with land holdings, 
livestock, and more monetary resources are sometimes more dependent on community 
forest resources than poorer households, and thus are in a better position to benefit from 
intermediate forest products (Adhikari, 2005; Gilmour, Malla, & Nurse, 2004). The very 
poorest households often have few land holdings and work for others as wage laborers. 
The role of heterogeneity in collective management of common pool resources 
has been hotly debated in the literature (Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). Heterogeneity here 
refers to differences that might impact the success of reaching a collective goal. Kant 
(2000) defined this heterogeneity in three levels: (1) if there are social, cultural, and 
economic differences between people living in the same area using the same resources, 
there are likely to be (2) different preferences for using the resources and (3) different 
preferences for the ways in which resources are managed. Thus, heterogeneity 
theoretically can pose difficulties in successful collective action to manage a common 
pool resource (Ostrom, 2005).  Ostrom (2005) argues that the focus on heterogeneity has 
been misplaced; instead the focus should be on the factors affecting differences in 
heterogeneity, such as the governance relationships, and interactions between factors. 
Chitwan community forests formally have homogeneous structures: to become 
recognized as community forests by the government, a community forest governance 
committee must create management and governance plans that are reviewed by the 
district forest office or, if the community forest borders the national park (as in all of the 
case studies), the plans are reviewed by the park office. These two offices have similar 
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requirements, and thus these two organizations have created formally homogenous 
structures in the community forests in this area. Local community forest members are 
part of a community forest user group and each community forest has a locally elected 
governance committee. Committees typically consist of ten to fifteen members each. 
Households are eligible to join an established community forest user group based on their 
location within a community forest’s catchment area. These catchment areas are 
administrative boundaries that are determined by district and local level government (the 
latter known as the village development committee). The community forest governance 
committees are responsible for carrying out rules and policies outlined in their own forest 
management plans. These plans can be altered by the governance committees, but they 
are largely similar across community forests and include policies such as fees (if any) for 
grass and fodder collection; membership fee structures; rules for collection of resources 
such as fuelwood and timber (which is typically prohibited due to the general scarcity of 
harvest-ready trees); and possible sanctions for violating resource collection or use rules. 
Community forest members are informed of their committee’s policies when they join 
and are responsible for upholding the policies outlined in the management plan as well as 
informal norms such as aiding in activities like annual forest cleaning where trash is 
collected. Based on my 2014 fieldwork and 2015 household survey data, membership of 
eligible households in the buffer zone community forests ranges from 38 percent in 
forests near urban areas to 93 percent elsewhere; over 80 percent of buffer zone 
households engage in some form of agriculture and thus many rely on the forest 
resources.  
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Formal rules (de jure) versus rules in use (de facto).  
It is important to understand institutions as they exist formally, but entirely 
different and equally essential to understand how they operate in practice, the “rules in 
use” (Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994; Ostrom, 2005, p.186). Formally, as defined in 
forest management plans, the buffer zone community forest rules are very similar due to 
the aforementioned management plan procedures. Figure 2.2 details the actors that 
theoretically, de jure, would be involved in some aspect of Mikania management based 
on forestry acts or Nepal’s government structures that have established these actors. This 
analysis will explore the ways in which the de facto situation, the way institutions are 
operationalized, differs from the de jure situation depicted in figure 2.2 and why this 
matters. Ultimately, this research contributes three propositions based on the finding that 
the situations differ significantly – connecting governance relationships, common pool 
resources, and invasive plants – which lend insight into the role of institutions in 
mediating social-ecological challenges more generally.  
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Figure 2.2. Governance relationships involved in Mikania management in the buffer zone 
community forests in the de jure situation. Darker grey circles are local level actors, 
while lighter grey circles represent district or national level actors (non-governmental 
organizations—NGOs—are both).  
 
Case studies.  
Using data from five case study community forests, the relationship between 
governance, institutions, and invasive species management is explored. This research 
investigates the role of institutions as mediators of shocks and disruptive events that 
threaten community sustainability (Leach, Scoones, & Stirling, 2010). In Chitwan, these 
disruptions take the form of invasive plants as a threat to the social-ecological system. 
Institutions evolve over time and adapt to the social, political, economic, and ecological 
context in which they are embedded. When there are slow or gradual changes in this 
context, there is time and flexibility for institutions and relationships to successfully 
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adapt. Abrupt shocks, such as rapidly spreading invasive species, challenge these 
relationships and their sustainability (Young et al., 2006). 
Distinct from much community forestry literature, the focus is not on 
understanding collective action to establish community forestry programs (Varughese & 
Ostrom, 2001; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004), but rather on collectively acting to manage the 
forest in the face of potentially catastrophic social-ecological challenges like Mikania. An 
understanding of collective action on-the-ground is important for confronting common 
pool resource threats (Ostrom, 2005).   
Methods 
Case study selection and fieldwork.  
Five community forests were selected for household and management committee 
interviews from a group of 11 buffer zone community forests where ecological data, 
including Mikania distribution, was collected in 2013. To select case studies, first, a 
preliminary “governance capacity” index (high, medium, or low) based upon historical 
data related to community forest income (government funds and money community 
forest governance committees raised via selling resources such as gravel or tourist entry 
fees) and the community forest’s age (time since establishment) was created. The 
stratification process ensured cases included a mixture of historically high, medium, and 
low governance capacities. After classifying all community forests, a random number 
generator was used to assign numbers to each case. The community forests corresponding 
to the two largest values in the high and low categories, and the largest value in the 
medium category, were selected. This methodology was adopted to reduce any personal 
biases (such as personal experience or learned information about specific communities) 
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in selecting the cases and to increase the likelihood of variation in governance capacities. 
The five community forests in this research are identified by pseudonyms (the names of 
rivers in Nepal) because some of the information discussed is sensitive to these small 
communities. 
In total I conducted 29 semi-structured, small-group interviews with 87 
interviewees between May and July 2014. This method is the most appropriate way to 
understand the rules in use, as I was able to collect richer, more nuanced information than 
with other methods such as surveys. Five interviews were conducted in each community 
forest, which each included between two and ten participants. The remaining interviews 
took place in Chitwan National Park, two non-governmental organizations, and the buffer 
zone committee office. All interviews were between one and two hours in length. These 
interviews included questions covering interactions with a variety of individuals and 
organizations, Mikania management, and perceptions of Mikania; the semi-structured 
nature also allowed participants to discuss emergent topics (Bernard, 2011). Before 
interviewing, the protocol was translated to Nepali by a native Nepali speaker and tested 
with several community forestry members at the Institute for Social and Economic 
Research-Nepal (ISER-N) in Chitwan. Some concepts, such as “invasive species,” do not 
directly translate or have a meaning in Nepali. As such, translations were made to best 
approximate the intended meaning in English. Fieldwork additionally consisted of 
participant observation (of activities such as fodder collection) between and during 
interviews to more fully understand the contexts of the responses.  
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Types of interviewees and interview structure.   
To explore governance relationships, I interviewed community forest members, 
the five governance committee presidents, Chitwan National Park officials, buffer zone 
committee officials, and officials from two non-governmental organizations. Figure 2.2 
presented the de jure conceptual representation of the actors. The buffer-zone community 
forests are connected to the buffer zone committee, which generally acts as a mediator 
between the community forest governance committees and the national park. Most of the 
community forests in Chitwan are registered with either the district forest or Chitwan 
National Park; all of the case study forests except one were registered with Chitwan 
National Park (the remaining community forest was restricting resource collection due to 
poor forest health and intended to register with the park in the future).  
While interviews with community forest members usually focused on one 
individual or household, they almost always became group events where neighbors’ 
opinions were provided. The interviewee composition was representative of the ethnic 
composition and educational status of each of the community forests. It is possible that 
higher caste Hindus were underrepresented in the interviews and females were 
overrepresented. Young women (18-21 years) who were less likely to participate in an 
interview with males or older females present were under-represented; additionally, there 
were fewer young men, as many were working overseas. Both farmers and non-farmers 
were interviewed, but it was very difficult to find people that did not farm in some 
capacity. Interviews were also conducted with two non-governmental organizations 
consisting of representatives from NGO A and NGO B (pseudonyms), both working in 
Chitwan and with some of the case study community forests. These non-governmental 
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organizations are both conservation oriented and provide services to local households, 
such as wildlife and plant identification classes and habitat management/restoration 
information (for example, wetland management). Each non-governmental organization 
has worked with some local households on invasive plant management.  
Content analysis.   
Content analysis, also sometimes referred to as theme analysis, is a systematic 
text analysis method common in anthropology that is applicable in any research with text 
data. Content analysis can be both deductive, where the analyst begins with a hypothesis 
or an idea from the literature that they seek to assess, or inductive where codes stem from 
fieldwork and intimate knowledge of the data (Bernard, 2011). Content analysis can be 
quantitative or qualitative in nature. In this analysis, it is both. Some of the codes are 
quantitatively presented as percentages while others are discussed qualitatively in the 
context of participant observation notes or an entire interview. The codebook was 
developed according to best practices established by MacQueen et al. (1998). Two 
independent coders went through the codes together and calculated inter-rater reliability 
for each code in five interviews. In order to resolve codes where an initial Kappa (the 
standard inter-rater reliability statistic of agreement) of 0.7 or greater was not reached, 
coders discussed the codes for clarification and re-coded (MacQueen et al., 1998).  
Institutional analysis.  
Content and institutional analyses are natural complements for qualitative data 
that explores governance relationships, as themes can be interpreted in the context of 
governance relationships. There are a wide variety of approaches to institutional analysis, 
but in many cases the institutional analysis and development framework provides a 
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background to the interpretation of existing strategies, norms, and rules (Ostrom, 2011). 
Here, I focus on the actors and the action situation within the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework (figure 2.3) to explore linkages between governance 
relationships. There are a variety of actors interacting with community forest groups in 
some manner. The linkages between these actors, including the frequency and strength of 
the relationships, are distinct in the five case studies. Coding the interview data for the 
presence of these relationships aided in clarifying them, but initial diagrams of 
governance relationships and norms of interactions were created during fieldwork for 
each case. The institutional analysis examines the text and participant observation notes 
for the existing relationships between the participants theoretically involved in the action 
arena focused on Mikania management presented in figures 2.2 and 2.3. These 
relationships impact how information about Mikania is communicated and will be 
discussed qualitatively in the context of the information from the content analysis. Future 
research will elaborate on other areas of the framework in figure 2.3, including linking 
biophysical conditions of the forests to the action situation and related outcomes.  
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Figure 2.3. The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, adapted from 
Ostrom et al. (1994)  
 
Results 
Community forests are heterogeneous. 
Based on the similarity of most community forest management plans, I 
anticipated that the community forests would be similar in multiple aspects. In actuality, 
heterogeneity in governance is the norm and the de facto governance relationships (figure 
2.4) differ from the de jure situation (figure 2.2) across the five community forests. There 
is variation in the concern about Mikania, perceived extent and spread of Mikania within 
the forests, the physical methods used to manage Mikania, and organization of 
community members involved in management. Variation also exists in the major 
problems identified by each case study: invasive species, human-wildlife conflict, 
flooding, forest degradation, and pollution. There is substantial variation in community 
forest collaboration with outside entities, specifically non-governmental organizations 
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and the national park. Next, I elaborate on these variations and then expand upon the 
importance and impact of this heterogeneity.  
 
Figure 2.4. Governance relationships involved in Mikania management in the buffer zone 
community forests in the de facto situation. Faded circles and lines (the lightest grey) 
represent actors and relationships formally present that do not exist, or are significantly 
weaker, in practice.   
 
Perceptions of Mikania and impact on daily lives.  
Most interviewees in all five community forests believed that Mikania was 
increasing in abundance, while some thought Mikania presence in their forest was the 
same when compared to the previous year (figure 2.5). Interviewees in Trishuli, Koshi, 
and Gandaki (particularly women, who are responsible for most resource collection) 
expressed that Mikania was impacting how they allotted their daily time, by making 
collection of forest resources such as grasses and fodder increasingly difficult. 
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Interviewees in all five community forests articulated that increasing Mikania abundance 
limits food sources for wildlife, resulting in additional large fauna (e.g. tigers, rhinos, 
wild boar) leaving the forest in search of food.  
  
Figure 2.5. Perceptions of change in Mikania abundance over the past year, by 
community forest. 
Major problems identified in the community forests.  
There was substantial variation in the problems discussed by interviewees (table 
2.1). All interviewees were asked about flooding, issues experienced with wildlife (crop 
destruction, attacks, or related), invasive species, and the condition of community forest 
resources. Industrial pollution was mentioned without prompting in Gandaki; in this case 
three interviewees discussed an industrial factory that had discharged an unknown 
substance onto their field.   
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Table 2.1. Major problems identified in each community forest  
  Tamur Ghaghara Trishuli Koshi Gandaki 
Flooding       
Wildlife: Rhinos       
Wildlife: Elephants      
Wildlife: Tigers      
Wildlife: Deer and boar      
Mikania       
Stressed/Limited CF resources      
Industrial pollution      
 
Interviewees from all community forests discussed a lack of forest resources in 
some capacity, but in Koshi resource collection was prohibited (except for one collection 
day per month) due to forest health and wildlife conflict (rhino attacks). In Koshi, the 
Nepal Army was stationed at entrances and within the forest in an attempt to prevent and 
protect people from rhino attacks (the Nepal Army only provides guards to the 
community forests in severe cases where the governance committee has requested them 
through the buffer zone committee, who then contacts the national park where a request 
is typically placed with the district level government). Mikania as a problem was 
discussed by interviewees from every community forest, but only in Ghaghara and 
Trishuli was it perceived as a top problem. In these communities Mikania was identified 
as directly affecting livelihoods by increasing the time and distance to collect forest 
products.  
Mikania.   
All of the case study communities discussed invasive plant species and Mikania 
within their forests, but there was variation in the level of concern. As noted, Ghaghara 
and Trishuli were the most concerned about Mikania. Interviewees discussed its impact 
on the time it took to collect grasses, as well as an increase in the distance ventured into 
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the forest to collect grasses not engulfed by Mikania. There was also variation in removal 
methods (table 2.2). Interviewees in Trishuli and Gandaki discussed burning for Mikania 
management, as well as to promote grassland growth (note in Trishuli and Gandaki the 
governance committee presidents denied burning; it can be a contentious topic as burning 
is prohibited in many community forests). Cutting and pulling was mentioned in all 
communities. Pesticide use was only discussed in Tamur and Gandaki. Only one 
interviewee (in Koshi) reported seeing Mikania on their farmland, which was very near 
the community forest fence. Other interviewees strictly reported finding it in the forest 
and along the forest fence. One interviewee (the governance committee president of 
Ghaghara) reported a group he organizes to remove Mikania by uprooting it from within 
the forest and throwing it all into the nearby river.  
Table 2.2. Presence of Mikania and removal methods  
  Tamur Ghaghara Trishuli Koshi Gandaki 
Mikania (presence)      
Burning       
Cutting      
Pulling      
Pesticides      
 
Understanding governance relationships. 
The de facto governance relationships (figure 2.4) are distinct from the de jure 
situation (figure 2.2). I find that community forest members are largely isolated in 
managing Mikania. First, governance relationships are discussed generally. Then, 
interactions explicitly involving Mikania management and the implications of general 
relationships for Mikania management outcomes are considered. All community forest 
members interviewed reported some level of interaction with the buffer zone committee, 
and many reported indirectly conveying concerns to the national park through the buffer 
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zone committee members. The community forest governance committee in each forest 
communicates with the national park and buffer zone committee about a variety of issues 
relevant to the community forests. Several key differences between the cases are 
emphasized.  
Key differences in governance relationships.  
First, collaboration and interaction with non-governmental organizations is 
distinct in each case (non-governmental organization connections include all non-
governmental organizations working with the community forests, not only ones related to 
invasive plants). For instance, in Trishuli, non-governmental organizations are highly 
integrated, interacting with the governance committee, community forest members, and 
village development committees (local level government). They provide resources such 
as toilets and wells, and in some cases skills-based trainings. Gandaki presents the 
opposite case, as they have little to no integration with non-governmental organizations. 
Second, the strength of the relationships between different actors and community 
forest members differs. For instance, community forest members in each case have either 
direct or indirect connections with the national park. However, the level of trust in the 
national park is very different in each case (figure 2.6). In particular, members of Tamur, 
Trishuli, and Koshi reported low levels of trust in the national park. Trishuli members 
expressed concern that park officials were corrupt and sequestering monetary resources 
that could be shared with the buffer zone forests. Ghaghara members expressed lack of 
trust in their governance committee’s ability to follow through with promises, as well as 
distrust in park officials. 
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Figure 2.6. Percentages of interviewees expressing distrust by community forest.  
 
Finally, Gandaki is the only case study with significant ties to the district forest. 
They are not registered with the district forest, but because of their proximity to a 
highway and the district forest office, the district forest office occasionally communicates 
with the governance committee members.  
Governance relationships affect information and management decisions.  
Characteristics of governance relationships are impacting management. First, 
members in each case are making Mikania management decisions without consulting 
their governance committees or other actors, limiting the information available regarding 
the best ways to successfully remove Mikania. In some cases, community members are 
engaging in removal practices (such as burning) that increase its dispersal (Murphy et al., 
2013). The content analysis revealed that community forests with increased numbers of 
negative interactions (e.g., a community forest member’s request to Chitwan National 
Park for monetary compensation due to wildlife injury being ignored) are more likely to 
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have members that report distrust and less likely to seek information about management 
from outside sources. Second, in cases where Mikania is affecting time budgets and daily 
lives, people expressed that they lacked resources or relationships that could improve the 
management situation. Additionally, interviews revealed that there were conflicting 
perspectives between actors contributing to distrust and information availability. For 
example, a non-governmental organization (NGO) expressed the opinion that Mikania 
was not increasing and largely failed to consider community forest members’ opinions 
regarding Mikania spread and management; this lack of communication negatively 
impacted the relationship between the community forest and NGO. Currently, community 
forest interviewees report no interactions with the NGO as a result.  
Collective action and governance capacity. 
Collective efforts to manage invasive species exist in each of the community 
forests, but to differing degrees. The income of the community forests affects their 
governance capacity; this amount differs substantially based upon political connections, 
as well as differing resources and income streams. The buffer zone community forests 
registered with the national park receive annual funds distributed through the buffer zone 
committee to individual governance committees; the total amount of money available is 
impacted by political conditions, which have dramatically changed in recent years (see 
Karna, Shivakoti, & Webb, 2010). Some governance committees supplement this income 
with tourist entry fees or selling resources like gravel, but their ability to engage in such 
activities is limited by the condition of the forest and their available resources, resulting 
in differential income opportunity, and thus governance capacity, across community 
forests.  
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In Tamur and Ghaghara there were organized efforts to cut and pull Mikania 
within the forest directly following monsoon season for at least the past five years. 
Trishuli had “jungle cleaning” groups where specific plants were removed and the forest 
was cleaned of trash, but they were not centrally organized and were not necessarily 
targeting Mikania. Koshi and Gandaki did not participate in collective efforts to remove 
Mikania in the past year. Koshi members previously attempted to cut and pull Mikania, 
but because forest access is currently restricted there, they are no longer able to organize. 
Gandaki members reported that their community forest governance committee paid 
individuals to pull Mikania along the fence, but most community members did not know 
this. Gandaki also hired people to burn Mikania (this was denied by the governance 
committee president), but there were fewer voluntary efforts. 
Collective action was not tightly linked to historical governance capacity, as 
defined by income and how long the community forest officially existed. Governance 
capacity has changed in some of the case studies based on income and resources reported 
from the community forest governance committee presidents and field observations. 
Collective action related to Mikania removal was assessed as either high, medium, or low 
based on interviewee reports of and/or participation in such efforts (table 2.3).  
Table 2.3. The relationship between governance capacity and collective action.  
  Tamur Ghaghara Trishuli Koshi Gandaki 
Collective action 
observed in 2014 
High High Medium Low Low 
Governance capacity 
observed in 2014 
High 
 
Medium 
 
Low Low 
 
High 
Governance capacity  
assessed from historical       
data (1995-2009) 
Medium Low Low High High 
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Discussion  
Overall, the methodological approach provided insight into how unanticipated 
levels of institutional heterogeneity between community forests impact the management 
of a common pool resource invaded by Mikania. In figure 2.2, I outlined governance 
relationships in Chitwan community forests de jure, as they formally exist according to 
official agencies, laws, and policies. However, as the analysis detailed, these relationships 
look different on-the-ground. Figure 2.4 represents the de facto situation, with the 
relationships as they exist in practice. This study discovered that formal relationships 
were often absent in practice, in part due to practical restrictions like distance (such as the 
lack of communication between most of the community forests and the district forest 
office), but also because of broken or absent trust between actors. These absent or 
weakened relationships effectively isolated Chitwan community forest group members in 
their Mikania management efforts. The diversity of management behaviors across 
community forests is significant because it suggests that the community forest system in 
Chitwan has not implemented a consistent, effective, and unified strategy to address 
Mikania.  
Ostrom (2005) argued that institutional scholars need to understand better the 
factors that influence institutional heterogeneity, i.e., in this case, why are there 
differences in norms and strategies surrounding Mikania management efforts? The 
analysis of the governance relationships in Chitwan revealed that these relationships 
influence such differences. Research exploring de jure institutions has made critical and 
important contributions, but it is also important to understand de facto institutions. 
Indeed, I argue that investigating both the de jure and de facto situations can create a 
  50 
richer understanding of a given case, leading to more effective solutions in natural 
resource management that are able to target management weaknesses as they exist in 
practice. Understanding the de facto institutions is important because in natural resource 
management efforts, particularly top-down efforts or those implemented by outside actors 
like NGOs, false assumptions are frequently made about resource users, information, and 
relationships that exist (Blaikie, 2006; Leach, Mearns, & Scoones, 1999).  
It is likely that understanding the reasons for specific management decisions and 
the relationships between actors will improve efforts to manage Mikania, as 
understanding these relationships is the first step towards strengthening them. Here I 
present three propositions for addressing common pool resource management, with 
particular relevance to invasive plant species that have proven difficult to remove, an 
increasingly relevant issue globally (Chornesky et al., 2005). The first two focus on the 
importance of access to information and how institutions impact this access, while the 
third focuses on connections to the natural resource of interest. These propositions are 
informed by my case studies, but I posit that they provide transferable insight (see 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985) to research with other communities facing related social-
ecological challenges. 
Propositions: managing invasive plants in the context of common pool 
resource.  
1. Communities that have more trust-based interaction with non-government 
organizations and local government actors will have increased access to 
resource management information, which is likely to increase management 
success. 
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This study found that communities that interacted more frequently with non-
government organizations and government actors reported greater access to information 
on a variety of topics, including farming, construction, and education opportunities. In 
particular, communities with ties to NGO B had increased access to information about 
best practices for Mikania management and the management activities in which other 
communities had engaged. Communities that did not interact with these external 
organizations, either because they were too far away from them or they did not trust them 
(figure 2.6), lacked this information. In essence, these differences in relationships 
between community forest members and non-governmental organizations produce 
information asymmetries related to Mikania management and often leave community 
forest members isolated, with fewer management options and frustrating, unsuccessful 
removal attempts.  
Connections to non-governmental organizations and other actors are often 
considered part of social capital (McCarthy, 2014); these networks provide improved 
access to information (Matsaganis & Wilkin, 2015). Thus, strengthening the networks of 
relationships between non-governmental organizations and communities managing an 
invasive plant is likely to provide information benefits. While increased knowledge does 
not always lead to increased efforts to implement this knowledge (Finger, 1994), 
communities with knowledge about best practices for invasive plant removal and 
information regarding others’ efforts begin with an advantage over communities missing 
this information. Further, in communities that are already actively attempting to manage 
an invasive plant, new information may be implemented sooner. For instance, community 
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forest members noted they welcomed and needed new Mikania removal information 
because their current efforts often resulted in the plant growing back.  
Due to Nepal’s political conditions (currently a very new democracy) and limited 
resources in mid-level government agencies, it is unlikely that all of the management-
relevant relationships absent in the de facto situation could be quickly built or repaired. 
Thus, to manage Mikania, community forest members need to bolster bottom up 
collective action. While current district and national level government actors lack 
resources to significantly aid Mikania management, a combination of bottom up 
collective action and improved community relationships with actors such as the national 
park or district forest office could increase the success of bottom up management efforts. 
Improving the frequency and quality of relationships between community members, non-
governmental organizations, and government actors is demanding in practice and these 
relationships depend on the historical and cultural context of the corresponding 
community (Bebbington, 2004). In the context of Chitwan, overcoming distrust could 
begin with an effort from the national park and the non-governmental organizations in the 
area to increase the accessibility of their information and services (Agrawal & Gupta, 
2005).  
2. If resource users are struggling to manage common pool resource threats (like 
invasive species), an absence of valuable management information due to lack 
of trust between resource users and actors at different scales is potentially a 
contributing factor and a useful diagnostic starting point.  
When resource users are struggling to confront threats to their common pool 
resource, where can stakeholders begin to address the issue? First, stakeholders, including 
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the case study community forest governance committees, may confirm that the threat to 
the resource is an important issue to the local resource users. In this case, Mikania is 
perceived as increasing in all of the community forest groups (figure 2.5) and that it is 
viewed as a major problem in some cases (table 2.1). 
The interviews indicated that the initiative to collectively manage Mikania was 
present, but that community members’ current efforts had largely been frustrating and 
unsuccessful, as Mikania typically returned. Additionally, distrust inhibited access to 
relevant management information and resources (figure 2.6). This analysis highlighted 
the importance of understanding the on-the-ground situation, as opposed to exclusively 
studying the de jure situation, as many of the relationships present in the de jure situation 
were absent or weakened in part due to trust issues. 
The idea that trust matters is intuitive in common pool resource management, but 
there is a dearth of empirical and systematic studies of trust in the common pool resource 
literature (Ostrom, 2010); this systematic analysis of interview data lends scientific 
support to the importance of unpacking trust in common pool resource management. 
Community forest members’ lack of trust between the national park and/or their 
governance committees resulted in isolation, where members managed Mikania alone or 
opted out of management entirely. The precise definition of trust is contentious in 
literature from a variety of scholarly fields (Heemskerk, Duijves, & Pinas, 2015). Here, 
trust refers to whether a partner organization or individual can be depended upon, 
whether they respect the interests of others, and if they are competent in acting upon their 
agreements (Dirks, 1999; Heemskerk et al., 2015). It is difficult to quantify and when 
resource users and managers hold different levels of power, distrust among actors can 
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result when power is abused (Dhiaulhaq, De Bruyn, & Gritten, 2015). Trust has been 
found to be central in natural resource management contexts generally, but is not as 
frequently explored in the context of common pool resources. For example, along with 
boundary spanning leadership (leadership that connects actors at different levels and of 
different types), trust has been shown to be vital in successful water management 
(Edelenbos & van Meerkerk, 2015). There are numerous studies exploring techniques to 
build trust. Berkes (2009) discussed the importance of trust in implementing successful 
co-management of natural resources and elaborated the vital role that bridging 
organizations play in cultivating trust between stakeholders. It has also been found that 
strong leaders can be instrumental in building trust (Folke et al., 2005), social learning 
processes can build trust in the context of natural hazards planning (Henly-Shepard, 
Gray, & Cox, 2015), and the participation of stakeholders can improve public trust in 
natural resource management (Reed, 2008). In order to strengthen the fairness and 
effectiveness of natural resources management, it is important both for governments to 
reach out to local resource users to nurture trust and for local resource users to 
reciprocate efforts to become trustworthy (Heemskerk, Duijves, & Pinas, 2015).  
There are fewer examples exploring what happens when trust is entirely lacking 
in governance relationships and how this influences the social-ecological system. One 
notable example is Heemskerk et al. (2015), who found that distrust among actors was 
detrimental in the management of mineral resources in Suriname, where distrust actively 
impacted natural resource policies and outcomes. Distrust is not only important in 
shaping policy perceptions but also prohibits communication and information flow 
  55 
among resource users, inhibiting effective natural resource management (Bodin, Crona, 
& Ernstson, 2006).  
Trust is important in shaping institutions on-the-ground, including how 
institutions are upheld and interpreted. An essential finding is that trust is sometimes 
deficient between community forest members and their own governance committees 
(figure 2.6). This is important because these committees are not typically viewed as 
“outsiders,” imposing rules and practices that are viewed as insensitive towards the 
community they are intended to serve. Instead these management committees have in the 
past been viewed as working for households and integral to sustainable resource 
governance. This distrust could in part be a reflection of the lack of ethnic diversity in 
management committees (committee members primarily belong to the higher socio-
economic status Brahmin/Chhetri ethnicity, whereas communities are more diverse). This 
study cannot discern the precise factors promoting distrust between members and 
governance committees, but it is an important area for future research. Davenport et al. 
(2006) studied natural resource management and trust in communities located near the 
Midewin Tallgrass National Prairie in Illinois, United States and detailed the critical 
importance of trust between the local community and the Forest Service (responsible for 
the prairie’s administration) in effective management. Although the local communities 
were not utilizing the prairie for resource extraction, but recreation, the study underscores 
the importance of identifying and encouraging trust between resource users and local 
resource managers for sustainable management.  
In Chitwan, where distrust is present, information availability was impacted 
(figure 2.4). When trust was lacking between the community forest members and either 
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their governance committee or the national park, the relationship between the community 
forest members and other actors suffered. Members reported less communication with 
participants they did not trust, which impacted Mikania management information. Well 
defined institutions in the forms of norms and cognitive structures can strengthen and 
engender interpersonal trust, as well as trust among different actors and organizations 
(Fuglsang & Jagd, 2015).  
Importantly, both propositions 1 and 2 argue that institutional norms and 
relationships are influencing information, and that information matters for successful 
common pool resource management. By articulating differences in governance 
relationships and management norms, the reasons for differences in information access 
become clearer and can be addressed to improve management efforts.   
3. Specific to community forests: Community forests that provide more 
resources to members will exhibit greater potential to collectively manage 
invasive plants and resources due to greater buy-in/reliance on forest 
resources 
The relationship between governance capacity and collective action is not entirely 
clear from the literature. Collective action has played a vital role common pool resource 
management in numerous global contexts (Agrawal, 2001; Agrawal, 2003; Ostrom, 2005, 
p.200) and this research supports that people are more likely to engage in collective 
action for Mikania management when they are more reliant on the community forest 
resources. Monetary and social resources have a positive relationship with governance 
capacity, and as this capacity increases, people may have greater access to a collectively 
managed resource and incentive to organize to manage it (Coaffee & Healey, 2003). 
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Governance capacity and collective action for Mikania management were closely linked 
in Tamur and Koshi, moderately linked in Ghaghara and Trishuli, and not closely linked 
in Gandaki (table 2.3). Supporting this proposition, in Koshi, the condition of the forest is 
very poor, the community forest governance committee has little resources, and the 
members are forced to rely less on these resources. In turn, members reported being less 
invested in maintaining the forest and organizing collective action for Mikania 
management. In Tamur, the condition of the forest is much better, the community forest 
governance committee has more income, and the members have greater access to fodder 
collection and timber resources. These members reported annual instances of collective 
action to both clean the community forest of trash and manage Mikania. Gandaki, the 
urban community in this study, represents a caveat to part of the proposition. This 
community forest has a high governance capacity, but a very low level of collective 
action for Mikania management. This deviation is likely due in part to Gandaki’s urban 
location; it has very close proximity to a city and a highway. Thus, despite the 
community forest governance committee’s capacity to maintain the community forest and 
provide members with access to these resources, the members are less dependent on 
forest resources as they have a variety of livelihood opportunities available in the nearby 
city.   
The perception that Mikania is increasing in all cases (figure 2.5), combined with 
identification of Mikania as a major problem in two cases (table 2.1), is an indication that 
people are frustrated by its impact on their forest resources. Women in particular 
identified having their daily time budgets altered, amplified vulnerability to wildlife 
attacks, and worrying about resource availability due to increasing Mikania. External 
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factors related to the differential income potential available to each community forest 
governance committee influence a committee’s ability to enhance governance capacity, 
including reducing potential social programs. Committees with fewer monetary resources 
could begin to enhance the quality of the resource, and the value members receive from 
membership, by seeking and sharing information on Mikania management best practices. 
Members that are more reliant on the resources and best able to utilize them are the most 
likely to participate in collective action to maintain them (Lise, 2000). Thus, this may 
increase collective action potential, reduce Mikania, and simultaneously have benefits for 
women. 
Through elucidation of the de facto institutions involved in collective efforts to 
manage Mikania, these propositions are a useful starting point for understanding how 
institutions mediate collective action problems involving social-ecological challenges 
such as invasive species. Understanding institutions is vital to successful common pool 
resource management (Becker & Ostrom, 1995; Ostrom et al., 1994; Tang, 1991) and can 
potentially aid community members and other stakeholders in designing systems to 
address issues that prohibit successful management such as lack of trust and information 
barriers.  
Conclusion 
While institutional research has stressed that there are no one-size-fits-all 
solutions (Ostrom, 2007), the approach presented here can be employed to understand de 
facto governance relationships in any region to inform resource management plans that 
address the idiosyncrasies of a given situation, such as varying levels of trust and the 
community of interest’s goals. The propositions presented in this chapter provide 
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stakeholders a generalizable starting point for addressing institutions and relationships 
that impact invasive plant management and common pool resource management 
generally.  
This study contributes knowledge relevant to the Chitwan case study participants, 
as well contributing more broadly to an understanding of the complexities involved in 
managing invasive plants and other disruptive events that threaten social-ecological 
systems, an increasingly important issue globally (Chornesky et al., 2005). It is my hope 
that in the context of Chitwan, this detailed understanding of governance relationships 
and norms related to management as they actually exist on-the-ground will support 
successful efforts to manage Mikania and other invasive plants. The key 
recommendations from this study related to institutional design are to foster norms of 
trust between actors and to implement well-defined management rules. The former has 
the potential to improve the flow of information pertinent to management decisions 
(Levin & Cross, 2004), while the latter has been shown to improve resource management 
in many cases (Anderies, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2004). One potential way to advance trust 
and strengthen relationships between resource users and other actors in this case study 
and beyond is for government actors to address problems viewed as critical by resource 
users (e.g. in Chitwan, wildlife attacks and flooding). Addressing issues that immediately 
threaten resource users’ daily experiences may augment community trust in government 
actors and bolster community efforts to manage invasive species, through freed time and 
expanded information access, improving the quality of their lives in multiple ways.  
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CHAPTER 3 
MOVING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY: INTEGRATING INTER- AND INTRA-
GENERATIONAL EQUITY INTO INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Chapter Overview 
Sustainability is often conceptualized as including equity in addition to 
environment and economy. However, this chapter argues that despite the institutional 
literature’s numerous contributions to sustainability research, institutional literature has 
typically failed to consider equity. A statistical model integrating equity in terms of 
income, wealth, and ethnic and caste access to natural resources is presented. The model 
is operationalized using a case study of community forestry in Chitwan, Nepal focusing 
on household access to forest resources through membership in a community forest user 
group. A first step in understanding equity for sustainable resource management is an 
assessment of who has rights to access. Although an important first step, often in 
community forestry work there is a presumption of membership for a local population 
without empirical examination of who is excluded. Membership in Chitwan is influenced 
by the degree of reliance on the forest resources, income, and ethnicity. These findings 
are explored in the context of livelihood transitions and the historic role of ethnicity in 
Nepal and the rationale for integrating equity into institutional studies more frequently is 
addressed. 
Introduction 
Over the past four decades, scholars of the Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory 
and Policy Analysis developed and utilized the institutional analysis and development 
(IAD) framework (Ostrom et al., 1994) to understand governance of the world around us, 
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but the IAD framework has not been operationalized to fully capture the breadth of 
sustainability (Cole et al., 2014). Sustainability has been defined in myriad ways, but 
often has been conceptualized with the “triple bottom line diagram,” where the 
intersection of environment, economy, and equity is characterized as achieving 
sustainability (Hansmann et al., 2012). Although the institutional literature has made 
significant contributions to scientific understanding of the environment and economy, 
scholars frequently fail to incorporate or consider the third component of sustainability, 
equity (Barnaud & Van Paassen, 2013). In this chapter, the attributes of the community 
are unpacked to explore equity in community forestry membership within a case study of 
21 forests in Chitwan, Nepal. Then, a richer conceptualization and integration of equity 
within the IAD framework is presented. 
Community forestry is a type of locally governed, decentralized forest 
governance. There can be numerous social benefits to community forest membership 
(Adhikari et al., 2007), but the primary benefit is arguably increased access to natural 
resources, including non-timber forest products and, to a lesser extent, timber. The 
relationship between household wealth or income and natural resource use is diverse; 
even within small, rural communities there may be differences in resource use among 
households within the same income level, and poorer households do not always extract 
the most natural resources (Cavendish, 2000). However, often as household wealth and 
income increase, reliance on and benefit from natural resources decreases relative to 
lower income households (Turner et al., 2007). The relationship between household 
socioeconomic status and environmental degradation is complex and in some cases 
reinvestment and intensification of agriculture by higher income households may lead to 
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increased resource extraction (Scherr, 2000). Both in urbanizing regions (such as parts of 
Chitwan) and more isolated rural communities, markets for products and labor are critical 
to understanding natural resource governance; yet global labor markets and flows of 
remittances are often overlooked. This research explicitly explores the impact of 
globalization through labor markets that allow Chitwan residents to work abroad and 
send remittances, changing household structures, livelihood strategies, and natural 
resource use. This critical teleconnection affects and connects the developing world to 
wider economic and employment opportunities, and in turn influences the ability of 
communities to sustainably manage natural resources for future generations. 
In Nepal, the 1993 Community Forestry Act granted communities use and 
management rights of forests, while the national government retained official ownership 
of the land. The government designated areas with land available for community 
management, such as those adjacent to Chitwan National Park, known as the buffer zone, 
and communities organized and registered with the government prior to gaining official 
recognition and access to the land and forestry resources. All of the case study forests 
presented here fall within or very near the buffer zone of Chitwan National Park; the 
national park oversees management plans, fiscal accounts, and forestry conditions. The 
community forests in the study were officially recognized by the national government 
five years ago, on average, but there is variability and some of the forests were 
established in the mid-1990s. Households do not live within the community forests, but 
rather live nearby; eligible member households live within a catchment area, designated 
by the local level of government, called the village development committee. These 
catchment area boundaries were established by the (primarily district level) government 
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in order to limit harvesting pressure on any particular forest, fitting one of Ostrom’s 
(2005) Design Principles establishing clear boundaries for user groups. Each community 
forest in Chitwan is governed by a community forest governance committee, elected by 
its members who establish management plans. Governance committees enforce the 
management plans including rules regarding resource collection and use and they collect 
any fees or fines. They additionally provide some welfare programs such as extra 
fuelwood and other resources for impoverished households, and provide various 
economic development, educational, and environmental programs for the benefit of the 
community and forest. To become a member of a community forest, households pay a 
membership fee (typically a one-time fee); some community forests also require other 
fees, or purchase of tickets, for collection of resources like grasses, thatch, and firewood. 
A few of the community forests offer timber sales to member households, but these sales 
are typically irregular for most Chitwan community forests due to the ecological 
conditions (i.e. there are not many mature, harvest-ready trees). Community forestry in 
Nepal has been widely hailed as a global model because of the locally created 
management plans, with their associated rules and boundaries, graduated sanctions, and 
nested governance structure which has reduced forest degradation while promoting 
development within the community (see Gilmour (2003) for an overview of community 
forestry in Nepal more generally). This success mirrors many of the design principles for 
successful common pool resource management (Ostrom, 2005), but less attention has 
been paid to issues associated with intra- and inter-generational equity.    
When intra-generational equity, or equity within a single generation, is examined 
as an important issue, there are sometimes cases where tension exists in management of 
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resources for biodiversity or economic development. In some cases, there has been 
evidence that better management of natural resources increases the ability of elites to 
capture rents, which may enhance the economy in the aggregate and the resource base, 
but increases inequity (Persha & Andersson, 2014). Studies of intra-generational equity 
within community forestry largely focus on community members, but here equity is 
examined starting with a more fundamental question: who has access to community 
forest resources in Chitwan via household membership?  
This work builds upon the extensive literature of new institutional scholarship 
examining community forestry governance and common pool resource management (see 
Ostrom, 2005). Within this literature, there is a recognition that the first step in 
understanding equity for sustainable resource management is an assessment of who has 
rights to access (Ostrom, 2005), yet there is a dearth of literature that actually examines 
this question empirically. In this chapter, a multi-level model is developed to explore who 
has access to natural resources by unpacking the factors that influence community forest 
membership in Chitwan.  
The Action Arena, the gray area in figure 3.1, of the IAD framework is relatively 
well studied and understood (Ostrom, 2005), but there is a need to better understand how 
community attributes (such as sociodemographics and livelihoods) affect membership 
and heterogeneity among resource users (Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). This concern is 
extended to examine how heterogeneity of members may be related to inequity and intra-
generational sustainability; intra-generational sustainability is a first step towards 
ensuring there are resources available to future generations (inter-generational 
sustainability). The model presented in this chapter is a contribution towards this goal.  
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Figure 3.1. Unpacking Attributes of Community in the IAD framework 
 
Sustainability, community forestry, and equity. 
Community forestry research has examined sustainable common pool resource 
management (Charnley & Poe, 2007); this work reinforces the Design Principles that 
Elinor Ostrom (2005; 1990) developed. Community forestry includes diverse programs 
that incorporate local governance and management of forest resources. The Nepalese 
community forestry program has been hailed as one of the world’s most successful 
(Acharya, 2002) and by many measures has achieved its initial goals of providing 
community access to resources while simultaneously reducing forest degradation through 
overharvesting (Bhattarai & Ojha, 2001). The community forestry program in Nepal has 
provided natural resources that are indispensable to a predominantly agricultural 
workforce (Baral & Subedi, 2000; Rai & Scarborough, 2014). In this sense, the economic 
and ecological aspects of community forestry, two elements of sustainability, have been 
widely considered. However, it is not clear whether the third aspect of sustainability, 
equity, has been achieved; partially this is due to more limited scholarly activity 
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(Agarwal, 2013). Thus to achieve sustainability, researchers and practitioners need to 
understand how community forestry has impacted not only rural development and forest 
conditions, but also equitability of resource distribution and access.  
Understanding who has access to natural resources is an important issue globally, 
but it is particularly vital in the context of developing countries. Historical and social 
processes have ensured that specific ethnic groups in developing countries are 
disproportionately disadvantaged in educational and economic opportunities. In Nepal, 
historical displacement of indigenous groups and a caste system shaped the social 
structure and unequal relationships between ethnic groups that persist in many present 
situations (Jha, 2014).  
Income inequality is another important indicator of inequality, which is frequently 
measured with the Gini coefficient, a measure of statistical dispersion producing a ratio 
that was developed to assess national income inequality (Deininger & Squire, 1996). The 
ratio ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 representing complete inequality (for example, all income 
is controlled by one person) and 0 representing a completely equal distribution of income 
(Kennedy et al., 1996). One critique of the Gini coefficient is that it is an oversimplified 
and relative measure, which is often incorrectly used and misinterpreted (Cobham & 
Sumner, 2013). Thus, it is important to keep in mind that the Gini coefficient does not 
provide information on absolute changes in income, as may be of interest for economic 
development, so it should be used in tandem with other measures, including qualitative 
context. Within Nepal, it has been used to assess income inequality between community 
forest member households in Nepal (Sharma, 2009).  
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Community forest membership is often an important indicator of the resources 
eligible households have access to, yet few previous studies have explicitly considered 
how community forest membership mediates access to natural resources important to 
agricultural households. Coulibaly-Lingani et al. (2011) explored factors that influenced 
established community forest members’ access to forest products in Burkina Faso and 
Maskey et al. (2006) examined aspects that motivated the level of participation in 
community forest management decisions. Because much of the research on community 
forestry bounds the study with members, it is unclear what factors influence the decision 
to become a member in contexts where households must register and pay a fee to join.  
How access to common pool resources is determined represents both a key to sustainably 
managing the resource, and to preventing over-harvesting (Ostrom, 1990), but also an 
important determination of sustainability writ large if exclusion is exacerbating inequity 
within the community. Thus, this study presents an opportunity to begin with a 
fundamental examination of who joins and who is excluded from a community-managed 
common-pool resource critical to livelihoods within a developing country context. 
Case study. 
In the western Chitwan case study, 34 percent of the survey sample consisted of 
nonmember households. The survey sample is described in detail in the methods section. 
A household may be a nonmember by purposeful choice, or through a barrier it cannot 
overcome. In Chitwan, all of the community forests have some sort of barrier to entry; 
these are rules regarding where a household is located, as well as fees. The fees vary 
across the forest, although very few nonmembers (three percent) cited fees as being 
problematic. Rather the most common reasons nonmember households cited for not 
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joining include distance to the forest (i.e. a household is too far away from the resource 
for it to be practical, which is by far the most common reason for nonmembership) and 
disagreement with a community forest governance committee’s policies. The goal is to 
better understand additional household attributes that may drive the decision to join a 
community forest or not. 
Model Development 
Household level.  
Technology: ownership of dairy animals and use of firewood.  
It is likely that a household’s reliance on natural resources, which they expect will 
be available via obtaining community forest membership, will increase the likelihood of 
becoming a community forest member. Agricultural households are more likely to need 
access to forest resources than non-agricultural households (Adhikari et al., 2004). 
Specifically, households that own dairy animals (such as buffalo, cows, sheep, and goats) 
need access to grasses and fodder to care for these animals. Without membership, 
agricultural households have limited legal access to forest resources such as grasses and 
fodder; the only remaining access to these products is to purchase on the market, gather 
along the roads or small public areas such as schoolyards, or own extensive lands to 
provide fodder (which is very uncommon). While agricultural households without 
farmland rely on access to forest grasses and fodder, they do not rely on these forests to 
the same extent for fuel wood and timber resources. Many of the Chitwan buffer zone 
community forests provide limited timber resources to members, often due to lack of 
timber ready for harvest. Buffer zone households have other ways of accessing and 
collecting fuel wood for cooking and heating. Thus, while this resource is important to 
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consider and could be a significant influence on membership in other regions, this 
research does hypothesize that a household’s use of fuel wood will be an important 
indicator of community forestry membership in Chitwan because most community forests 
limit access to fuelwood for members due to dearth of supply. 
Dairy animals are coded as a continuous variable representing the number of dairy 
animals the household owns. Firewood usage is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the 
household uses firewood for cooking, and 0 otherwise. 
Income. 
The literature contains mixed evidence regarding the influence of household 
income on use of community forest resources. For instance, lower income households 
might be less able to join a community forest if the fees are too high and lower income 
groups have been found to receive fewer benefits from community forestry in many 
instances (Adhikari, 2005). Higher income households are often better positioned to take 
advantage of intermediate forest resources (Acharya, 2005) while very high-income 
households may not need forest products and may opt not to become members. 
Income was measured as total household income from all sources in the past year, 
including wages, salaries, pensions, income from selling crops, animals, or goods, 
income from renting houses, land or equipment, business income, or income from gifts or 
other payments. This was coded as an ordinal variable representing seven income 
categories. 
Ethnicity/caste.  
Nepal has a complex social structure with castes and ethnicity historically playing 
a role in access to resources and livelihood strategies (Pokharel, 2011). Since the mid-20th 
  70 
century, Chitwan has been the site of extensive internal migration within Nepal; minority 
households from the Hills have moved to access land and economic opportunities 
(Shrestha, 1989). In Nepal, the Brahmin and Chhetri are religious castes of higher status, 
the Newar is a middle caste associated with trade and shop-keeping, the Hill Janajati and 
Terai Janajati are indigenous groups with a historically lower socioeconomic status, and 
Dalit are a religious caste with historically lower socioeconomic status (Stash & Hannum, 
2001). Minority households are classified into four dummy variables, with the non-
minority ethnicity (Brahmin/Chhetri) serving as the reference case. The variables 
represent the Hill Janajati (indigenous ethnicity historically from the mountains and hills 
in Nepal), Dalit, Newar, and Terai Janajati (indigenous ethnicity from the Terai, which 
includes Chitwan). In many cases, minority access to locally governed natural resources 
is underrepresented (Gilmour et al., 2004). I anticipate that minority households may be 
underrepresented in community forest memberships.   
Receipt of remittances from household members abroad. 
Both migration into the region and the temporary absence of individuals working 
abroad are very common in Chitwan (Bohra & Massey, 2009). Households that are 
receiving remittances from family members abroad tend to have higher incomes than 
strictly agricultural households. Increased income combined with increasing market 
access in Chitwan provides some households the opportunity to begin to shift their 
dependence on agriculture and the need to harvest their own natural resources (Acharya, 
2011). Thus, remittances may reduce the need to access natural resources and decrease 
the likelihood of joining a community forest. Household remittances were coded as the 
number of household members currently away who sent remittances in the past year 
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(information regarding the total amount of income received exclusively from remittances 
was unavailable; future work will seek to assess the impact of remittances in distinct 
ways, including collecting the total monetary value of remittances received).  
Household size. 
Most of the households in Chitwan are agricultural (over 80 percent). It follows 
that households with more individuals require increased natural resources to support their 
lifestyle. It is anticipated that larger households will have a higher rate of community 
forest membership in an effort to access these resources. Household size is coded as the 
number of household members.  
Household distance from community forest center. 
In the Chitwan household survey, 179 nonmember households (51 percent) 
identified distance to the forest as a barrier to membership. Previous studies have found 
that distance to other natural resources influences access and usage, especially when 
human-wildlife or armed conflicts are present (Stites et al., 2010). Here, it is proposed 
that distance to the community forest will influence a household’s ability to regularly 
access the forest resources, and thus the likelihood they will join. Distance was calculated 
as the kilometers between the interviewed household and the center of the nearest 
community forest. 
Community level. 
Gini coefficient. 
At the community forest level, community forests with higher levels of income 
inequality may have lower membership rates. The Gini coefficient is employed to assess 
the level of income inequality within 21 community forests in Chitwan and explore 
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whether potential income heterogeneity between the community forests impacts 
membership decisions.  
Methods 
The analysis utilizes a sub-set of a 2014 survey consisting of 1041 households in 
the catchment area of 21 community forests located in the buffer zone in Chitwan (194 
households surveyed outside the community forest catchment area were excluded, 
because these households were ineligible for community forest membership based on 
their location). The survey was implemented in 2014 with a response rate of 98.6 percent. 
Using this robust dataset, a multilevel model is developed to explore the factors 
influencing community forest membership, as a lens to examine equity in access to forest 
resources. Multilevel models are useful for accounting for group effects in a dataset 
(Steele 2008). Not accounting for group effects in grouped data will likely violate the 
assumption of independence in an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. While there 
are ways of accounting for group effects in OLS regression, such as using dummy 
variables to represent groups, such approaches risk over fitting the model when there are 
a large number of groups (Steele, 2008). Here, the data are structured in terms of 
households (level 1) within community forest catchment areas (level 2).  
As the dependent variable (membership) is binary, a binary logistic model is 
fitted. Member and nonmember households are present across the 21 community forest 
catchment areas. Table 3.1 presents this breakdown in detail. Overall, about two-thirds 
(690/1041) of eligible households have joined a community forest, but this varies from a 
low of 38 percent to a high of 93 percent. 
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Table 3.1. Membership dependent variable categories by community forest 
Community forest Non-member HHs Member HHs Total 
1 18 33 51 
2 5 39 44 
3 11 35 46 
4 27 34 61 
5 15 34 49 
6 14 34 48 
7 16 33 49 
8 22 28 50 
9 10 39 49 
10 15 35 50 
11 33 31 64 
12 20 32 52 
13 3 38 41 
14 36 22 58 
15 13 34 47 
16 12 27 39 
17 12 33 45 
18 14 33 47 
19 10 33 43 
20 36 28 64 
21 9 35 44 
Total 351 690 1041 
 
The independent variables included in the specification are presented in table 3.2, 
with descriptive statistics following in table 3.3. The model was implemented in R 
(version 3.1.2) using the lme4 package (version 1.1-9).  
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Table 3.2. Multilevel membership model variables 
Variable  Type  Description   
Dairy_animals Continuous Number of dairy animals owned by a household  
Ethnicity_2  Binary Ethnicity of the head of household; coded 1 if Hill 
Janajati 
Ethnicity_3  Binary Ethnicity of the head of household; coded 1 if Dalit 
Ethnicity_4 Binary  Ethnicity of the head of household; coded 1 if Newar 
Ethnicity_5  Binary Ethnicity of the head of household; coded 1 if Terai 
Janajati 
Use_firewood Binary Household use of firewood; coded 1 if the household 
uses firewood 
HH_size Continuous Number of individuals in a household 
HH_remittances Continuous Number of individuals abroad sending remittances to a 
household 
Income Categorical  Household income, categorized into seven ascending 
categories based on survey 
HH_dist_CF          Continuous  The distance (in kilometers) of a household from the 
center of the closest community forest  
CF_gini Continuous  The Gini index of a community forest, based on 
household income  
 
Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics of multilevel membership model variables  
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Mean 0.663 3.072 0.159 0.127 0.037 0.170 0.740 5.281 0.586 3.384 0.469 
Standard 
error 0.015 0.098 0.011 0.010 0.006 0.012 0.014 0.069 0.024 0.079 0.001 
Median 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 2 0.476 
Mode 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 1 0.425 
Standard 
deviation 0.473 3.155 0.366 0.333 0.188 0.376 0.439 2.240 0.766 2.541 0.036 
Sample 
variance 0.224 9.954 0.134 0.111 0.035 0.141 0.193 5.019 0.587 6.458 0.001 
Kurtosis -1.53 5.516 1.474 3.052 22.55 1.098 -0.81 2.561 2.660 -1.54 -1.06 
Skewness -0.69 1.599 1.863 2.246 4.950 1.759 -1.09 1.281 1.450 0.440 0.345 
Range 1 29 1 1 1 1 1 15 5 6 0.108 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.425 
Maximum 1 29 1 1 1 1 1 16 5 7 0.533 
Sum 690 3197 166 132 38 177 770 5497 610 3523 488.7 
Count 1041 1041 1041 1041 1041 1041 1041 1041 1041 1041 1041 
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Results 
The model revealed that ownership of dairy animals and household size are 
positively associated with being a community forest member and that belonging to the 
Hill Janajati or Dalit ethnicities, income, and a household’s distance to the closest 
community forest are negatively associated with being a community forest member (table 
3.4). These results are consistent with previous literature and the hypotheses discussed. 
Belonging to the Terai Janajati minority ethnicity, household use of firewood, a 
household’s receipt of remittances from household members abroad, and a community 
forest-level measure of income inequality are not significantly correlated with community 
forest membership. Table 3.5 presents regression results for eight model specifications, 
each including one independent variable to assess its relationship with membership alone. 
Each of the variables alone has the same sign and significance as in the final model 
version with all variables included. This indicates there is not strong colinearity between 
the independent variables. Potential reasons for these findings are discussed next. 
Table 3.4. Multilevel membership model regression results  
Level 1 (HH) Estimate Standard error 
Intercept  1.07566 2.09252    
Dairy_animals 0.16319*** 0.02898    
Ethnicity_2 (Hill Janajati) -1.04440*** 0.23224   
Ethnicity_3 (Dalit) -0.71965*** 0.25293   
Ethnicity_4(Newar) -0.15315 0.39821   
Ethnicity_5 (Terai Janajati) -0.38262 0.25627   
Use_firewood -0.05036 0.18111   
HH_size 0.08630*** 0.03735    
HH_remittances 0.03512 0.10683    
Income -0.06680** 0.03179   
HH_dist_CF           -0.51833***    0.13358   
Level 2 (CF)   
CF_gini 0.48778     4.07159    
p < 0.001 ‘***’ p < 0.01 ‘**’; N = 1041 HH, 21 CFs 
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Table 3.5. Relationship of each independent variable with membership 
Model  Estimate (Standard error)  
Model  1 (dairy_animals) 0.18057***(0.02766)    
Model  2 (ethnicity)    ethnicity_2 
                                    ethnicity_3 
                                    ethnicity_4 
                                    ethnicity_5 
-0.8821*** (0.2022) 
-0.6733*** (0.2283)  
-0.2593       (0.3781)       
-0.2726       (0.2389)      
Model  3 (use_firewood) 0.0062         (0.1657)    
Model  4 (HH_size) 0.12309***(0.0329) 
Model  5 (HH_remittances)  0.13980       (0.0916)    
Model  6 (income)  -0.002151*   (0.0271) 
Model  7 (HH_dist_CF) -0.4080*** (0.1123)   
Model  8 (CF_gini) 3.766           (3.829)    
p < 0.001 ‘***’ p < 0.01 ‘**’; N = 1041 HH, 21 CFs 
Discussion 
The results highlight two important themes that influence access to natural 
resources: social structure and livelihood transitions. These concepts, the role of 
household distance from a community forest, and the potential role of community forest-
level income inequality are unpacked in order to understand these indicators of access to 
resources and equity in locally governed common pool resource systems.  
Social structure matters. 
There is local debate regarding how caste and demographics affect community 
forest membership, which largely centers on whether lower castes, many of which are 
indigenous groups, were stripped of access via formalization of the community forests 
and creation of local user groups to manage these forests. The evidence is decidedly 
mixed depending on where the research is done and how the lower castes and 
socioeconomic classes are defined, yet it clearly remains a concern within the nation via 
policies that implement ethnicity quotas in community forest management.  
In this case it does appear that Brahmin/Chhetri are more likely to be members of 
a community forest than Dalit; additionally, all of the community forest presidents are 
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also Brahmin/Chhetri, which echoes prior work such as Yadav et al. (2015). But the 
survey data demonstrate that the fees set in Chitwan forests are not cost prohibitive, with 
only three percent of nonmembers reporting that high fees were a reason for not joining, 
indicating that there are more complex reasons for these decisions. Thus, a significantly 
lower likelihood of membership among lower caste groups, like the Hill Janajati and 
Dalit in this analysis, may be more reflective of social differences as opposed to income. 
It is possible the relatively high number of non-members expressing concern about forest 
policies, which are largely written by higher caste Brahmin and Chhetri management 
committees, may indicate the tension between the ethnic and caste groups. Nepal has 
changed numerous institutions regarding castes (Lawoti, 2007), but these structures have 
evolved over centuries, so it may take time for differences in access to be understood and 
recognized, but more importantly for their influence on access and economic opportunity 
to decline.  
Unpacking the influence of ethnicity in Chitwan. 
The historic roots of the caste system and the migration of indigenous ethnicities 
continue to influence community forest membership today. Members of the Terai 
indigenous population, which is from Chitwan and nearby districts in southern Nepal, are 
just as likely to be a community forest member as a Brahmin/Chhetri individual. This is 
likely influenced by a unique feature of the Chitwan region; in comparison to the 
remainder of Nepal, there is substantially more government oversight of community 
forests due to their proximity to the jewel of Chitwan National Park. Government 
oversight in the Terai includes recent policy efforts to increase the participation of the 
indigenous Terai Janajati population in Chitwan community forests. Community forest 
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governance committees in the Terai region were encouraged to provide membership/fill 
quotas related to this indigenous group. In contrast, the indigenous population that 
emigrated to Chitwan from the hills, the Hill Janajati, is significantly less likely to be a 
member than the Brahmin/Chhetri and similar policy efforts do not exist in the Terai 
region for this indigenous group.  
Livelihood transitions: the shift from agriculture.  
The negative correlation of income with community forest membership indicates 
that the model may have captured some households shifting out of agriculture. Although 
households with higher income are often better positioned to take advantage of 
intermediate forest products, like fuel wood for stoves, provided by many community 
forests (Acharya, 2005), some higher income households in Chitwan are receiving 
income from non-agricultural sources and this correlation indicates that they may have 
become less dependent on forest resources. One of the most common sources of non-
agricultural income in Chitwan is the receipt of remittances from family members 
working abroad. Although receipt of remittances is not significant in the model, this is an 
important area for future research and further ethnographic work may aid scientific 
understanding of the relationship between remittances, livelihoods, and community 
forestry. It appears that the more critical element in determining membership is overall 
income level, which is likely related to other sources of non-agricultural income. For 
instance, the increasing urbanization of the region has afforded some households 
opportunities to work in industries such as tourism and hospitality, facilitated by a 
household’s proximity to the highway and the nearest city (Narayangarh). Future 
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modeling efforts will incorporate related variables to assess their possible influence and 
better understand the linkage between household income and community forestry.  
The ownership of dairy animals is one of the most direct linkages between 
households and natural resource use, as they require grasses and fodder for feeding and 
bedding. These resources are sometimes obtained from an individual’s farmland, but 
farmland is typically utilized for other crops for both subsistence and market. Households 
with dairy animals are reinforcing resource ties to the community forests, while some of 
those with alternative livelihood options appear to be transitioning away from agriculture.  
Relatedly, this analysis found that the farther from the nearest community forest a 
household is located, the less likely they are to become a member. This could be an 
indicator that distance is a physical barrier to access to community forest membership, 
but typically in Chitwan households farther from the community forests are non-
agricultural and dependent on some of the alternative income sources mentioned above, 
such as tourism, hospitality, or other market opportunities. It may be the case that 
distance to these opportunities for member households limits access to other resources 
and livelihood strategies, which is an important area for further study.   
The potential importance of community forest-level income inequality.  
Populations eligible for community forest membership with higher levels of 
income inequality are theoretically more likely to have lower membership rates 
(Adhikari, 2004; Bhattarai & Ojha, 2001), but in this case there are two factors that limit 
the effects of income inequality on membership. First, there is very little variation in the 
level of income inequality among the 21 community forests. Second, as noted earlier 97 
percent of nonmember households indicated that fees were not an obstacle to 
  80 
membership. Similar to the impact of household level income on membership, the fact 
that membership fees were not identified as an issue for low income households indicates 
that even with an increase in community forest-level income inequality, there may not be 
a significant difference in Chitwan community forest membership. Importantly, these 
relationships between income, income inequality, and membership may not hold if 
community forest membership fees are increased enough that they become burdensome 
to lower income households in the future. As the prior results regarding ethnicity make 
clear, it may be important for researchers to investigate how community-level ethnic 
heterogeneity affects membership. The results indicate that the relationships between 
sociodemographics and equity in terms of community forest access are complex. 
Implications of incorporating equity in institutional analysis.  
Incorporating equity and considerations of resource access within Ostrom's body 
of work in a more explicit manner extends the IAD framework in a manner, it appears, 
she would have strongly supported. Increasing equal access to resources strengthens 
natural resource management efforts (e.g. some development work notes that inequality 
in access to natural resources is a catalyst for violence and other issues (Jensen & Halle, 
2013)). Including equity in institutional analysis will not necessarily alter the theoretical 
findings about common pool resource management, but rather it will allow researchers to 
address and unpack community attributes within the IAD framework, a social component 
of resource access that is important ethically and may strengthen efforts to sustainably 
manage natural resources.  
Sustainable resource management can be achieved under circumstances of 
inequality (if sustainability is defined solely in economic and ecological terms) (Baland et 
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al., 2007), but equality in resource access is (beyond the ethical importance of ensuring 
people have equal access to resources) likely to strengthen successful resource 
management. This idea is supported in the Chitwan case through a study of the factors 
influencing collective action (see chapter 4). The collective action study finds that 
members with resource access are more likely to participate in managing and caring for 
the community forest resources. A small portion of institutional literature has considered 
equity (e.g. Clement, 2009), but incorporating equity, including discussions of how it is 
defined, is a gap the institutional literature can continue to address in future studies. It is 
possible that extending equity considerations of IAD research will facilitate sustainable 
management in all three aspects, economic, environmental, and equity. This usage of the 
IAD framework to explore equity has the potential to aid researchers in systematically 
understanding under what conditions equity contributes to sustainable resource 
management and the institutions that engender equity.  
Conclusions 
In this chapter, community forest membership was analyzed as a starting point for 
investigating natural resource access, with the recognition that this is but one aspect of 
access. Future research may examine elite capture, or the control of resources primarily 
by elite groups (Persha & Andersson, 2014), in more detail. In the case of Chitwan, this 
research supported that certain minority ethnic groups are as likely as elite groups to have 
access to community forest resources via membership. In Chitwan, it is known that most 
community forests are led by elites. Thus, while these results support equitable access for 
some indigenous groups, it is unclear how they translate to tangible resource collection or 
perhaps more importantly to forest policies that affect the overall economic development 
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trajectory of the community. While these findings are situated in Chitwan community 
forests in the Chitwan National Park buffer zone, they point towards the importance of 
studying and understanding membership decisions in natural resource user groups as a 
way to explore equality in access to natural resources throughout the world.  
Studies informed by institutional perspectives and theory consistently consider 
economic and environmental components of natural resource governance, but 
institutional studies explicitly incorporating equity are infrequent. Examining the 
attributes of a community within the IAD framework will naturally aid in revealing 
characteristics where inequalities have manifested within a system (figure 3.1). Coupling 
a more detailed understanding of community attributes (and revealed inequalities) with 
an understanding of biophysical conditions and rules will position researchers to 
holistically understand the sustainability of a system, which is ultimately necessary to 
maintain and design sustainable social-ecological systems (Ostrom, 2009; Ostrom, 2007).  
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CHAPTER 4 
HOW DOES PERCEPTION AT MULTIPLE LEVELS INFLUENCE 
COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE COMMONS? THE CASE OF MIKANIA 
MICRANTHA IN CHITWAN, NEPAL  
Chapter Overview 
Collective action has played a vital role in managing common pool resources in 
numerous global contexts. This article explores the factors affecting collective action 
related to the removal of the mile-a-minute weed (Mikania micrantha), an invasive plant, 
in community forests in the buffer zone region around Chitwan National Park in Chitwan, 
Nepal. Few studies have combined larger sample size quantitative data with greater 
generalizability and nuanced, case study-based qualitative data to explore what factors 
influence collective action or focused on how perception of the issue at multiple levels 
affects outcomes. This research employs household and community forest management 
survey data from 21 community forests in and near the buffer zone of Chitwan National 
Park in Nepal in an econometric analysis, which aims to investigate what influences local 
people’s participation in Mikania removal and contextualizes the findings with rich case-
study interview data. The model finds that reliance on community forest resources and 
perception of the issue are influential factors in participation in Mikania removal efforts. 
The implications of these findings are discussed in the context of increasing the 
effectiveness of Mikania removal efforts and influencing collective action in relation to 
other global human-environment issues.  
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Introduction 
In contrast to popular imagery of mountainous terrains, Nepal, at roughly the size 
of the U.S. state of West Virginia, is one of the most diverse countries (both 
geographically and culturally) in the world. Historically, Nepal has often been isolated 
from outside influence due to the surrounding terrain along borders shared by China and 
India and is one of very few nations in the region never colonized by the British Empire 
(Bohara et al., 2006). Geographically, the country consists of three distinct horizontally 
divided regions: the mountains in the north, the sub-tropical Terai in the south, and the 
mid-hills in between. The sundry rivers, mountains, forests, and other features made 
travelling between these regions prohibitively difficult in the past and often demanding in 
the present. As a result, the Nepali people have developed many different sub-cultures 
and ways to interact with the environment. The varied climates of each region shape this 
biodiverse nation and house numerous endangered plant and animal species (Nepal & 
Weber, 1993). For over two decades, community forestry has been an integral part of 
improving and maintaining the ecological conditions of the forests in the mid-hills and 
Terai that are home to many of these plants and animals (Acharya, 2002; Adhikari et al., 
2007). Recently, community forest user groups in the Terai have confronted managing 
their forests located around the border of Chitwan National Park in the face of a rapidly 
spreading invasive plant species, known informally as the mile-a-minute weed and 
scientifically as Mikania micrantha (hereafter referred to as Mikania). 
As a type of forest governance, community forestry attempts to decentralize forest 
resource management from national level government by transferring most use and 
management rights to local forest user groups (Barsimantov, 2010; Lama & Buchy, 
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2002). It has been argued that decentralizing resource management may lead to increased 
possibilities for collective action to manage resources more sustainably. In Nepal, 
community forestry appeared in 1978 when the national government issued the first set of 
regulations intended to legitimize this form of governance (The Panchayat Forest and 
Panchayat Protected Forest Rules and Regulations of 1978). With promulgation of the 
Forest Management Act (1993), management rights were formally transferred to local 
user groups. Although there have been setbacks (particularly during political turmoil in 
the early 2000’s (see Gilmour, 2003)), the community forestry program in Nepal has 
been considered one of the most successful in the world, particularly in the middle hills 
region (Nagendra, 2002; Timsina, 2003). However, the success of community forestry in 
the southern Terai is more debatable. When community forestry was implemented in the 
Terai, some of the forests were retained by the national government to be protected as 
national forests. A portion of the remainder of the unprotected forests was given to local 
communities to manage. However, the condition of the forests transferred to community 
forest user groups to manage was significantly poorer than that of the forests that 
remained under national protection. Protected forest lands have been found to have a 
higher level of biodiversity and plant mass (Nagendra, 2002). Despite this difference in 
condition, the initial historic conditions of the forest given to local user groups must be 
taken into account when evaluating the success of community forestry in the Terai. 
Overall, the community forestry program can be considered successful in the Terai on the 
basis of forest health, as there is evidence that resource conditions have improved in 
many cases (Nagendra, 2002), but its outcomes related to equity and relinquishing of 
technocratic control by the national government are more debatable (Nightingale, 2005; 
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Ojha, 2006; Tinker, 1994). Given this tension in the literature, there is much room to 
contribute to understanding the outcomes of community forestry in the Terai and what 
influences those outcomes, especially in the context of recent attempts to manage 
Mikania to reduce its impact on forest resources.  
The contribution in this analysis is to combine independent, representative data 
sources from community forest management committees and households living in the 
areas served by the community forests. The multilevel approach spans both community 
forest and household levels to examine how an ecological, and potentially economic, 
shock to this social-ecological system impacts multiple stakeholders and the potential for 
collective action to respond to this shock. 
Mikania micrantha. 
Mikania is a vine species that both grows and reproduces rapidly. Mikania is 
native to South America and is believed to have been intentionally transferred to India 
and the Pacific Islands around the 1940s for use as a cover crop for airfields (IUCN, 
2005). It was additionally utilized by soldiers in India during World War II as a type of 
camouflage (IUCN, 2005) and has since spread to warm, humid places in Asia (including 
parts of China, India, and Nepal) and elsewhere globally. Yang et al. (2005) noted that 
Mikania is one of the top 100 invasive plant threats in the world. As it is a creeping vine, 
it climbs small trees and covers grasses, often depriving them of sunlight and smothering 
them to death (Siwakoti, 2008). Mikania primarily reproduces via seed dispersal, with 
one plant able to disperse up to 40,000 seeds per year, but also reproduces through 
vegetatively (Yang et al., 2005).  
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There are a variety of removal methods for Mikania including mechanical 
removal and pulling, uprooting, cutting, burning, chemical herbicides, and the use of a 
predatory rust fungi (Ellison et al., 2007). The success of these methods depends on both 
the biology of Mikania and the social context. For example, burning can further aid seed 
dispersal (Murphy et al., 2013) and the plant can reproduce vegetatively, an asexual 
process where the plant can reproduce when a stem is placed in moist soil. Regarding the 
social context, people’s commitment to regular removal using known best practices 
impacts its spread.  
In addition to the negative impact Mikania has had on Chitwan animals and plants 
(Ram, 2008), Mikania also appears to be an important social issue. In consideration of the 
impacts of Mikania on rural livelihoods in Chitwan, household surveys have provided 
evidence that Mikania disproportionately affects forest-dependent households (Rai & Rai, 
2013). The longer it remains in the forest, the greater the perceived social impacts 
become and in absence of a plan to successfully remove it, households feel they have 
been forced to find uses for it (Rai & Rai, 2013), despite the fact that Mikania is not 
useful to most households (Rai & Scarborough, 2014). In the past five years there has 
been news coverage from high profile media on the Mikania issue, primarily focusing on 
its impact on the vulnerable (previously endangered) one horned rhinoceros’ habitat. In 
2010, the BBC published a short report containing excerpts of an interview with the then 
chief warden of Chitwan National Park, exploring the impact of Mikania on the park’s 
ecosystems (Khadka, 2010); this included the fact that Mikania had spread to cover over 
20 percent of the park. Mikania has become a relatively well known issue in the region 
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and successfully managing Mikania to reduce or remove its presence has the potential to 
improve conditions for both humans and the remainder of the environment.   
Mikania as a collective action problem.   
The case of Mikania removal presents a social dilemma, a situation where acting 
in the benefit of the group puts an individual at a disadvantage unless everyone acts in the 
interest of the group; i.e. an individual return is always greater than an individual’s share 
of a group return. Such dilemmas present a collective action problem, where collective 
action could lead to the best outcome for the group, but not the best outcome for an 
individual (unless everyone chooses the action most individually advantageous, causing 
everyone involved to lose as the tragedy of the commons plays out) (Ostrom 2005, p. 37). 
A large and diverse body of literature explores the situations and reasons individuals 
choose to act in the interest of the group when a rational actor would act in their own self-
interest (Vanni 2014). Removing Mikania takes an investment of time and physical and 
mental effort, whereas opting to ignore the plant’s presence and collect resources not 
impacted by it (i.e., free riding off of someone else’s efforts to manage it) reduces the 
personal costs involved with collecting forest resources.  
The model presented in this article focuses on understanding what factors may 
impact local people’s participation in collective action, and is informed by previous 
analyses but expands these with an additional focus on perception of the situation at 
multiple levels (household and community forest) and a comparative analysis exploring 
the influence of space via size-varying neighborhoods. This study assesses the following 
questions: What factors are affecting collective action regarding Mikania removal in 
Chitwan community forests? What role does perception of Mikania as a threat at both the 
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household and community forest governance levels play in the decision to participate in 
its removal?  
What is collective action? Many definitions with common ground.    
Collective action as a concept has been adopted by a wide variety of social 
science disciplines, ranging from psychology to political science, to research and explain 
actions taken by a group to achieve a specific outcome. As such, collective action as a 
whole has been defined and redefined numerous times, but Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004) 
find that common ground can be found among most definitions. Collective action at its 
core includes a group of people acting voluntarily in the name of a common purpose or 
shared interest to achieve a desired outcome. People do not always have to act 
simultaneously in a group to engage in collective action; sometimes a representative of a 
group may act on the group’s behalf. Further, collective action can occur at multiple 
scales and include both top-down or bottom-up actions, with Davies et al. (2004) labeling 
the former “coordination” and the latter “cooperation.” In the context of commons 
research, collective action has been found to be of vital importance in successful 
governance of common pool resource systems around the globe (Ostrom et al., 1994; 
Vanni, 2014).  
What influences collective action?  
A variety of factors have been found to influence collective action in common 
pool resource management situations, including governance structure, group size, 
distance from nearest market, resource scarcity, age, income, land holding, distance from 
the relevant resource, caste, gender, and education (Adhikari, 2005; Araral, 2009). 
Despite this work, the role that informal institutions (such as social norms) play in 
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community forestry outcomes remains poorly understood (Lachapelle et al., 2004) and 
the factors influencing collective action are incredibly complex, requiring further 
investigation (Araral, 2009).  
The role of heterogeneity in collective action is not always clear or 
straightforward (Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). Heterogeneity in this context relates to 
variation that could influence a group’s ability to achieve a commonly held goal. It is 
therefore possible that variation in formal and informal institutions could pose a 
challenge to successfully engaging group members in collective action to manage 
common pool resources (Kant, 2000; Ostrom, 2005). Variation in local institutions 
related to sociodemographics, like caste, ethnicity, race, or gender, influences community 
forestry operations including who benefits from or participates in collective resource 
management (Adhikari, 2005). Some scholars assert that sociodemographic heterogeneity 
undermines collective action, but there are few empirical studies that assess how 
variation affects the individual decision to collectively act (Ostrom 2005). This study 
posits that exploring this variation, shifting focus from the obstacles heterogeneity poses, 
can lead to important insights in what factors may influence collective action. The 
multilevel modeling approach presented here promotes exploration of heterogeneity in a 
variety of factors, including caste, household income, and perception of the issue, and 
provides an understanding of their significance in the Mikania collective action problem.  
Previous econometric analyses have used collective action as a dependent 
variable, but usually as an assessment of free riding in a collective action problem rather 
than directly estimating household or individual participation in a specific collective 
action (outside of participation in small-scale resource management programs like 
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forestry or irrigation (e.g. Chun, 2014; Coulibaly-Lingani, 2011)). Araral (2009) used a 
binary variable to represent irrigation systems that were under government control or 
fully managed by local users, finding that collective action was impacted by governance 
structure, as well as resource scarcity, resource user group size, and farm size. There is a 
need for further research in this area to understand if similar factors influence collective 
action in other systems. Few empirical quantitative analyses of collective action have 
been conducted, partially due to lack of data, and interactions between group 
heterogeneity and size have been paid little attention in the past (Poteete & Ostrom, 
2004). The majority of commons research has been qualitative work, but there are calls to 
conduct more systematic, comparative, and quantitative research (Agrawal & Chhatre, 
2006). Such studies would complement existing qualitative studies, provide a different 
prospective, and increase the replicability of research.  
Space and collective action: The role of neighborhoods. 
Previous work exploring space has most often conceptualized space in terms of 
place, region, or networks (e.g. Bosco, 2001; Hedström, 1994; Miller, 1992; Murdoch & 
Marsden, 1995; Paasi, 2002); such work has largely concluded that space seems to play 
an important role in the formation of collective action for political and other purposes and 
that the role of space in collective action requires further investigation (Newman, 2008). 
Within the realm of space, neighborhoods are highly influential on many different social 
dynamics (Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn, 2000; Lochner et al., 2003; Sampson et al., 2002). 
The term “neighborhood” has been defined and redefined many times, but a key 
component of most definitions is that neighborhoods are nested units within larger 
communities; the way these units are defined varies from administrative boundaries (such 
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as census blocks in the U.S. census) to local networks (Sampson et al., 2002). Despite the 
potential importance of the role of neighborhoods in influencing participation in 
collective action and the particular significance of neighborhood social groups in Nepal, 
to my knowledge such research linking collective action and neighborhoods has seldom 
been conducted.  
 Combining qualitative and quantitative data. 
It has been argued that research related to collective action must move towards a 
diagnostic approach where local context is taken into account in exploring institutional 
and governance arrangements in social-ecological systems and acknowledge that there is 
decisively not a single, optimal set of rules and norms (Araral, 2009; Ostrom, 2007). To 
accomplish this, research is needed that carefully combines in-depth qualitative, 
contextual knowledge to inform and aid in interpretation of quantitative (e.g., statistical) 
analyses (Agrawal & Chhatre, 2006).  
Collective action has been assessed at the association/resource group level by 
multiple studies, but multilevel models of collective action incorporating household data 
are less common (Tesfaye et al., 2012), and even lesser are models considering the 
influences of various visible or invisible neighborhoods. By using both household and 
community forest level data (see methods section), this study provides a more nuanced 
picture of factors influencing collective action. This study builds on previous analyses 
about the factors influencing collective action and explores additional factors related to 
perception of the situation, in this case whether Mikania is viewed as harmful. It is 
important to understand the factors that impact collective action in a variety of contexts to 
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discern patterns as many pressing global environmental problems are also collective 
action problems (Esty & Moffa, 2012; Ostrom, 2010).  
Model Development: Variables that may Influence Participation in Mikania 
Removal   
Household level variables.    
Participation in collective removal of Mikania growing in or near a community 
forest. 
The dependent variable in the model concerns whether a household participates in 
Mikania removal either with a group or both individually and with a group. In the study 
site, each community forest is governed by a locally elected governance committee. No 
organized effort to remove Mikania has been implemented by the community forest 
governance committees in this study; some committees have paid individuals or rarely 
have paid specific user groups within their community forest to remove Mikania. As 
such, almost all group removal efforts are coordinated by households (both community 
forest members and non-members) living in the area. In interviews with individuals from 
five case studies from 21 Chitwan community forests (case studies were selected to 
capture the range of resources available in each group, including monetary), it was found 
that household members participating in Mikania removal self-organized annual efforts 
with their neighbors. The survey question (see the methods for survey information) 
captured all such self-organized group removal efforts. A unique dependent variable 
conceptualization in an econometric model of collective action is presented here. Other 
such models have assessed free riding (monetary and labor) in collective resource 
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management (Araral, 2009; Ito, 2012) whereas this research explicitly models who is 
engaging in collective Mikania removal (i.e. who is not free riding).  
Community forest membership.  
Most households in the buffer zone region of Chitwan National Park using forest 
resources are members of an established community forest user group. However, there 
are households in the buffer zone that utilize forest resources yet are not community 
forest members; two-thirds of the survey sample (690/1041) are community forest 
members. There are several reasons households are not members, including (from most to 
least common): living too far from the forest, disagreement with management policies, 
ineligibility for membership (due to living outside the community forest ward, which is 
the administrative boundary containing all households eligible for membership), and fees 
being too high (fewer than three percent of respondents report that fees are a barrier to 
entry). The household survey dataset analyzed here includes both buffer zone community 
forest members and non-members, in an effort to accurately assess the factors influencing 
collective action among all the households in the region, whether they are community 
forest members or otherwise. Previous work has discovered that community forest 
members tend to be more reliant on forest resources than non-members (see chapter 3) 
and I hypothesize that households that are more reliant on natural resources from the 
forests are more likely to participate in collective action; thus, I anticipate that 
community forest membership will be an important predictor of participation in Mikania 
removal efforts. Other variables included represent different dimensions of reliance on 
forest resources.   
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Ethnicity/caste and income. 
Caste plays a complex role in community forestry outcomes in Nepal. In general, 
several studies have found that traditionally disadvantaged indigenous ethnic groups in 
Nepal are less likely to receive benefits from community forestry operations (Adhikari et 
al., 2004; Gilmour et al., 2004). However, this relationship is not always straightforward, 
as there are policies regarding ethnicity and caste that influence regions in Nepal, 
benefiting certain groups (Nightingale, 2011). In the case of collective action problems, 
indigenous groups often lead and participate in efforts to collectively solve them, but may 
not receive the same benefits as other privileged groups (Graner, 1997). Given this 
uncertainty in the literature, caste is included to explore potential differences in caste 
composition among the 21 community forests to understand if they influence 
participation in Mikania removal efforts.  
In many social science applications, the influence of income is well understood. 
However, there is no consensus on the impact of household income on reliance on natural 
resources. Some studies have found that households with lower levels of income are more 
dependent on natural resources and receive more absolute benefits from the resources 
(Shackleton & Shackleton, 2006; Turner et al., 2007). Others have discovered that higher 
income households are better positioned to take advantage of intermediate forest 
resources (Acharya, 2005).  
Household size.  
A larger household size could either be prohibitive in deciding to remove 
Mikania, due to the effort required to shift time away from other important household 
activities, or helpful in that more household members are available to distribute the labor 
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involved in Mikania removal. It is logical that as household size increases, people already 
reliant on natural resources would tend to maintain or increase their resource use 
(Adhikari, Di Falco, & Lovett, 2004). However, household size may also be irrelevant as 
small households dependent on natural resources may be just as likely to engage in 
resource management and Mikania removal as large households using forest resources.    
Farming activity.  
This variable is coded one if a household farms any amount of land, and zero 
otherwise. Over 80 percent of households in Chitwan farm in some capacity. Farming 
households in general are especially reliant on natural resources from community forests 
to maintain farm animals and crops. Over 80 percent of Chitwan households rely on 
farming for a portion of their food and income, so although this is an indicator of reliance 
on forest resources, it is possible there may not be enough variation in the case study to 
accurately discern its impact.  
Household distance to community forest. 
A household’s distance to the nearest community forest was the most frequently cited 
barrier to entry by survey respondents. Households that are farther from community 
forests are less able to access the resources they may need. As distance from the resource 
influences access to the resources (chapter 3), and a household’s ability to utilize them, it 
is likely households that are farther from the resource will be less able to participate in 
Mikania removal.  
Household perception of Mikania as harmful to households and forests. 
Individual level perception of collective action problems can alter whether an 
individual is interested in participating in collective action to solve an issue. In a study of 
  97 
participatory forest management in Ethiopia, perception of planting success rates 
(seedling survival) was found to strongly influence intentions and attitudes towards 
participating in collective tree planting efforts (Tesfaye et al., 2012). Similarly, individual 
perception of risk has been found to influence willingness to engage in collective action 
to solve climate change and other environmental problems in other case studies (Lubell, 
2002; Lubell et al., 2007; Stoutenborough et al., 2015), with higher perceived individual 
risk correlated with a greater potential of participating in collective action.  
Community forest level variables. 
Community forest age and income. 
This model explores the influence of a variable of the total income per capita of 
each community forest governance committee (CF_income in table 4.1). This 
information is recorded in Nepal rupees from community forest management survey 
responses and then divided by 1,000,000 to ensure the variable is on a similar scale 
compared to the other variable ranges (the exchange rate of rupees to dollars is small: 
1,000,000 rupees is approximately 15,000 USD as of this writing). Like household 
income, the impact of community forest management-level income is unclear. Increased 
income should allow for community forest governance committees to provide their 
members with more resources and attract members (Graner, 1997), but how such income 
is invested is not always clear to members. A second variable measuring the number of 
years since a community forest was established is included to detect the impact of the 
maturity of the community forest governance on collective action. Earlier founded 
community forests are likely to possess increased social capital including monetary 
resources and connections with non-government organizations and other community 
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forest governance committees. The resources available to members can influence their 
investment in the resource and age influences governance structure (Araral 2009).  
Community forest governance committee perception of Mikania as harmful.  
Qualitative findings support that perception of issues by different actors within 
polycentric governance systems can influence actions among other actors (Ostrom, 
2010). In this case, I believe the perception of Mikania as harmful to local households by 
members of community forest management will impact the household decision to remove 
Mikania.  
 Space conceptualized via neighborhood size.  
Space often plays a key role in social-ecological outcomes (Alessa et al., 2008; 
Walker et al., 2004). As few previous studies have explored the potential impact of 
neighborhoods on collective action, it is hypothesized here that incorporating space, via 
neighborhoods at various sizes, into this analysis may change the interpretation of the 
results and that varying neighborhood sizes may have different impacts on a household’s 
participation in collective action (i.e. it is hypothesized that some relationships in the 
presented model may change as neighborhood size increases).  
Methods  
In order to assess the factors influencing collective action, a 
multilevel/hierarchical analysis of survey data is conducted and the results are interpreted 
in the context of rich, qualitative case study interview data. First the results of the model 
without space are presented and then a comparative analysis incorporating space is 
shown. Agrawal and Chhatre (2006) have called for more studies of common pool 
resources that combine statistical analysis with rich contextual data. The qualitative data 
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consists of 29 semi-structured interviews conducted in 2014 in five case study 
community forests. Survey data from 1041 households in 21 Chitwan buffer zone 
community forests and survey data from members of the governance committees of all 21 
community forests are utilized in the analysis (table 4.1). The dependent variable is not 
continuous and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with discrete dependent variables 
(in contrast to continuous) produces biased estimators. Thus, the multilevel model is 
binary logistic, as it allows for analysis with discrete dependent variables (Williams, 
2006).    
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Table 4.1 Variable explanations and summary statistics    
Variable Explanation  Type  Mean S.D. Min Max Sum 
participateCA Household 
participation in 
Mikania removal 
in a group or as a 
group and an 
individual.  
Dependent 
variable; 
Dichotomous; 
1 = yes, 0 = no  
0.348 
 
0.47 
 
0 1 363 
CFmember Is the household a 
community forest 
member? 
Dichotomous; 
1 = member, 0 
= non-member 
0.662 
 
0.47 
 
0 1 690 
ethnicity/caste Caste of 
interviewee or 
head of household. 
Expanded 
dummy 
variable with 
Bramin as the 
reference level 
(ethnicities 2-5 
in order*) 
0.159 
0.126 
0.036 
0.170 
 
0.36 
0.33 
0.18 
0.37 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
166 
132 
38 
177 
 
income Household income 
past year. 
Categorical; 
coded 1 to 7 
from under 
10,000 rupees 
to more than 
500,000 rupees 
4.163 
 
1.42 
 
1 7  
HH_size Number of people 
in a household.  
Continuous 5.280 
 
2.24 
 
1 16  
HH_dist_CF Distance from 
house to nearest 
community forest 
in km. 
Continuous  1.644 
 
1.06 
 
0.04 
 
5.2 
 
 
farm Does the 
household farm? 
Dichotomous; 
yes = 1; no = 0 
0.810 
 
0.39 
 
0 1  
perceive 
threat  
Does the 
household perceive 
Mikania as 
harmful? 
Dichotomous; 
yes = 1; no = 0 
0.886 
 
0.31 
 
0 1  
CF_income Total income 
received by 
governance 
committee in past 
year, divided by 
total member 
households; in 
Nepal rupees, 
divided by 
1,000,000.  
Continuous 1.396 
 
1.87 
 
0.002 
 
6.7 
 
 
CF_age Years since 
community forest 
was established to 
present. 
Continuous  20.86 
 
6.84 
 
6 35  
CF perceive 
threat 
Does governance 
committee 
perceive Mikania 
as harmful to local 
households?  
Dichotomous; 
yes = 1; no = 0 
0.749 
 
0.43 
 
0 1  
*ethnicities- 2: Hill Janajati, 3: Dalit, 4: Newar, 5: Terai Janajati (all ethnicities are coded 
in reference to the Bramin/Chhetri group).  
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Model specification. 
Building off of factors found to be significant in impacting collective action and 
including new variables, the model specification is below.  
	
 =   + 
 + ℎ
 + 
 + 
 +  

+ !"
 + #$%&'ℎ
 +  () + *
+ $'ℎ +  + 
 
The above specification is a random effects hierarchical linear model for every individual 
i in community forest j where + represents these random effects at community forest 
users group level. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, a logistic model where 
the dependent variable represents the log odds ratio (or logit) is appropriate and estimated 
(Snijders & Berkhof, 2008). In any type of logistic regression, the primary assumptions 
involve sample size, outliers, and multicolinearity (Menard, 2002). Sample sizes for 
logistic regression should take into consideration the number of predictors used; small 
samples with a large number of predictors can produce problems (sample N = 1041 
households, 21 community forests). Outliers and multicolinearity were checked for in 
each independent variable; extreme outliers were not present and issues with correlation 
between independent variables are discussed below. Analyses were conducted in R 
(version 3.1.2) using the lme4 package (version 1.1-9). 
Using eigenvectors to explore the impact of space.  
In order to understand how spatial association among nearby households may 
influence the chosen factors' capability to explain collective action, the comparative 
spatial models employ eigenvectors as spatial filters. Eigenvectors are non-zero vectors 
and the incorporation of eigenvector values in regression models to explore spatial 
impacts has been established in geographical analysis (An et al., 2016; Y. Chun & 
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Griffith, 2011; Griffith, 2000). Eigenvectors were calculated for a set of predetermined 
neighborhood sizes according to latitude and longitude coordinates collected from each 
survey respondent’s household location. These coordinates allowed for mapping of 
households into neighborhoods and eigenvectors were accordingly calculated for the 10, 
20, 30, 40, and 50 nearest neighbors for each household. One hundred eigenvectors were 
calculated for each household at each neighborhood size. The top ten eigenvectors (i.e., 
the ones with the highest eigenvalues) at each neighborhood size in five models (one for 
each neighborhood size) were used as a comparative analysis with respect to the model 
without spatial filtering. The full details of the eigenvalue calculation can be viewed at 
http://complexities.org/Photo&PDF/CNH_Eigvec_Instructions.pdf.  
Results  
Belonging to a community forest and perceiving Mikania as a threat are 
significantly positively associated with participating in Mikania removal at the household 
level and being Newar decreases the likelihood of participating in Mikania removal (table 
4.2). In Chitwan, being Newar is relatively rare as the Newar are an indigenous group 
that has been historically present further north, in the valley just outside of Kathmandu. 
The Newar have a higher average socio-economic status compared to other indigenous 
groups in Nepal and traditionally have held professions outside of agriculture and are 
thus likely less reliant on forest resources. Additionally, at the community forest level, 
the governance committee’s perception of Mikania as harmful is significantly negatively 
correlated with a household’s decision to participate in Mikania removal. Household 
income, belonging to several indigenous groups or being Dalit, household size, household 
distance to the forest, and farming were not significant influences on Mikania removal in 
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the final non-spatial model. However, alone, household distance to the forest and farming 
were both significant influences on participation in Mikania removal (table 4.3). These 
variables are correlated with being a community forest member and the moderate 
multicolinearity renders them insignificant in the final model including all variables. 
Table 4.2. Model results with all variables (no spatial filtering) 
Level 1 (HH) Estimate (standard error) 
Intercept              -1.385059** (0.614937)   
CF_member                 0.813201*** (0.164079) 
ethnicity_2 (Hill Janajati)            -0.004459 (0.212095)       
ethnicity_3 (Dalit)                 0.172931 (0.231685)   
ethnicity_4 (Newar)            -0.993093** (0.475196) 
ethnicity_5 (Terai Janajati)             0.062026 (0.242313)      
income                    0.029869 (0.050848)        
HH_size                   0.017616 (0.032006)        
HH_dist_CF               -0.144327 (0.116428)       
farm                      0.232520 (0.199788)        
perceive_mikania_threat   0.861755*** (0.255881) 
Level 2 (CF)  
CF_AGE                   -0.012219 (0.017111)    
CFincome                 -0.057189 (0.075865)       
CF_perceive_threat       -0.597360* (0.318123) 
p<0.0001 ***, p<0.01 **, p<0.05*; N = 1041 HH, 21 CF 
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Table 4.3. Model results with single variable estimates   
Model (predictor)  Estimate (Standard error) 
Model 1 (CF member)  0.8793*** (0.1574) 
Model 2 (ethnicity) ethnicity_2: -0.1353 (0.2027); ethnicity_3:  0.0788 (0.2233); ethnicity_4: -
1.0785**    (0.4660); ethnicity_5:  0.1383 (0.2353)    
Model 3 (income) 0.0415 (0.0478)    
Model 4 (HH size) 0.0477 (0.0300)    
Model 5 
(HH distance forest) 
-0.1800* (0.1042)   
Model 6 
(farm) 
0.4904*** (0.1877)    
Model 7 (perceive 
Mikania threat) 
0.8775*** (0.2494)    
Model 8 
(CF income) 
-0.0320 (0.0709)   
Model 9 
(CF age) 
-0.0191 (0.0183) 
 
Model 10 
(CF perceive threat) 
-0.2793*(0.3014) 
p<0.0001 ***, p<0.01 **, p<0.05*; N = 1041 HH, 21 CF 
 
When spatial filtering is incorporated into the model, the majority of the results 
hold at the smaller spatial scales, but some relationships change as the neighborhood size 
increases (table 4.4). The implications of the findings are discussed next. 
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Table 4.4. Results of spatial filtering models    
Model  No spatial NBH 10 HBH 20 NBH 30 NBH 40 NBH 50 
Level 1(HH)       
Intercept -1.385059** 
(0.614937)   
-1.8627**    
(0.79675) 
-1.6117**   
(0.614022)   
-1.76583**   
(0.555294)   
-1.5442**   
(0.565005)   
-1.5526**   
(0.571927) 
CF_member 0.813201*** 
(0.164079) 
0.80440***    
(0.16825)    
0.77331***   
(0.165543)    
0.81208***   
(0.164652)    
0.8146***   
(0.164825)   
0.8332***   
(0.165212) 
ethnicity_2 (Hill 
Janajati) 
-0.004459 
(0.212095) 
-0.02685    
(0.21929)   
-0.029390   
(0.2136)  
-0.101710   
(0.211223)   
-0.075044   
(0.211663)   
-0.077877   
(0.211145)   
ethnicity_3  (Dalit)                 0.172931 
(0.231685)   
0.30331    
(0.25158)    
0.175541   
(0.234244)    
0.174156   
(0.232780)    
0.253085   
(0.234320) 
0.327081   
(0.238692)    
ethnicity_4 (Newar)           -0.993093** 
(0.475196) 
-0.90141**    
(0.48807)   
-0.93893**   
(0.478861)   
-0.94097**  
(0.482376)   
-0.9165**   
(0.478808)   
-0.8664**   
(0.482824)   
ethnicity_5 (Terai 
Janajati)              
0.062026 
(0.242313)      
0.10685    
(0.2712)  
0.216007   
(0.232012)    
0.305682   
(0.23917 )   
0.273732   
(0.240665)   
0.271159   
(0.237680)    
income                    0.029869 
(0.050848)       
0.02750    
(0.05165)    
0.026267   
(0.050938)    
0.014879   
(0.051204)    
0.017177   
(0.051276) 
0.018064   
(0.051340)    
HH_size                   0.017616 
(0.032006)       
0.01910    
(0.03259)    
0.021240   
(0.032479) 
0.020089   
(0.032338)    
0.018595   
(0.032309)   
0.018612   
(0.032252)    
HH_dist_CF               -0.144327 
(0.116428)      
-0.37557**    
(0.16224)   
-0.152223   
(0.138599) 
-0.240010   
(0.139012) 
-0.3104**   
(0.144388)   
-0.241587   
(0.150712)   
farm                      0.232520 
(0.199788)       
0.21845    
(0.20421)    
0.249721   
(0.201226)    
0.220717   
(0.203623) 
0.251899   
(0.202856) 
0.254372   
(0.202335)    
perceive_mikania_threat   0.861755*** 
(0.255881) 
0.87822***    
(0.26066)  
0.85084***   
(0.256024)    
0.82325***   
(0.257383)    
0.8135***   
(0.257638)   
0.8223***   
(0.258346)    
Level 2 (CF)       
CF_AGE                   -0.012219 
(0.017111)    
0.02428    
(0.02931)    
-0.001696   
(0.015828) 
0.006029   
(0.015092) 
0.004768   
(0.015155)   
0.005126   
(0.015207)    
CFincome                 -0.057189 
(0.075865)      
0.14540    
(0.13262) 
-0.007164   
(0.088989)  
-0.4018***   
(0.107376)  
-0.372***   
(0.102935)   
-0.3969***   
(0.104871)   
CF_perceive_threat       -0.597360* 
(0.318123) 
-0.87605**    
(0.42155) 
-0.726559*   
(0.295239)   
0.354947   
(0.306564)    
0.159632   
(0.279693)   
0.008384   
(0.289957)    
Eigenvectors       
Eigen1  -5.04185   
(14.18957)   
-2.168690   
(3.217738)   
-6.949163   
(3.566353)   
4.525912   
(5.697266) 
49.8083***  
(14.365982)   
Eigen2  9.80318   
(14.86248)    
3.712529   
(3.677870)    
-19.542***   
(5.004745)   
-25.92***   
(6.252023)   
110.795*** 
(28.413786)   
Eigen3  -5.19743    
(3.80379) 
-9.14711**   
(3.774720)   
15.7656***   
(4.411047)    
24.922***   
(6.817462)   
-3.354607   
(5.874289)   
Eigen4  -4.15245    
(3.83952) 
2.106211   
(4.729554)    
31.4282**  
(13.538901)   
37.171***   
(9.308714)   
7.884616   
(6.584032) 
Eigen5  -1.16079    
(3.95069)   
-0.174514   
(4.179696)   
43.4101***  
(16.038039)   
-2.745146   
(5.358389) 
-14.663***   
(4.656964)   
Eigen6  12.85628**    
(6.34740)    
-6.995553   
(4.172717)   
6.209407   
(4.717159) 
-39.54***  
(14.82324)   
-13.005*** 
(4.252553)   
Eigen7  10.06661**    
(4.52989)    
-23.02401  
(12.4325) 
-13.774***   
(4.989631) 
10.067689   
(6.254897) 
1.858194   
(5.419257)   
Eigen8  12.89399**    
(5.87581)    
-20.35677  
(16.96564)   
28.1619***   
(8.254470)   
-15.22334   
(9.217449)   
8.2293***   
(3.910026)    
Eigen9  -3.91785    
(5.11391)   
-4.677092   
(5.970647)   
-6.072814   
(3.486686) 
-6.495850   
(7.688246)   
-12.446***   
(4.502668) 
Eigen10  -1.34642    
(4.33239) 
-2.108502  
(10.12355)   
-5.291565   
(4.414548)   
2.440397   
(2.515810)   
-9.018***  
(4.367460)   
p<0.0000 ***, p<0.01 **, p<0.05*; N = 1041 HH, 21 CF; Standard error in parentheses  
Values that have changed in significance are bolded and NBH = neighborhood  
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Discussion  
Here, the results are first considered without spatial filtering and later discussed in 
the context of the impact of the spatial filters.  
Perceptions of collective action problems influence participation.  
The model supports that household perception of Mikania presence as harmful is 
significantly positively correlated with a household’s participation in Mikania removal. 
This indicates that people need to perceive the situation as personally harmful before 
working to collectively solve it or cease free riding off of others efforts (Lubell, 2002); 
this insight has important implications for other collective action problems. This analysis 
is not the first to suggest the importance of individual, community, or household 
perception of issues in solving collective action problems, but this quantitative, multilevel 
exploration in the context of an increasingly important global human-environment issue, 
the spread of invasive species, is an important contribution and confirms the need for 
further study in this area.  
Reliance on natural resources is an important indicator of engaging in 
collective action.   
This analysis supports the hypothesis that households more dependent on 
community forest resources are more likely to engage in Mikania removal, as belonging 
to a community forest was significantly correlated with participating in Mikania removal; 
community forest membership is an important indicator of having a personal stake in 
community forest resources. Another measure of reliance on community forest resources, 
farming, was significantly correlated with participating in Mikania removal on its own, 
but was highly correlated with being a community forest member and thus insignificant 
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when all variables were included (see tables 4.2 and 4.3). The correlation between 
resource dependence via farming and membership aligns with expectations, as although a 
few Chitwan residents in need of forest resources are prohibited from joining a 
community forest (see “community forest membership” section for a discussion of 
barriers to entry), most that are dependent on forest resources are members (whether or 
not all members receive the same benefits is contested, see Bhattarai & Ojha, 2001). The 
relationship between reliance on forest resources and participation in Mikania removal is 
linked to the perception of the problem as harmful or benign because people with no 
stake in the impacted resource (those who do not need to use it) are unlikely to perceive 
Mikania as an issue that impacts them and needs to be addressed; there is little perceived 
risk in their choice to ignore Mikania.  
Unpacking the influence of perception at the community forest level.   
The finding that perception of Mikania as harmful by a community forest 
governance committee is significantly negatively correlated with a household’s 
participation in Mikania removal may seem counterintuitive at first. It appears logical to 
make the connection that perception of Mikania as harmful at the community forest 
governance committee level might foster a setting where more individual households are 
aware of Mikania as harmful and choose to participate in removal efforts. Awareness of a 
problem does not always lead to action (e.g., Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002), and in this 
case, governance committees that perceive Mikania as harmful do not always share this 
information with their members. In the fieldwork conducted in 2014 in five case-study 
community forests, interviewees reported distrust in their community forest governance 
committees and officials from the nearby Chitwan National Park. With this 
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contextualized knowledge, it makes sense that even if governance committee members 
were diligent in informing community forest members of their perceptions of the Mikania 
issue, members are unlikely to trust all of the information they receive from their 
governance committees and may perceive issues differently. Further, research has learned 
that perceptions of collective action problems among actors in polycentric governance 
systems can influence collective actions taken by actors at different levels (Andersson & 
Ostrom, 2008; Ostrom, 2010). Another possibility is that the forest governance 
committee’s perceptions are a consequence of their member’s lack of action. In other 
words, governance committees may perceive Mikania as a significant threat to their 
forests when they realize that their own members are not engaging in any efforts to stop 
the spread of Mikania. This analysis is unable to discern the mechanism that differentially 
links members’ and governance committees’ perceptions to households’ Mikania 
removal, but the multilevel approach highlights the importance of measuring perceptions 
at these two different levels: as these results show, it is unwise to assume that perceptions 
of governance actors is identical to and is merely a reflection of members’ perceptions. 
Top-down versus bottom-up approaches to solving collective action 
problems. 
In this case, the model supports that perception of Mikania as harmful by 
individual households is vital to participation in efforts to prevent and reduce the spread 
of Mikania. This linkage between the perception of an issue as personally harmful 
(personal risk) and engaging in collective action in an effort to solve it is highly relevant 
to other critical global environmental issues, such as mitigating or adapting to climate 
change (Lubell et al., 2007). Even in cases where Mikania is not viewed as harmful by 
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the community forest governance committee, households that view Mikania as personally 
harmful are more likely to participate in removal efforts. In the case of collective action, 
problems where households or individuals do not rely on or buy into the impacted 
resource or system, top-down perception of the situation may be important. For example, 
in the case of climate change, even in cases where bottom-up collective action has been 
absent, strong action from government in a top-down approach can have success; many 
studies have found support for a blended top-down and bottom-up approach to solving 
collective action problems (Anderson & Grewell, 1999; Ansari et al., 2013; Fujisawa et 
al., 2015; Green et al., 2014; Pahl-Wostl, 2009). 
According to the survey data, 35 percent of the surveyed households are 
participating in Mikania removal efforts. The initiative for engaging in collective action 
to remove Mikania exists in Chitwan but the methods people choose to remove Mikania 
often unfortunately work against their goals, spreading the plant and its seeds further. It is 
possible that the nature of the human-environment problem determines what type of 
collective action will be proficient in solving it. For example, some problems may be 
most effectively solved with collective action initiated from the top down, while others 
will have better results organizing from the bottom up. However, it may also be the case 
that most collective action problems can be solved with a bottom-up approach if the 
people involved are given access to the appropriate tools, knowledge, and resources; most 
research on the commons supports the assertion that individuals can self-organize to 
solve a wide variety of human-environment issues (Ito, 2012;  Meinzen-Dick et al., 2000; 
Tang, 1992). For instance, if a local non-government organization provided information 
on the best practices for Mikania removal to every household in Chitwan, it is possible 
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the collective action efforts of the community would be far more effective in preventing 
the spread of Mikania than they are at present. 
Incorporating spatial filtering: The role of neighborhoods. 
Overall, the addition of spatial filtering did not have a large impact on the factors 
influencing collective action at smaller neighborhood sizes, but some of the relationships 
in the model changed at larger spatial scales (table 4.4). It is important to keep in mind 
that the survey data utilized in the analysis represents a subset of the households within a 
given community forest. Therefore, the spatial influences in the analysis are likely to be 
amplified in the actual neighborhoods containing more households. Based on fieldwork 
in Chitwan, the smaller neighborhood scale (10 or 20 households in the analysis) is the 
most accurate representation of how people regularly interact and define their neighbors. 
Because the spatial filtering via inclusion of the eigenvectors largely significantly 
impacts the model results at the larger neighborhood sizes, space is more influential as 
neighborhood size increases. Two collective action relationships that space appears to 
influence are interpreted: community forest level income and the perception of Mikania 
as a threat by a community forest governance committee (both community forest level 
variables in the analysis).  
 Community forest level income. 
The model results indicated that spatial influences operate at the larger 
neighborhood sizes on community forest level income (the total income available to each 
community forest governance committee; see table 4.1). With the addition of spatial 
filtering, community forest level income changes from insignificant to significant and 
negative at neighborhood sizes 30, 40, and 50 (indicating the higher the community 
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forest’s income, the less likely a household will participate in Mikania management). In 
chapter 3 it was discovered that household income was negatively correlated with 
membership; households with higher incomes were less likely to be community forest 
members. The relationship between income and membership appears to be capturing a 
livelihood transition in Chitwan, where people with higher incomes have begun to 
transition away from dependence on the forest resources to other, non-agricultural 
livelihoods. Similar to the household level relationship between income and membership, 
the influence of space (especially in terms of larger neighborhoods where households 
may be more representative of aggregate community forest characteristics) on the 
relationship between income and collective action is intuitive, as the model results 
support that collective action is influenced by community forest membership. Households 
in wealthier community forests that provide a wider variety of resources to their members 
(such as non-agricultural, skills based trainings and workshops) may be less likely to 
participate in collective action because they may be shifting away from dependence on 
the community forest resources. As mentioned above, a neighborhood of 50 (or 40 or 30) 
selected households may represent a much larger actual neighborhood, even exceeding 
the size of a community forest user group. This might imply that the spatial spill-over 
effect operates across several community forest groups, e.g., some community forest 
groups have similar incomes. Capturing this kind of spatial spill-over effect is important 
not only for statistical reasons (e.g., an insignificant coefficient becomes significant or 
vice visa), but also for theoretical and practical reasons: This kind of spatial spill-over 
effect only exists on some variables, which might indicate that collective action may be 
affected by factors operating at more than one spatial scale or neighborhood size. Hence 
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there should not exist one-size-fits-all solutions when considering management 
interventions. 
 Perception of Mikania as a threat at the community forest level. 
Spatial filtering additionally impacts the relationship between collective action 
and the perception of Mikania as a threat by community forest governance committees. 
Perception at the community forest level shifts from significantly influencing collective 
action at the smaller neighborhood scale, to being insignificant at larger neighborhood 
sizes (30, 40, and 50 households); in other words, this relationship breaks down at larger 
spatial scales. Numerous households belonging to Chitwan community forests report 
distrusting either their governance committee members or Chitwan National Park 
officials and such households are often spatially close (i.e. neighbors) and share their 
immediate neighbors' or family members' opinions (chapter 2). This results in 
heterogeneous clusters of opinions within a given community forest user group. When 
these heterogeneous clusters are grouped together in a larger spatial unit, the relationship 
between perception and household participation in collective action breaks down.  
As space appears to alter some factors' influences on collective action at larger 
neighborhood sizes, i.e., sizes that are more representative of the community forest 
spatial extent, there are important implications for local stakeholders interested in 
encouraging or influencing Mikania management efforts. For instance, if community 
forest governance committee members wish to improve the reception of their opinions 
regarding Mikania and management options in areas where household distrust is present, 
the analysis indicates engagement at the sub-community forest level is important to 
overcome these issues. Opinions of community forest governance committees are 
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clustered and influential in collective action decisions at smaller neighborhoods, of which 
there are many in a given community forest area. Targeting efforts to disseminate 
information about Mikania management at a smaller scale may improve trust and have a 
greater impact than attempting to blanket all households in the community forest with the 
same information simultaneously.   
The comparative analysis incorporating spatial filtering is one way to examine the 
influence of space on collective action and is a point of departure for future efforts. There 
are many potential ways to strengthen or expand this analysis in future work, including 
exploring different conceptualizations of neighborhoods and investigating other ways of 
defining space, such as through different network analyses. 
Conclusions 
Understanding what influences collective action in the management of natural 
resources is broadly important, with the potential to unlock insights to aid groups in 
overcoming barriers to taking collective action at multiple scales to solve a host of global 
human-environment issues. A more detailed understanding of the factors influencing 
collective action, using an approach that values both quantitative and qualitative 
information, is the first stage in handling problems that have the potential to be addressed 
with collective action. This analysis also supports the importance of studying the 
precursors of collective action at multiple scales, including both actors at the individual 
or household level as well as the larger governance institutions in which they are 
embedded. 
 Agrawal (2001, 2014) notes that the search for general principles to govern the 
commons and common pool resources, that apply in all cases, is often fruitless and time 
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consuming and argues researchers should instead focus on comparative analyses and 
statistical interpretations of data to achieve an “empirically relevant theory of the 
commons” (Agrawal, 2001, p.1649). I believe statistical analyses, large sample size 
comparative studies, and consideration of neighborhood impact can contribute to both of 
these ideas. Statistical analyses can assist researchers in identifying overarching patterns 
in collective action as they accumulate over time, while they simultaneously provide 
insight into unique systems and local problems (Gibson et al., 2005; Pagdee et al., 2006). 
Using a statistical model, this research was able to compare collective action across 21 
community forests, contextualize the findings with qualitative data, and explore how 
these findings fit into a larger discussion regarding the importance of rigorously 
understanding what influences collective action. 
Certain types of human-environment problems are suited to be effectively solved 
with different types of collective action (i.e. top-down versus bottom-up), and although 
solutions will be context and community specific (Ostrom, 2007; Ostrom et al., 1999; 
Taylor & Van Grieken, 2015), general patterns that emerge in factors that influence 
collective action resulting from empirical statistical studies and large sample size 
comparative studies can promote research able to identify commonalities. This more 
general understanding of what impacts collective action from a rigorous perspective can 
contribute to influencing situations and designing institutions to encourage collective 
action at different levels, such as households, neighborhoods, or entire community forest 
user groups. In other words, if researchers understand what is likely to motivate 
collective action in different global contexts, they can empower communities with this 
information to aid them in building strong, effective collective action movements to solve 
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critical issues as the community perceives them. If individuals must perceive 
environmental issues as posing personal risk to attempt to solve them (Lubell, 2002; 
Lubell et al., 2007; Stoutenborough et al., 2015), researchers need to fully understand 
when and why people perceive some human-environment issues as personally risky while 
others are interpreted through a distant, detached, or indifferent perspective. Information 
gained from a greater number of rigorous studies investigating perception of collective 
action problems as personally harmful or benign to individuals at multiple levels will aid 
researchers in understanding (1) if perception is universally important in all collective 
action problems and (2) the differences between individuals who perceive these problems 
as posing personal risk. This work contributes to an empirical understanding of how these 
variables catalyze effective collective action.  
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPLORING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE THROUGH RATIONAL CHOICE 
AND CULTURAL DIFFUSION PERSPECTIVES 
Chapter Overview 
There are multiple theories regarding how institutions change over time, but 
institutional change is often difficult to study and understand in practice. Agent-based 
modeling, also called individual-based modeling, is known as a technique to explore 
emergent phenomena resulting from the micro level activities and interactions between 
heterogeneous agents and between agents and the environment. Such models allow 
researchers to investigate theories which may otherwise be difficult to examine. This 
study presents a theoretically driven agent-based model to explore two perspectives on 
institutional change, rational choice and cultural diffusion, in a rapidly changing social-
ecological system in Chitwan, Nepal. The Chitwan region is urbanizing and facing a 
threat associated with the spread of an invasive plant, Mikania micrantha (Mikania). This 
chapter focuses on understanding how shared norms and strategies for Mikania 
management may change over time with each perspective of institutional change and the 
resulting impacts on the spread of Mikania. Understanding shared norms and strategies 
(often referred to as types of ‘informal’ institutions) is critical to understanding natural 
resource management outcomes. The model results are largely intuitive and consistent 
with previous studies. It is found that rational choice is an unlikely candidate for 
institutional change in Chitwan and that the social learning and imitation mechanism 
modeled in the cultural diffusion perspective better replicates empirical patterns. 
Although the focus here is on invasive species, the approach is applicable to many other 
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sites with implications for understanding institutional change in any social-ecological 
system confronting global environmental changes. Ultimately, this study advances the 
understanding of how adopted norms and strategies change over time and how norms and 
strategies mediate prominent social-ecological challenges, contributing to the possibility 
of effectively confronting such challenges in the future. 
Introduction and Literature  
Institutional scholars have widely documented that institutions, as the shared 
rules, norms, strategies, and values that shape human decision making (North, 1990; 
Ostrom, 2005), profoundly influence natural resource management. The institutions in a 
given system often shape whether resource management will be successful or not 
(Ostrom, 2005; Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994). In cases where natural resource 
management is deemed unsuccessful, people often seek to change the institutions 
governing that system (Burger et al., 2001; Ostrom, 1990). Understanding how 
institutions change is a topic rife with difficulties, including observing change over long 
time scales, different theories about the mechanism of change, and analysis and 
measurement (Campbell, 2004). In this study, it is argued that understanding how 
institutions change is an important element of moving towards sustainable natural 
resource management in systems facing rapid social-ecological changes and a 
theoretically driven agent-based model (ABM) exploring institutional change in such a 
system is presented.  
Many institutional studies of common pool and natural resources have focused on 
the role of rules in management decisions, but here management norms and strategies are 
explicitly operationalized (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995). An agent-based model is utilized 
  118 
to explore the change in shared strategies when confronted with a social-ecological 
challenge via two theoretical perspectives: cultural diffusion (Axelrod, 1997) and rational 
choice (see Ostrom, 2005). Understanding shared norms and strategies (often called 
‘informal’ institutions) is critical to understanding social-ecological systems, especially in 
decentralized management situations that may place less emphasis on formal rules. The 
agent-based modeling approach also empowers exploration of different theories that 
would otherwise be difficult to unpack and observe the implications of over time. 
Studies of successful common pool resource management are often case-study 
based and rely primarily upon analysis of rich qualitative data. More recently, the field 
has focused on incorporating quantitative data and computational analysis with 
qualitative data. Advances in the area of computational social science have made agent-
based (also known as individual-based) models increasingly appealing to study natural 
resources and social-ecological systems (SES) (Bonabeau, 2002; Epstein & Axtell, 1996; 
Heard et al., 2015; Lee et al., 2015). Such computational models provide researchers the 
opportunity to manipulate a wide variety of system characteristics to construct 
counterfactual situations, reevaluate past conditions, or explore the impact of added 
factors that cannot be or are very difficult to directly observe in actual systems. In this 
sense, agent-based models have been described as virtual laboratories for exploring 
social-ecological systems (Magliocca, Shelley, & Smorul, 2015). The agent-based model 
presented here explores the impact of changes in management norms and strategies on 
the spread of an invasive plant in locally governed forests in Chitwan, Nepal. 
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Study site and objectives.    
Community forests and their user groups are one example of collectively 
managed social-ecological systems that the institutional literature has explored. 
Community forestry programs, each giving local users some degree of autonomous 
resource management, have been established globally (Charnley & Poe, 2007). They 
include a forest ecosystem and the group of people that actively contribute to the 
management of the forest resources. Globally, they have encountered differing levels of 
success. Some are entirely managed by local organizations, while others are formally 
owned by the national, state, or regional governments with management rights held by 
locally established community forest management committees (White & Martin, 2002). 
The complex human-environment dynamics and the heterogeneity in management and 
decision processes in community forestry situations make them an excellent candidate for 
agent-based modeling (Borshchev & Filippov, 2004; Janssen & Ostrom, 2006).  
Chitwan, Nepal is a district located in the southern region of Nepal, in the sub-
tropical Terai climate. Chitwan has been home to formal community forest user groups 
since the program was formalized in the 1990s by the national Forest Management Act 
(Gilmour, 2003). These resource users have faced a variety of challenges, such as 
increasing urbanization, but more recently a rapidly growing invasive plant (Mikania 
micrantha, referred to as Mikania) has disturbed the system. Mikania is a vine-like plant 
that is particularly difficult to successfully remove due to its biological seed dispersal; if 
not properly covered/contained in removal efforts during the flowering season, the seeds 
will further spread the plant (Barreto & Evans, 1995). Mikania grows on both the forest 
floor and climbs small trees, meaning it is often tangled in fodder and grasses that 
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community forest users collect. Thus, commonplace resource collection and management 
efforts have resulted in aiding Mikania dispersal.  
The aim of this study is to develop and employ an agent-based model to 
understand the following questions:   
1. How do empirically observed and theoretically hypothesized management 
norms and strategies in Chitwan impact patterns of Mikania distribution?  
2. How does the adoption of norms and strategies change over time and which 
theory of institutional change, rational choice or cultural diffusion, better fits 
empirical observations in the system?  
3. What are the implications for managing social-ecological systems in the 
future, including when current institutions do not fit new social-ecological 
challenges?  
This study incorporates two perspectives on how shared norms and strategies for 
managing Mikania are adopted and change over time: rational choice and cultural 
diffusion. Much institutional work has focused on operationalizing rules, with less focus 
on shared norms and strategies (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Raiser, 1997). Under a 
bounded rationality framework, individuals seek to maximize their own utility under 
cognitive, information, and time constraints (Ostrom, 2005). Experimental economics 
studies conducted with cultures around the world have shown that there are individuals 
everywhere who fail to conform to the selfish rational actor theory (Richerson & Henrich, 
2012), noting that individuals can act cooperatively or altruistically to seek personal or 
group benefits. The rational choice sub-model incorporates these findings, allowing 
individuals to evaluate factors beyond the cost of a norm or strategy. Axelrod (1997) 
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developed a model of cultural diffusion, where the probability of individuals interacting 
and adopting new cultural characteristics is based on their level of cultural similarity. I 
wish to be clear that “cultural diffusion” does not refer to the pseudoscientific concept of 
hyperdiffusion, where all cultures are assumed to diffuse from a single cultural source 
(Williams, 1991, p.224). This study extends this approach to explore how shared norms 
and strategies change over time based on individual interactions. Utilizing these two 
perspectives in the model assists in unpacking the impact of each process and the 
outcomes that may arise in comparison to empirical observations from Chitwan. 
Although the focus of this study is invasive species, the approach and insights related to 
institutional change are generalizable to other social-ecological systems encountering 
rapid global environmental change. 
 How do institutions change?  
There are several theories of institutional change (table 5.1). These theories are at 
times competing, but often elements of separate theories are compatible. Here, two main 
theories of institutional change are described, while acknowledging there are others. The 
authors that have theorized institutional change under each of these perspectives often 
utilize different definitions of ‘institution.’ In this study, institutions refer to the shared 
rules, norms, strategies, and values that shape human decision making; they are the ‘rules 
of the game,’ in line with North (1990) and Ostrom (2005).  
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Table 5.1. Common categories of theories of institutional change (summarized from 
Kingston & Caballero, 2009 and Mahoney & Thelen, 2010)  
Type  Description Examples Problems  Citations 
Centralized  Also described as 
deliberate/purposeful; this 
type of institutional 
change is not usually 
random or accidental 
(although, it can have 
unintended 
consequences). Often 
occurs via a political 
process or collective 
choice mechanism 
Explaining the 
origin of property 
rights via 
‘contracting,’ where 
higher level rules 
shape the change of 
lower level property 
rules; The cost-
benefit analysis 
embedded in 
Ostrom’s 
constitutional- 
collective choice- 
operational rule 
hierarchy 
Has difficulty 
explaining 
when/why ‘formal’ 
rule are 
ineffective/ignored 
and addressing 
“informal” 
institutions, such as 
social norms  
Libecap 
(1994),  
Ostrom 
(2005), 
Alston 
(1996), 
Kantor 
(1998)  
Decentralized  Also described as 
evolutionary (where 
institutions emerge via a 
decentralized selection 
process), incremental; new 
institutions can emerge at 
random and sometimes 
through design  
Transaction cost 
literature where the 
most 
efficient/optimal 
institutions are 
assumed to survive; 
Sequences of habits 
that cause emergent 
actions; Punctuated 
equilibrium  
characterized by 
long periods of 
stability and short 
periods of rapid 
changes 
Often neglects the 
roles of collective 
action and political 
processes in 
institutional change  
Williamson 
(2000), 
Veblen 
(1899), 
Hayek 
(1978), 
Young 
(1996) 
Equilibrium  Combines elements of 
both decentralized and 
centralized processes of 
institutional change. Focus 
is not on the rules 
governing behavior, but 
on behavior. Formal and 
informal rules are viewed 
as the means to people 
achieving a shared set of 
beliefs about behaviors 
which result in individual 
actions.  
Institutions 
generate social 
behavior; 
“…institutions 
emerge as 
endogenous 
equilibrium 
outcomes, 
reflecting a socially 
constructed reality.” 
(Kingston & 
Caballero 2009, p. 
171)   
Tradeoff in 
attempting to study 
formal and informal 
rules simultaneously  
Aoki 
(2001), 
Greif & 
Laitin 
(2004), 
Schotter 
(1981), 
Kingston & 
Caballero 
(2009)  
 
The primary distinction drawn between theories of institutional change is 
deliberate change that occurs via a centralized mechanism (like collective-choice 
situations) versus evolutionary change that occurs via a decentralized mechanism 
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(Kingston & Caballero, 2009). Institutional change that occurs in a deliberate manner in a 
centralized process (such as through voting to alter legislations) tends to occur more 
quickly than institutional changes that occur via a decentralized process. It has been noted 
that ‘formal’ rules, often defined as written rules (such as laws), are more frequently 
changed deliberately, whereas ‘informal’ rules are much slower to change and usually 
shift in a decentralized process resulting from uncoordinated micro-level behaviors. 
Informal rules include unwritten agreements, moral or ethical norms, and social norms. 
Institutional change may also occur, via both centralized and decentralized processes, in a 
punctuated manner with periods of stability interrupted by points of rapid transition. 
Understanding rates of institutional change is important to policy makers and 
stakeholders attempting to deliberately change either formal or informal institutions 
(Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). A third category of institutional change theories is that of the 
“equilibrium view” (Kingston & Caballero, 2009), where behaviors and the endogenous 
nature of institutions (both formal and informal) are the focus. The equilibrium view is 
fully compatible with both centralized and decentralized theories of institutional change 
(table 5.1).  
The model described in this research is concerned with informal institutions, 
specifically norms and strategies related to Mikania management. Each of the explored 
perspectives, rational choice and cultural diffusion, assesses decentralized processes of 
institutional change, with individuals interacting on the micro-level potentially leading to 
changes in the composition of norms and strategies on the macro-level over time, via a 
different mechanism. The shared norms and strategies for Mikania management are 
endogenous to the system outcomes, thus the model is also compatible with the 
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equilibrium view of institutional change where institutional changes are viewed as 
endogenous to the system and people’s shared beliefs about behaviors (table 5.1). 
Rational choice is explored in the first sub-model. In this case, agents engage in a cost-
benefit analysis; if the individual benefit of adopting a specific strategy is greater than its 
cost, the individual can select a costlier institution. But otherwise, the boundedly rational 
agents assess whether Mikania is present, the value of the land, and if removal is 
beneficial; with this assessment, they adopt the lowest cost institution. Although the cost-
benefit analysis in this model occurs at the micro-level, the process is similar to Ostrom’s 
theory of institutional change where individuals engage in a cost-benefit analysis and 
agree to institutional change if a ‘minimum coalition’ is achieved (Ostrom, 2005, p. 61). 
Instead of the change taking place on the scale of the entire community simultaneously 
(i.e. individuals are not voting or agreeing on a threshold where everyone will adopt one 
institution after the 'minimum coalition' is met, such as a majority in democratic voting 
processes), the change takes place as individuals evaluate the cost of adopting specific 
strategies over time. The second perspective on change is investigated in the cultural 
diffusion sub-model based on Axelrod (1997). Axelrod explored how simple interactions 
between agents with some level of cultural similarity created changes in cultural 
heterogeneity over time. I modify the model to examine institutional change by modeling 
Mikania management norms and strategies and tracking the change in these norms and 
Mikania patterns over time. These strategies change via individual agent interactions and 
the mechanism of change can be thought of as social learning.  
People in Chitwan engage in collective action using shared strategies for Mikania 
removal, but many of these strategies are inefficient, furthering Mikania dispersal to 
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different degrees. Thus, the approach facilitates an exploration of how initial 
configurations of shared strategies and norms, which correspond to different rates of 
Mikania spreading or redistributing, change over time in an effort to identify efficient 
institutions and understand how institutional change occurs.  
Modeling social-ecological systems. 
The concept of social-ecological systems has a long history, with scientific 
articles discussing the concept over a century ago (Berkes & Folke, 2000), while the last 
decade has witnessed the emerging of a similar concept of coupled human and natural 
systems (CHANS; Liu et al., 2007a; Liu et al., 2007b). The concept recognizes that most 
environmental and social problems cannot be solved without considering the impact of 
humans on the remainder of the environment and the reverse. In the study of common 
pool resources, many researchers addressing variations in successful resource 
management ignore biophysical variables in favor of social ones despite the frequent 
importance of biophysical variability in resource condition (Agrawal & Chhatre, 2006).  
Attempting to model social-ecological systems in an effort to better understand 
them is full of inherent complexities including scale, boundary, and information issues. 
As such, the modeling literature contains a diversity of methods including systems 
dynamics, geographic information systems (GIS), agent-based models (ABM), and 
various combinations of these approaches (Railsback & Grimm, 2011). Agent-based 
models of social-ecological systems have explored a wide variety of topics including 
forest fire regimes, fisheries collapse, and land use and land cover change. Recent studies 
have indicated that these models could benefit by more explicitly incorporating ecology 
(Epstein et al., 2013). It is important to recognize that ABMs have contributed to moving 
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science forward in a variety of fields. For instance, simulations of cooperating and selfish 
agents’ harvest of a renewable resource contributed to increased understanding of the 
evolution of cooperation (Pérez & Janssen, 2014). In the realm of institutions, ABMs 
incorporating institutional components have furthered scientific understanding of how 
institutions impact outcomes in social-ecological systems. For instance, an ABM assisted 
in understanding the effects of environmental processes on decision making in small 
scale forestry. By incorporating institutional and ecological data, Leahy et al., (2013) 
showed that harvesting was driven in part by economic motivation contrary to previous 
findings. Vallino (2014) utilized agent based modelling to explore the impact of both 
exogenous and endogenous institutions on the outcomes of forest management. The 
model simulations support previous findings that the presence of either endogenous or 
exogenous institutions, including use rules and enforcement, are correlated with better 
forest conditions over an open access regime. It also led to the insight that exogenously 
imposed institutional arrangements can be ineffective in sustainable forest management 
when they harm the “intrinsic environmental motivations” of resource users (Vallino, 
2014). 
While there is some overlap between other modeling approaches, such as system 
dynamics (Schieritz & Milling, 2003), ABMs provide the opportunity to more precisely 
explore the role of individual heterogeneous agents (Grimm et al., 2005) and have been 
used to model the dynamics of a variety of social-ecological systems, including 
agricultural decision making (e.g. Bithell & Brasington, 2009; Schreinemachers & 
Berger, 2011), water management (e.g. Becu et al., 2003; Schlueter & Pahl-Wostl, 2007), 
and forest management (e.g. Leahy et al., 2013; Vallino, 2014).    
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Invasive species as a social-ecological challenge. 
Invasive species represent one type of challenge facing social-ecological systems 
and common pool resources and are often interconnected with or exacerbated by other 
issues such as urbanization, climate change, and environmental pollution (Keller, 
Cadotte, & Sandiford, 2014). Studies of invasive species have been conducted on plants, 
animals, and insects, but this section will focus primarily on those conducted with plants. 
There are thousands of invasive, or non-native, plant species that have been identified 
globally (Lodge et al., 2006) and they cause varying degrees of impact on people and the 
environment. Invasive species are most frequently studied in the context of their 
ecological or economic, but not social, impacts (Rai & Scarborough, 2014; Schuettler, 
Rozzi, & Jax, 2011). Yet it is recognized that it is important to understand invasive 
species’ social and ecological influences (Atlan & Darrot, 2012). Evaluating invasive 
species in a social-ecological context allows researchers to more accurately consider the 
impacts that invasive species have, both on humans and the biophysical world. This 
approach is important in the face of attempts to manage invasive plants. Without an 
understanding of how invasive plants impact both the social and ecological subsystems, 
management attempts may be contentious among social groups with different interests 
and values (Estevez et al., 2015) or ineffective due to poor understanding of the 
institutional norms and rules that interact with management efforts. It has been suggested 
that geographic areas with diverse land uses (referred to as “management mosaics”) are 
more susceptible to invasive species spread, as there are more likely to be a variety of 
managers with different, conflicting interests involved. As the number of managers in an 
area increases, the incentive to engage in collective action to remove and manage 
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invasive species decreases (Epanchin-Niell et al., 2009). In order to foster invasive 
species management, it is important to understand the social elements of the system, 
including the interests and values of different stakeholders. 
Research examining invasive species in a social-ecological context is nascent, but 
the body of relevant literature is increasing (Schuettler et al., 2011). Such studies tend to 
adopt different approaches to exploring the social elements of invasive species, including 
understanding attitudes and beliefs surrounding invasive plant management (Fischer et 
al., 2014), exploring risky behavior related to invasive species (Drake et al., 2015), 
incorporating social elements in landscape modeling of invasive species (Crespo-Perez et 
al., 2011), and discussing the role of traditional resource management in areas impacted 
by invasive species (Ticktin, Whitehead, & Fraiola, 2006). There are also a variety of 
studies addressing the economic impacts of invasive species encompassing the ecosystem 
services perspective (e.g. Ayanu et al., 2015), utilizing bioeconomic models (Fenichel, 
Horan, & Bence, 2010; McDermott, Irwin, & Taylor, 2013), and investigating solutions 
to the international trade related risks invasive species pose (Perrings et al., 2010).  
In the case of Mikania management, Murphy et al. (2013) find that efforts to 
manage Mikania in the future must incorporate plans to reduce burning and to 
introduce/spread information about the best Mikania removal practices. Successful 
implementation of these recommendations requires a detailed understanding of the social 
context, including institutions. Without an understanding of the social-ecological system 
invasive species occupy, people attempting to remove or manage an invasive species risk 
running into conflicts among people with different interests and strategies and stagnating 
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such attempts (Estevez et al., 2015). This methodological approach is generalizable to 
understand norms and strategies in other systems facing rapid social-ecological changes.  
The model.  
An analysis of a simple, but theoretically interesting and informative, agent-based 
model that explores two perspectives on how norms and strategies for Mikania 
management are adopted and change over time is presented. To increase the 
generalizability of the findings, the cost of implementing management norms and 
strategies are parameterized in the model; these parameters can be altered to reflect the 
cost of different institutions in other systems. This approach is intended to allow 
exploration of the impact of institutional change on outcomes in the context of other 
social-ecological systems.  
Methods  
In a review of the ABM literature studying coupled human and natural systems, 
An (2012) identified nine primary types of models with their own assumptions about 
human decision making. These included: assumption based rules, evolutionary 
programming, empirical rules, preference based decisions, participatory based, 
institutional based, cognitive, space theory, and microeconomic based models. This ABM 
does not fall strictly into any of these categories, but rather combines several to create the 
framework where agents make decisions within the social-ecological system. 
Specifically, the model is institution based at its core, and assumes that agents make 
Mikania management decisions based on the associated norms, but it also incorporates 
cognitive elements. As An (2012) notes, institutional based models are almost 
inseparably linked to cognitive based models. The model is also informed by 
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ethnographic fieldwork. The agents in this model represent households distributed on a 
virtual landscape. 
 Model overview.  
An overview of the model setup and processes is presented here; more detailed 
information is provided in the Overview, Design elements, and Details (ODD) protocol 
(An et al., 2014; Grimm et al., 2006, 2010) in Appendix D. The model was implemented 
using NetLogo (version 5.3.1) (Wilensky, 1999). NetLogo is an open source agent-based 
modeling platform. One of its disadvantages is its lack of advanced features found in 
other ABM platforms such as Repast. However, NetLogo has been praised for being user 
friendly and includes both extensive documentation and a large user community (Brown 
et al., 2005).  
  Set up. 
There are two distinct, interacting elements within the model: the landscape and 
the agents. Within the model, the agents represent households that make individual 
decisions regarding Mikania management. The model can be initialized with between 100 
and 1000 agents; all simulations analyzed here were initialized with 100 agents. The 
agents are aware of their geographic location (in NetLogo, their patch ID), their own 
features, and the environment (Mikania cover in their patch and the patch’s productivity 
value). Agents are randomly placed on a landscape composed of individual spaces, called 
patches in NetLogo, and each patch represents one 5ft2 plot within a forest. The 
landscape is represented by a two dimensional grid, consisting of 1024 patches. Each 
patch has a randomly assigned corresponding ‘productivity value’ ranging from 0 to 1, 
where 0 represents highly degraded land or land that is otherwise useless to an agent. 
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Each patch additionally has an initial ‘Mikania cover’ value, ranging from 0 to 1, that 
represents the percent of the patch that is populated with Mikania. The landscape can be 
setup with a gradient of Mikania cover, with groups of patches initially ranging from 0 to 
75 percent cover (0 to 0.75), or with a random distribution of Mikania cover, with each 
patch randomly assigned a cover value. Conversations with ecological experts working 
with Mikania data in Chitwan indicated that a gradient of cover more accurately reflects 
the actual distribution, so it is used as the basis for all analyses presented and discussed in 
this research. As the goals of this model are theoretically driven, topographic and land 
use data is not incorporated at this time. Although useful for policy decisions, the use of 
such data can restrict the interpretation of a model; the model risks becoming more about 
the particular conditions and less about the processes being studied (Gimblett, 2002).  
The agents are initialized with several values, including a random ‘value-
threshold’ (representing in part the value an agent places on Mikania removal for 
altruistic reasons) ranging from 0 to 1 used in the rational choice sub-model; see the 
ODD protocol in Appendix D for details. After setup procedures are completed, the 
model completes procedures to ‘remove Mikania’ and ‘redistribute Mikania’; the latter 
changes Mikania distribution (i.e. Mikania in a given patch may change) based on a rate 
of increase, which is explained below. In order to manage Mikania (the ‘remove 
Mikania’ procedure), agents enter the rational choice or cultural diffusion sub-models, 
depending on which sub-model the model analyst has selected (the cultural diffusion and 
rational choice sub-models are independently processed).  
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  Rational choice.  
In the ‘rational choice’ sub-model (figure 5.1), an agent enters a cost-benefit 
analysis to adopt a Mikania management strategy. These are outlined in table 5.2. Each 
agent’s ‘value-threshold’ is intended to allow agents to evaluate their management 
decisions considering more than time cost and can be thought of as including preferences 
such as altruistic actions or consideration of other responsibilities such as children. If an 
agent engages in removal, they remove Mikania from their current location and Mikania 
changes. The rate of change of Mikania cover in their patch depends on the ‘initial 
amount removed,’ which can be altered for sensitivity analysis in the model. In table 5.2, 
the cost associated with each strategy is accurately ranked based on qualitative fieldwork. 
However, the removal cost, in terms of time and personal effort, is essentially an ordinal 
variable- the ordering is accurate, but the distance between the numbers (i.e. how much 
costlier it is to conduct mechanical removal versus burning) is unknown. Because of this, 
a sensitivity analysis is conducted to explore the impact of different costs for each 
strategy, while maintaining the ranking of the costs (Appendix D). See Yang and Gilbert 
(2008) for a conversation on parametrizing qualitative data.  
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Figure 5.1. A simplified conceptual view of the rational choice sub-model. Mikania cover 
(the small squares) in the forest changes over time based on changing removal norms and 
strategies in each model. In this sub-model, agents engage in a cost-benefit analysis to 
adopt and change removal strategies over time. 
 
Table 5.2. Mikania management strategies and costs for the rational choice sub-model  
Management strategy  Cost1 
Do nothing 0 
Mechanical removal (pulling)  0.3 
Pulling and burying  0.35 
Burning  0.2 
Best practice* 0.5 
*The best practice, or most effective, removal method is thought to be mechanical 
removal, followed by bagging all of the plant parts, and burning them. This hypothesis 
will be confirmed or rejected with forthcoming ecological data from Chitwan.  
 
  Cultural diffusion. 
The second sub-model agents can enter to make Mikania management decisions 
is ‘cultural diffusion’ (figure 5.2). This sub-model is a modification of the “Diffusion of 
Culture” model from open ABM implemented by Sergi Lozano and Michael Maes 
(Lozano & Maes, 2008) and based on Axelrod’s (1997) article. Here, agents each have a 
set of norms, strategies, and values represented as a randomly assigned string of length n 
(n ranges from 1 to 20). Each of these traits has m possible features (m ranges from 1 to 
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20). For example, one of the traits is modeled as ‘Mikania removal strategies’ (table 5.3). 
This trait can take on five possible values, represented by 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4. Thus, each 
agent has a string of numbers, of length n; some agents may have identical strings, but 
most differ by some random degree. In this modification of the model, the first feature is 
defined as ‘Mikania removal strategy’ and the other features remain abstract 
representations of other possible norms/values/cultural components. Agents within the 
sub-model choose to interact with the spatially closest agent based on the similarity of 
their feature list. If agents are similar, it is possible they will interact. If they interact, they 
may exchange some of their traits, increasing their similarity. In terms of exchanging 
heritable, biological elements, this would represent the exchange of genes. The exchange 
of social elements, such as norms and values, typically occurs via learning or imitation. 
The “Diffusion of Culture” model investigates a variety of variables that influence how 
quickly culture homogenizes over time, including a rate of mutation and the inclusion of 
random interactions. In this modification, the focus is on tracking the impact of the initial 
percentage of agents with each management strategy. Here again, if an agent engages in 
removal, they remove Mikania from their current location and Mikania changes (the 
percent decrease depends on the removal strategy). The rate of change in their patch 
depends on the ‘initial amount removed,’ which can be altered for sensitivity analysis in 
the model.   
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Figure 5.2. A simplified conceptual view of the cultural diffusion sub-model. Mikania 
cover (the small squares) in the forest changes over time based on changing removal 
norms and strategies in each model. In this sub-model, agents interact based on the 
similarity of their set of values/strategies/norms. When agents interact, they randomly 
exchange some of their shared strategies, leading to changes and homogenization over 
time.  
 
Table 5.3. Mikania removal strategies and associated feature value in cultural diffusion 
sub-model  
Mikania removal strategy  Feature value (trait) in model  
Do nothing  0 
Best practice 1 
Mechanical removal (pulling)  2 
Pulling and burying  3 
Burning  4 
 
            Redistributing the Mikania.   
Each Mikania removal strategy is tracked within the model based on an agent’s 
current cost (rational choice) or the value of the first feature (trait) (cultural diffusion). 
Each removal strategy then corresponds to a specific probability that Mikania will 
increase and eventually spread into a neighboring patch. For example, engaging in 
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burning could increase the Mikania cover in a given patch by 10 percent due to seed 
dispersal. The values for the rate of increase for each strategy were selected based on a 
combination of literature and expert opinion. The values for the rate of increase were also 
systematically varied in the model to explore the impact of different rates and can be 
adjusted as new information is available. When the Mikania cover of a patch is greater 
than 0.5 (based on expert opinion and sensitivity analysis; see the ODD protocol), the 
Mikania from that patch spreads to a neighboring patch.  
            Parameters, validation, and verification. 
The model parameters are primarily informed by previous literature and empirical 
observations from ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Chitwan in 2014. Although most 
agent-based models are validated using quantitative data, there has been a growing 
conversation about the importance of incorporating qualitative data into the model 
creation and validation processes and several authors have assessed agent-based models 
informed by ethnographic data (Agar, 2005; Dean et al., 2000; Huigen, Overmars, & de 
Groot, 2006; Yang & Gilbert, 2008). Agent based modeling as a whole relies on intuition 
and creativity that are developed with experience (Railsback & Grimm 2011). There are a 
few books and many articles written on the subject of agent based modeling, but they 
each stress that while it is good science to follow standardized protocols like ODD 
documentation and some form of model validation and testing, no modeling process is 
identical and building, refining, and testing a model will be a unique experience. For 
example, Railsback and Grimm (2011) outline an order for designing, building, and 
testing ABMs, but they note that these heuristics will not always work and all models 
may not involve the same steps. It thus becomes vital that a researcher creating an agent-
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based model is thorough in documenting the modeling process in an effort to provide 
other researchers with a replicable study.  
Validation of ABMs takes on a variety of definitions in the literature, but can 
generally be thought of as the process through which models are assessed for either their 
ability to represent their intended, limited process or their ability to produce outcomes in 
the “real” world (Zeigler, Praehofer, & Kim, 2000). There is not a singular process for 
model validation or analysis, and model validation is often difficult (Brown et al., 2005), 
with several scholars recognizing that models for complex open systems cannot truly be 
validated (Oreskes, Shrader-Frechette, & Belitz, 1994). Following advice from Railsback 
and Grimm (2011) and An et al. (2005), model validation included checks for structural 
validity, including conversations with experts, and a comparison of empirical fieldwork 
and model output. Verification was an iterative process that included a continuous 
debugging of the model as it was coded, running extreme value tests (where model 
responses when parameters were set to extreme values were assessed), and sensitivity 
analyses (assessing how the model responded to small parameter changes). The results of 
the extreme value tests and sensitivity analysis largely comply with the qualitative data 
and field observations (for detail see the ODD protocol in Appendix D).  
Additionally, sixteen different scenarios to explore the impact of the percentage of 
agents adopting the best practice removal method in the cultural diffusion sub-model are 
explored (table 5.4). These scenarios are designed to test the hypothesis that higher initial 
percentages of agents adopting the best practice removal method will reduce Mikania, 
even with burning still occurring. There are four categories of scenarios classified as 
high, low, or moderate burning. The percentage of agents initially adopting the best 
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practice management method is then varied systematically, which represents part of a 
one-at-time sensitivity analysis (ten Broeke, van Voorn, & Ligtenberg, 2016).  
Table 5.4. Parameters for cultural diffusion scenarios  
 Initial best 
practice  
Initial 
burning  
Initial 
pulling  
High burning, high mechanical 
removal 
0.05 0.4 0.4 
0.1 0.4 0.4 
0.3 0.35 0.35 
0.5 0.25 0.25 
Moderate burning, high mechanical 
removal 
0.05 0.25 0.4 
0.1 0.25 0.4 
0.3 0.25 0.4 
0.5 0.25 0.4 
Low burning, high mechanical 
removal  
0.05 0.1 0.4 
0.1 0.1 0.4 
0.3 0.1 0.4 
0.5 0.1 0.4 
Moderate burning, moderate 
mechanical removal  
0.05 0.25 0.3 
0.1 0.25 0.3 
0.3 0.25 0.3 
0.5 0.25 0.3 
 
Results  
Due to stochastic variables in the model (including agent variables like ‘value 
threshold’ and patch variables like ‘productivity value’), the results are the averages of 30 
model runs. Results from 60 model runs were very similar, so only the averages of 30 
runs are presented. Due to the agents’ fixed spatial configurations and value thresholds, 
the model parameters stabilized around 100 time steps; thus, each model was stopped 
after 100 time steps.  
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Baseline comparison of rational choice and cultural diffusion. 
In each scenario, Mikania gradually decreases over time, but that Mikania 
decreases more in the cultural diffusion scenario (figure 5.4). In the baseline rational 
choice scenario, without monitoring or sanctions for engaging in burning, most agents 
select the least costly management strategy (figure 5.3, top). In the baseline cultural 
diffusion scenario, very few agents start out with the best practice management strategy, 
and the numbers do not vary much through the simulation (figure 5.3, bottom). With the 
initial amount of Mikania removed set to greater than 20 percent, Mikania gradually 
declines over time. When this parameter is less than 20 percent, Mikania continues to 
gradually increase over time.     
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Figure 5.3. Top: change in agents’ adoption of Mikania management strategies over time 
in baseline rational choice model (no monitoring or sanctions for burning). 0.2 is the cost 
parameter of the least costly method, burning; 0.3 = mechanical, 0.35 = pull and bury, 0.5 
= best practice. Bottom: change in number of agents’ adopting Mikania management 
strategies over time in baseline cultural diffusion model.  
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Figure 5.4. Top: change in Mikania over time corresponding to rational choice runs in top 
of figure 5.3. Bottom: change in Mikania over time corresponding to rational choice runs 
in bottom of figure 5.3.  
 
Cultural diffusion scenarios exploring the impact of best practice adoption 
and initial Mikania removed. 
The cultural diffusion model enables exploration of the change in management 
strategies over time when the percentage of agents initialized with the best practice 
strategy is altered. Each group of scenarios explores how altering the initial percentage of 
agents with the best practice strategy (5 to 50 percent) impacts Mikania when other 
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agents pursue different levels of burning and mechanical removal. The first group of 
scenarios (figure 5.5) sets the initial amount of Mikania removed to less than 20 percent, 
while the second group of scenarios (figure 5.6) sets the initial amount removed to 
greater than 20 percent. In the first group of scenarios, Mikania gradually increases over 
time, while in the second it gradually decreases over time. In all cases, increasing the 
percentage of agents adopting the best practice method resulted in Mikania either 
increasing the least or decreasing the most.  
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Validation. 
To understand which of the theoretical perspectives, rational choice or cultural 
diffusion, most closely represents the situation in Chitwan, qualitative fieldwork 
conducted in Chitwan and later household surveys that confirm much of the earlier 
fieldwork is utilized. Fieldwork and an understanding of on-the-ground conditions can be 
an important indicator of model validity (Yang & Gilbert, 2008). The fieldwork described 
here was conducted in 2014 and included interviews with over 87 individuals from five 
case study community forests in Chitwan. The household survey data were collected in 
2015 and included 1041 households in the catchment areas of 21 Chitwan community 
forests. 
In the rational choice model baseline, without monitoring or sanctioning for 
excessive burning, most of the agents adopt the least costly strategy (burning). This is not 
the case in Chitwan, where only 17 percent of households reported burning Mikania. 
Based on interviews, discussing burning can sometimes be a sensitive subject as some 
community forests have rules against burning. Thus, the actual number of households 
engaging in burning is possibly higher than that reported in the household survey, but it is 
unlikely the percentage of agents engaging in burning reaches the levels in the rational 
choice baseline model. With the introduction of monitoring and sanctioning the number 
of agents adopting the least costly strategy drastically declines. However, regular 
monitoring and sanctioning for burning does not formally exist in Chitwan community 
forests. Considering this, and consistent with a large empirical and experimental literature 
on rational choice and natural resources (see Ostrom, 2005), it is unlikely that the rational 
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choice sub-model accurately represents how institutional change occurs in Chitwan 
community forests.  
The cultural diffusion perspective presents a more plausible possibility for how 
management norms and strategies may change over time in Chitwan and other systems 
facing rapid social-ecological change. In Chitwan, many people reported engaging in 
collective action to remove Mikania based on their neighbors’ decisions or unspoken 
social norms that required at least one person from a household to participate. This 
decision making process is similar to the learning and imitation mechanism modeled in 
the cultural diffusion sub-model. In fact, several recent studies have concluded that most 
humans do not conform to the rational actor model (Richerson & Henrich, 2012) and that 
humanity’s ability to socially learn and imitate is what has allowed humans to thrive in 
changing environmental conditions (Mathew & Perreault, 2015). The observation that 
decision making in Chitwan is often based on social norms and interactions means that 
cultural diffusion is a possible mechanism for institutional change in Chitwan, but it does 
not confirm that cultural diffusion is the actual or only way institutions will change over 
time. I believe comparison of the cultural diffusion model with other theories of 
institutional change is an interesting and vital step for understanding institutional change 
in future work.  
It is difficult to validate models with outcomes that may change and occur over 
very long time scales, such as institutional change. Although this continues to be an issue 
for ABMs (Bithell and Brasington 2009), even models that are difficult to validate 
provide insights for future theoretical work, a discussion point for stakeholders, and can 
inform future policy-oriented conversations and modeling efforts.  
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There are several opportunities for further validation in the future. One option 
includes engaging stakeholders in role playing games and organized conversations about 
model assumptions (Castella, Trung, & Boissau, 2005; Janssen & Ostrom, 2006). Such 
information about perceptions of model validity from people in the system being modeled 
can be critical in understanding and validating key model assumptions and for thinking 
about different ways to model and compare different mechanisms for institutional 
change. Another area for future work is pattern oriented modeling. Pattern oriented 
modelling (POM) (Grimm et al., 2005) is one method to create models representative of 
the systems they model. Railsback and Grimm (2011) describe POM as “…the use of 
patterns observed in the real system as the additional information we need to make ABMs 
structurally realistic and, therefore, more general and useful, scientific, and accurate” (p. 
227). POM is fundamentally based on the “standard” scientific method involving creating 
models that can largely reproduce patterns. An ABM can be pattern oriented by creating 
a model that produces real world pattern-like outcomes; this is especially necessary in 
models that are intended to support decision making. Statistical analyses can also be 
useful in pattern oriented modeling for determining patterns to be analyzed within the 
model, but often important patterns are qualitative in nature (Railsback & Grimm, 2011). 
Thus, further qualitative fieldwork could inform POM efforts. 
Discussion  
The model assessed here explored how agents initially selected Mikania 
management norms and strategies, and how these changed over time, via two different 
theoretical mechanisms of decentralized institutional change. The model contributes the 
ability to make these dynamics of institutional change trackable and easier to explore, 
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understand, and manipulate. The cultural diffusion perspective supported exploration of 
how institutions gradually shift over time in response to changes in sets of shared norms, 
strategies, and values based on meetings with other similar agents (figure 5.3, bottom; 
figures 5.5 and 5.6). The rational choice perspective demonstrated institutional change 
subject to agents seeking to maximize their benefits and reduce their costs, considering 
their preferences (figure 5.3, top). The model results from each of these perspectives are 
largely intuitive based on common pool resource, cooperation, and economics literature 
but the computational approach enabled simultaneous comparison of these perspectives 
in a generalizable manner. Somewhat counterintuitively, the model also shows that the 
initial percentage of agents adopting the best practice, or most efficient, Mikania removal 
method is not as important in reducing Mikania spread as the initial amount of Mikania 
removed.  
In this discussion, the results are first explored from the rational choice and 
cultural diffusion sub-models, noting the major implications for each. Finally, the concept 
of institutional fit and other implications are examined.  
Rational choice. 
Many of the results from this sub-model are intuitive from previous research. In 
particular, the finding that the majority of agents select the least costly common pool 
resource management strategy (here, burning Mikania) is consistent with utility-
maximizing agents engaging in a cost-benefit analysis (figure 5.3, top). Only agents with 
a high value-threshold (reflecting variations in preferences and values) will adopt a 
method that is personally costly to them. When well known institutional design principles 
are incorporated, such as monitoring and sanctions (here, an ‘excessive burning fee’ that 
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is not shown graphically in the results), the number of agents engaging in burning as a 
management strategy decreases. Thus, consistent with the commons literature, one way to 
have agents adopt management practices that reduce the spread of Mikania, but are more 
personally costly, is to implement monitoring and associated sanctions (Anderies, 
Janssen, & Ostrom, 2004).  
Cultural diffusion. 
Here, the goal was to explore institutional change via multiple experiments where 
the initial percentage of agents adopting the best practice management strategy was 
adjusted (figures 5.5 and 5.6). One of the main findings from the scenarios is that agents’ 
adoption of the best practice removal strategy does result in Mikania declining or 
increasing the least, but the initial amount of Mikania removed from a patch is more 
important in determining whether Mikania decreases or increases over time. In the 
context of Chitwan and Mikania, a major challenge to successful removal is that the 
current organized collective management covers relatively small areas of the forests. The 
importance of the initial amount of Mikania removed indicates that successful 
management may include removing more Mikania in a given area at once, while 
additionally expanding the forest area covered in removal efforts to reduce the amount of 
Mikania that reoccurs in previously cleared areas.  
The results also indicate that ecological factors may be driving the continued 
Mikania invasion more than human ones. Even with half of the agents initially adopting 
the best practice removal method, Mikania can still increase over time depending on the 
initial amount of Mikania removed. While the initial amount removed is a human 
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controlled factor, it may be very difficult to increase removal efforts due to the associated 
time costs.  
Institutional fit and introducing new management information.  
In cases where there are historical norms that exacerbate a newer social-
ecological disturbance, implementing best practices for common pool resource 
management like monitoring and sanctioning may not be effective. In Chitwan, the norm 
of burning for other reasons (i.e. traditional agricultural or forest management practices) 
is long standing (Nagendra, 2009), but unintentionally aids in Mikania dispersal (Murphy 
et al., 2013; Ram, 2008). Because of the relative ease of burning in terms of labor/time 
compared to other management options, some agents still opt for this strategy even when 
monitoring and sanctioning are introduced, which contributes to Mikania’s continued 
spread. The case of fit between existing institutions and current social-ecological 
challenges has been previously addressed (Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern, 2003; Folke et al., 
2007; O. Young, 2002), with the conclusion that institutions need to change and evolve in 
order to sustainably govern the commons. In these cases, the introduction of outside 
information may be useful in supporting such governance and change.  
In the case of Chitwan and Mikania, people engage in burning both because it is a 
less costly strategy, but also because they believe it will have some level of success in 
removing Mikania. As Mikania is a relatively new disruption, many households lack 
access to information on effective removal. Even local community forest management 
committees do not always hold this information. Thus, as new disturbances appear as 
global climate and social structures continue to change, natural and common pool 
resource management situations may require increased access to new knowledge coupled 
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with best practices. Introducing new information to communities that are managing their 
own natural resources, particularly in communities with large populations of indigenous 
people, may not always be welcome due to past experiences with colonialism, 
paternalistic knowledge imposition, and the disrespect of local ecological knowledge 
(Davis & Wagner, 2003; Gratani et al., 2011; Mazzocchi, 2006; Nightingale, 2005). 
Thus, the information provider, an outsider versus a community member, is important 
(Nightingale, 2005). It is also important that the community desires outside information 
or assistance with assuaging a disturbance or the information provided is unlikely to be 
welcomed or utilized. When exogenous institutions are imposed, they may crowd out the 
community's intrinsic environmental motivation to manage a resource sustainably When 
endogenous, participatory management norms, established at least in part by community 
members, are in place, intrinsic environmental motivation may allow the community to 
more successfully manage their natural resource (Vallino, 2014). This is important to 
consider in the context of Chitwan when introducing a new “best practice” management 
method. 
Overall, the model indicates that future attempts to catalyze institutional changes 
through a centralized, intentional process should consider implementing incentives for 
switching to the newer “best practice” management strategy. The result that 
implementing monitoring and sanctions allows burning to continue indicates that 
switching to the best practice method is not a problem necessitating increased 
enforcement and sanctioning, but rather a “carrot” problem, requiring greater incentives 
to encourage the switch. This is an interesting finding that merits further research, as 
previous studies have found that punishment and rewards can work together to maximize 
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cooperation in some cases (Andreoni, Harbaugh, & Vesterlund, 2002), although users 
will frequently choose implementing rewards systems over punishments (Sutter, Haigner, 
& Kocher, 2010).  
Further, institutions could change over time due to the introduction of new 
institutions, or the shifting composition of existing ones, via migration processes. 
Migration is an important part of the history of the Chitwan Valley, with new migrants 
regularly entering and others immigrating to nearby countries to send remittances back to 
family members (Bohra & Massey, 2009; Massey, Axinn, & Ghimire, 2010). The 
introduction of new norms and strategies via migration is a process that could be 
explicitly modeled in future efforts. 
The press of Mikania, resilience, and the role of ABMs.  
The invasion of Mikania represents a press disturbance in that it has invaded over 
a long period of time and the changes resulting from the invasion have accumulated and 
will continue to accumulate over years. Press disturbances may contribute to pulse 
disturbances, which occur over a short period of time (either once or reoccurring) and are 
often catastrophic (Arens & West, 2008). For example, climate change is a press 
disturbance, but catalyzes pulse disturbances (like natural disasters or hospitable 
environments for invasive species).  
Press and pulse disturbances are often evaluated in the context of the resilience of 
a system (Berkes, Colding, & Folke, 2003; Collins et al., 2011). The more difficult it is to 
alter the functions of a system and shift it out of its current state when faced with 
disturbances, the more resilient the system is said to be (Holling, 2001). From an 
anthropocentric perspective, when people within a system decide that the function of 
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their current system is desirable, it is also likely desirable to create and maintain 
resilience within that system. Sustainability and resilience are often linked because 
creating a sustainable system can be aided by understanding the current state of the 
resources in the system and how those resources respond to changes, such as press and 
pulse disturbances. Agent-based models have been implemented to understand 
mechanisms of resilience in natural resource management, exploring how different types 
of management respond to changes in factors like information and level of resource 
availability (e.g. Schlueter & Pahl-Wostl, 2007). Creating and maintaining resilience of 
the corresponding system in the face of disturbances involves increasing adaptability, or 
the ability of actors in the system to influence resilience by reacting to external and 
internal system factors (Folke et al., 2010). This concept is similar to increasing adaptive 
capacity to successfully adapt, but adaptability focuses on the ability to respond to 
changes to maintain the current state of the system. Adaptability can be increased through 
stakeholder inclusion and the incorporation of local knowledge (Folke et al., 2010).  
Further, resilience can be strengthened by deliberately bringing together 
stakeholders at different scales, including citizens, local organizations, and government 
(Walker & Salt, 2006). With more insight into how different institutions might impact the 
spread of Mikania and the resilience of the system, decision makers can make more 
informed decisions regarding the structuring of rules. As Andersson (2004) noted, it can 
be more difficult to change the biophysical elements of a system than it is to work 
together to redesign institutional elements, such as norms and rules surrounding Mikania 
management. This is potentially encouraging or discouraging in this case. The model 
indicates that shifting historical norms and engaging in best practice removal may help 
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reduce Mikania, but on the other hand, if biophysical elements are playing a greater role 
in Mikania invasion than people, it may be very difficult to effectively reduce Mikania.   
ABMs have played a role in resource management decision making processes in a 
variety of contexts. For instance, researchers have recently used ABMs to aid policy 
makers in understanding future scenarios when social and ecological parameters are 
changed (Matthews et al., 2007). The agent-based model presented here could potentially 
be one very important element informing future management efforts including 
understanding how different press and pulse disturbances impact institutional change and 
Mikania over time. The model was designed so that the parameters could be altered to 
explore institutional change in other social-ecological systems, but it could also be 
extended to include more Chitwan specifics (like geographic information systems, social 
networks, etc.) to attempt to explicitly predict Mikania distribution in Chitwan. Further, 
agent-based models have also been designed in a process known as companion or 
participatory modeling where stakeholders are actively involved in structuring the model 
from the start to increase its structural validity and community relevance (Moss, 2008), 
which is another potential future research avenue.   
Conclusions 
In this research, a simple agent-based model was constructed and assessed to 
explore how two different perspectives of institutional change impacted outcomes in a 
social-ecological system facing rapid change. Agent-based models can serve as amazing 
virtual laboratories that simultaneously allow researchers to explore generalizable 
properties and local implications (Magliocca et al., 2015); they can further the study of 
different theories of institutional change important to natural resource management that 
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would otherwise be challenging to observe and assess. Ethnographic interview and 
observation data was employed to inform an understanding and validity of the two 
perspectives and it was concluded that (1) it is unlikely the rational choice perspective 
represents how institutions change in Chitwan over time and (2) it is possible institutional 
change in Chitwan follows the cultural diffusion perspective, underscoring the 
importance of social learning in communities faced with variable environmental 
conditions found to be important in previous research (Mathew & Perreault, 2015). The 
latter is an important area for further study, especially comparing cultural diffusion to 
other perspectives of institutional change and exploring the implications of institutional 
change in other social-ecological systems.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation employed a mixed methods approach to understand how 
institutions, as the shared, rules, norms, strategies, and values that shape human decision 
making, mediated social-ecological outcomes in a system faced with rapid change. To 
explore this concept, I analyzed several components of the management of an invasive 
plant, Mikania micrantha, in community forests in Chitwan, Nepal. Each element of this 
dissertation contributed a distinct perspective on the role of institutions in social-
ecological systems confronting rapid change. Here, I recap the major findings and 
contributions, and discuss the study’s limitations and future directions.  
Research Questions and Main Findings   
The overarching question that this dissertation investigated was: How do 
institutions mediate outcomes in social-ecological systems facing rapid changes?  
Specifically: How do institutions mediate Mikania management and outcomes in Chitwan 
community forests? Each chapter was guided by related questions that aided in answering 
the principal questions in greater detail.  
In chapter 2, I addressed the following: What actors should de jure be involved in 
Mikania management and what does Mikania management actually look like de facto, or 
on-the-ground? Through an institutional analysis employing the institutional analysis and 
development framework to better understand the participants in Chitwan community 
forestry and their interactions, I learned that community forest operations in the buffer 
zone were heterogeneous in their relationships with government and non-government 
actors. I additionally learned that trust played a vital role in structuring these interactions, 
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and subsequently, the access each community had to forest and Mikania management 
information and resources. 
In chapter 3, I addressed equity and asked: Who has access to community forest 
resources? What factors influence community forest membership? Access to resources 
was conceptualized in terms of community forest membership, while recognizing that 
there are other ways to obtain forest resources. A hierarchical linear statistical model 
provided insight into questions of access and I discovered that reliance on the forest 
resources and ethnicity were two important drivers of community forest membership. 
These findings were tied to livelihood transitions and Nepal’s historical relationships 
with different ethnicities.  
In chapter 4, I investigated collective action, asking: What factors are affecting 
collective action related to Mikania in Chitwan community forests? Building upon 
chapter 3, these questions were also addressed with a hierarchical linear statistical model 
and informed by the equity model results. I found that collective action was also 
influenced by reliance on community forest resources. Additionally, perception of 
Mikania invasion as a problem at both the community forest and household levels 
influenced whether a household participated in collective Mikania management efforts.  
In chapter 5, I explored institutional change and asked: How does the adoption of 
norms and strategies change over time and which theory of institutional change, rational 
choice or cultural diffusion, better fits empirical observations in the system? The 
development and analysis of an agent-based model allowed me to explore these two 
perspectives of institutional change. I discovered that cultural diffusion is a better fitting 
model for institutional change in Chitwan compared to rational choice. Model results also 
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supported ethnographic and ecological data indicating that a historical norm for burning 
(primarily for agricultural purposes) aids in the spread of Mikania even when it is not the 
dominant removal strategy.  
Contributions to the Growing Field of Environmental Governance    
This dissertation makes several theoretical contributions to the growing 
interdisciplinary field of environmental governance (see Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). The 
overall mixed methods approach (figure 1.9) is generalizable to understand how 
institutions mediate outcomes from social-ecological challenges in any system. This 
dissertation has illustrated the unique combination of insights that can be gained via a 
mixed methods approach; these contributions are outlined here. 
Combining institutional and content analyses, I discovered that community forest 
members had become isolated in dealing with Mikania invasion due in part to a lack of 
trust between members and other actors. It is my hope that the propositions developed 
based on these findings will provide insight to both stakeholders engaging in the 
complicated process of invasive species management and natural resource managers 
seeking to understand how lack of trust influences management.  
In complementary econometric models, this dissertation explored equity and 
collective action. Institutions and equity have seldom been studied together, especially in 
a manner that contextualizes quantitative analyses with rich qualitative data. In order to 
link these two areas of study, I explored the influences on access to resources via 
community forest membership in Chitwan and discovered that certain ethnic groups are 
more likely to be excluded from membership and that reliance on the forest resources is 
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key in joining. These findings were intimately tied to collective action, as I found 
membership to be an important driver of collective action. 
Collective action research has infrequently combined qualitative and quantitative 
approaches, despite the fact that this approach has the potential to further the 
generalizability of related findings. Understanding the drivers of collective action in a 
more systematic way has important implications for many global environmental issues; if 
stakeholders are equipped with information about who participates in collective action 
and their motivations, efforts to encourage and increase collective action may become 
more successful over time. Additionally, the collective action model contributed to the 
field’s understanding of how perception of an issue (in this case, Mikania invasion as 
problematic or benign) shapes communities’ collective action efforts. Enhanced 
understanding of the drivers of differing perceptions of collective action problems is the 
next step for such research, which directly ties into climate change and other common 
pool resource management literature where perception of the issue has been found to be 
highly influential in collective action success.   
The agent-based model presented in this dissertation reinforced previous research, 
supporting the finding that rational choice seldom represents how people behave in 
resource management situations. My comparison of two perspectives of institutional 
change paves the way for future comparisons of the cultural diffusion perspective to other 
difficult to observe theories of institutional change. Methodologically, the agent-based 
modeling approach assists researchers in explicitly testing theoretical ideas that are often 
unfeasible to examine in real time (like institutional change); these models can then be 
compared with available empirical data from a given system to assess their validity. Such 
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information can facilitate the examination of alternative paths toward sustainable 
governance of stressed resources and inform efforts to deliberately change or design 
institutions.   
Ultimately, this dissertation advances environmental governance researchers’ 
understanding of how institutions mediate prominent social-ecological challenges, with 
my focus being invasive species, and contributes information that may aid stakeholders in 
addressing such challenges in the future.  
Policy Relevance of the Findings   
In addition to theoretical contributions, there is an opportunity for the dissertation 
findings and future work to inform policy efforts in Chitwan and in the broader context of 
natural resource management. It is important to understand social-ecological systems 
holistically in order to inform important policy decisions in a variety of contexts 
(Agrawal, 2014; Ostrom, 2005). The mixed methods approach employed in this 
dissertation can be utilized with data from other systems to create a multi-dimensional 
understanding of how institutions are impacting natural resource management options 
and strategies. This approach could be especially fruitful for policy efforts when 
combined with participatory research directly involving a specific community. 
In this research, I discovered several drivers of collective action in Chitwan. 
Systematically understanding the motivation behind collective action efforts more 
generally is a vital part of initiating and sustaining collective efforts to solve a wide 
variety of human-environment problems globally. In Chitwan, and other cases in the 
future, the factors that influence collective action could inform policy efforts related to 
Mikania management. All of the findings presented in this research are a starting point 
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for discussion related to Mikania management with stakeholders in Chitwan (and 
potentially communities elsewhere dealing with Mikania), ranging from sensitive topics 
such as the role of trust in communities to information that could be relevant for long-
term planning, such as how strategies for Mikania management may change over time 
under different conditions. It is important to present any and all of this information as a 
scientific perspective on these issues, with this perspective being one of several possible 
traditions of analyzing information and informing management decisions. This research 
should be interpreted in the context of other information, such as local ecological 
knowledge and concerns. By considering these equally important sources, stakeholders 
can decide what information is relevant to their communities and personal definitions of 
success, and make cognizant decisions based on a holistic view of the issues and options.  
Limitations and Future Directions  
Chapter 2.  
This chapter focused on understanding collective action solely in Chitwan 
community forest groups. However, Mikania has invaded other forest systems throughout 
India and China. In the future, I would like to collaboratively explore a cross-site 
comparison of communities in India and China also dealing with the invasion of Mikania. 
What generalities could be drawn from these sites and if there are differences in 
collective action and management success, what drives them?  
Additionally, this chapter explored government and non-government actors at 
multiple levels and ultimately found that the community forest members were primarily 
isolated in dealing with Mikania. This chapter could have also scrutinized these actors via 
polycentric governance theory, focusing on how power dynamics differed between the 
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different levels and if and how this contributed to trust issues; this is an interesting 
direction for future analyses. Relatedly, there are other natural resource management 
issues where trust is important (such as resource extraction (e.g. mining) or changing 
rules for extraction/use). How has trust been fostered in these cases and what are the 
lowest cost (time, monetary, or other) ways to consistently overcome issues of trust to 
foster successful natural resource management?  
Chapter 3.  
This chapter conceptualized equity in access to natural resources in terms of 
community forest membership, but there are numerous other avenues to approach equity 
in resource access. For instance, in Chitwan fieldwork provided the knowledge that some 
households illegally harvest forest resources from the national park. What are the 
characteristics of households illegally harvesting in the national park and what are their 
motivations? Are they prohibited from legal access elsewhere? Or does the condition of 
their community forest or convenience factor into their decisions? Additional 
ethnographic work could contribute to answering these questions. Institutional analysis in 
general has seldom incorporated considerations of equity. The creation of a framework 
for integrating institutional analysis and dimensions of equity, including power and 
resource access is another future direction. Ideally, such a framework would draw 
attention to this issue and provide interested researchers a starting point for their own 
work.  
Chapter 4.  
The collective action model only included Chitwan data. In order to make 
generalizable statements about the drivers of collective action, especially in the context of 
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newer or developing threats like Mikania invasion, it will be important to explore cross-
site comparisons and information. Additionally, the model only explored data at the 
household and community forest level. There are other scales that are potentially 
relevant, such individuals rather than entire households, that could be included in future 
efforts.   
Chapter 5.  
With an agent-based model, there are a seemingly endless number of potential 
modifications and additions. While Railsback and Grimm (2011) recommend avoiding 
adding too much complexity to a model due to the increased difficulty of understanding 
and interpreting its outcomes, there are a variety of future directions for the institutional 
change agent-based model. First, the most pertinent next step is to implement and 
compare other perspectives of institutional change and explore different mechanisms of 
the social learning modeled in the cultural diffusion perspective. There are not currently 
formal rules regarding Mikania management. It would be interesting to compare the 
impact of rules and a collective choice (intentional change) mechanism for adopting new 
management strategies (as opposed to the evolutionary or unintentional change process 
currently implemented).   
The model did not include topographic or land use information to tie the model 
explicitly to Chitwan’s terrain. In the future iterations, movement, migration, and other 
dynamics could be implemented, especially in the context of participatory or companion 
modeling, where the model would be developed by working directly with community 
members to ensure the accuracy of model mechanisms in the minds of people living in 
the system.  
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In general, with regard to all of the chapters, there is substantial opportunity to 
extend the inclusion of and integrate additional ecological data, including information on 
forest health and other invasive plants. Future efforts could more explicitly incorporate 
such data to examine its impact on collective action in Chitwan.   
Institutions as “Underlying Building Blocks” of Human Behavior?  
This dissertation has been devoted to understanding how institutions influence an 
array of outcomes, ranging from collective action efforts, to resource access via 
membership, to patterns of Mikania distribution. Institutions have been shown to be 
important and influential in each of these cases, contributing to the variety of literature 
supporting the crucial influence of institutions in social-ecological systems. Although 
institutions are not always the most important or influential factors in understanding 
human behavior, they frequently play a vital role in a considerable diversity of situations 
(Ostrom, 2005). In Understanding Institutional Diversity (2005), Elinor Ostrom poses the 
following questions:  
 
Can we dig below the immense diversity of regularized social interactions in 
markets, hierarchies, families, sports, legislatures, elections, and other situations 
to identify universal building blocks used in crafting all such structured 
situations? If so, what are the underlying component parts that can be used to 
build useful theories of human behavior in the diverse range of situations in which 
humans interact? Can we use the same components to build an explanation for 
behavior in a commodity market as we would use to explain behavior in a 
university, a religious order, a transportation system, or an urban public economy? 
Can we identify the multiple levels of analysis needed to explain the regularities 
in human behavior that we observe? Is there any way that the analyses of local 
problem solving, such as the efforts of Maine lobster fishers for the last eighty 
years to regulate their fisheries…, can be analyzed using a similar set of tools as 
problem solving at a national level… or at an international level…? My answer to 
these questions is yes. (pp. 5-6) 
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Institutions represent these “underlying building blocks” of human behavior in many 
contexts. It is my hope that this dissertation has contributed to a small part of 
understanding these building blocks as they pertain to natural resource management in 
social-ecological systems. It is my goal to continue investigating the role that institutions 
play in shaping human decision making processes and outcomes in a variety of social-
ecological systems, contributing to generalizable science serving successful 
environmental governance.   
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Chapter 2 presented an analysis of five selected community forests in the buffer zone in 
Chitwan, Nepal: Tamur, Ghaghara, Trishuli, Koshi, and Gandaki. These forests represent 
a mix of ecological types, sociodemographics, and governance capacity; additionally, all 
were a part of an ecological survey in 2013. The analysis is based on semi-structured 
interviews with approximately 87 individuals and participant observation in Chitwan, 
Nepal conducted by Abigail Sullivan and Rajendra Ghimire between May and July 2014. 
The case study communities are identified solely by pseudonyms (rivers in Nepal) 
because some information discussed may be sensitive to these small communities.  
 
Summary 
Across the five community forests, there is variation in the concern about Mikania, 
perceived extent and spread of Mikania within the forests, the methods used for Mikania 
removal (burning, pesticide use), and the organization of community members to deal 
with Mikania (large groups organized after monsoon, hiring individuals; focused on 
removal along fence, widespread efforts within the interior of the community forest).  
There is substantial variation in the collaboration with outside entities, specifically non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and Chitwan National Park.  Some communities 
regularly work with NGOs, while others have little connection. Only one case study 
forest collaborated with an NGO for an invasive species program. Some communities 
trust the national park, while others see it as corrupt and unresponsive to community 
needs.  Finally, there is variation in the major problems identified by the community 
forests: invasive species, human-wildlife conflict, flooding, forest degradation, and 
pollution.  
 
Interviews  
Types of interviewees and general information. 
Twenty-five interviews were conducted with community forest user group members. 
While interviews usually focused on one individual or household, they almost always 
became group events where neighbors’ opinions were given. The interviewee 
composition was representative of the ethnic composition and educational status of each 
of the communities. It is possible that Brahmin were under represented in the interviews 
and that females were oversampled. I under-sampled young women (18-21 years) who 
were less likely to participate in an interview with males or older females present; 
additionally, there were fewer young men, as many were overseas. I was able to 
interview both farmers and non-farmers, but it was very difficult to find people that did 
not farm in some capacity. 
 
NGOs interviewed.  
Interviews were conducted with two conservation-oriented NGOs, both working in 
Chitwan and with some of the case study communities. They have each worked on 
Mikania issues, but it is not the focus for either organization. NGO A focuses on Mikania 
more; NGO B believes the problem is declining. NGO A was very concerned about 
Mikania and they have several ongoing experiments to determine the best methods for 
removing Mikania and its optimal growing conditions. NGO B is more concerned about 
poaching; during the interview, the representative actually asked why Mikania was such a 
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focus of conversation.  NGO B interestingly had presented an educational workshop in 
Ghaghara to more than 50 people on Mikania and wildlife management, but this was only 
mentioned by the president of the governance committee. This NGO B program also 
focused on wetlands management, which several community members mentioned.  
 
Tourism.  
Interviews revealed that tourism organizations did not play an important role in any of the 
five case studies. One case (Tamur) indicated they would like to see more tourism in their 
community in the future, but none were working with or had contact with outside tourist 
organizations. Tamur had some Nepali tourists that opted to take elephant tours, 
providing the community forest governance committee with some extra income. 
However, tourists that took elephant tours were rare and not a large source of income for 
the community forest. 
 
Invasive Plants: Mikania, Lantana, and Chromolaena 
Mikania. 
All of the community forests mentioned invasive species and all mentioned Mikania 
within their forest, but there was variation in the level of concern. Ghaghara and Trishuli 
specifically were the most concerned about Mikania. Interviewees discussed how it was 
affecting grass collection. There was great variation in what the communities were doing 
to manage Mikania.  Interviewees in Trishuli and Gandaki talked about burning for 
invasive species management, as well as to promote grasslands (note in Trishuli and 
Gandaki the Presidents denied burning). Cutting and pulling was mentioned in all 
community forests.  Pesticide use was only mentioned in Tamur and Gandaki. Only one 
interviewee (in Koshi) reported seeing Mikania on their farmland, which was very near 
the community forest fence. No one else reported seeing Mikania (or Lantana) on their 
farmland- they have strictly found it in the forest and along the forest fence.  
One interviewee (the community forest governance committee president in Ghaghara) 
reported a group he organizes to remove Mikania uproots it from within the forest and 
throws it all into the Rapti River.  
 
Lantana. 
Interviewees in each community also mentioned the presence of Lantana, but it was not 
viewed as being as much of a threat or nuisance as Mikania. In Tamur the President was 
very concerned about Lantana, more so than Mikania, but that was the only interview 
where Lantana was a bigger concern.  The president also talked about how they are trying 
to entice deer to eat Lantana, although to no avail. On the main road on the way to 
Tamur, there were men hired by the government to cut Lantana growing along the 
roadside. They simply cut it with machetes (without pulling the roots up) and left it in 
piles by the roadside. Some people mentioned not wanting to get rid of Lantana because 
it has colorful flowers and is aesthetically pleasing.  
 
Chromolaena.  
Chromolaena was not mentioned by as many people, or in every community. NGO A 
mentioned it being problematic to wildlife in the area because they cannot digest it.  
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Table B.1. Invasive plants present and methods of removal in case studies 
  Tamur Ghaghara Trishuli Koshi Gandaki 
Mikania      
Chromolaena      
Lantana      
Burning       
Cutting      
Pulling      
Pesticides      
 
Governance 
Relationships within community forests and levels of trust. 
There are numerous relationships among the community forest user group members and 
the governance committee in each case study. For example, all community forest user 
group members interviewed reported some level of interaction with the buffer zone 
committee and many reported indirectly conveying concerns to Chitwan National Park 
through the buffer zone committee members. The governance committees in each forest 
communicate with the national park, buffer zone committee, and village development 
committees about a variety of issues relevant to the community forest. However, there are 
a few key differences in the case studies.  
 
Collaboration and interaction with NGOs is different in each case. (NGO connections 
include all NGOs working with the communities, not only ones related to Mikania). For 
instance, in Trishuli, NGOs are very integrated, interacting with the governance 
committee, community forest user group members and other user groups, and village 
development committees. They provide resources like toilets and wells and in some cases 
provide skills based trainings. Gandaki presents the opposite case, as they have little to no 
integration with NGOs. Interviewees in Gandaki reported no connections with any type 
of NGOs.  
 
The strength of the relationships between different groups and individuals within a 
community forest user group is also different between the cases. For example, 
community forest user group members in each case have either direct or indirect 
connections with the national park. However, the level of trust in the national park is very 
different in each case. In particular, Ghaghara, Koshi, and Trishuli interviewees reported 
low levels of trust in the national park. Community forest user group members in Trishuli 
expressed concern that the park officials were corrupt and not sharing enough monetary 
resources with the buffer zone forests.  
 
Additionally, Gandaki is the only case study with ties to the district forest. They are not 
registered with the district forest, but because of their proximity to a highway and the 
district forest office, the district forest occasionally communicates with the community 
forest governance committee.  
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Collective action and governance capacity.  
Collective action for Mikania removal and management was also highly varied.  In 
Tamur and Ghaghara there were organized efforts to cut and pull Mikania within the 
forest right after the monsoon for at least the past five years. Trishuli had groups, but they 
were not centrally organized and were not necessarily only targeting Mikania. Koshi and 
Gandaki did not organize groups in the past year. Koshi previously had groups that 
attempted to cut and pull, but because they are not currently allowed in the forest, they 
are no longer able to organize. Ghaghara paid individuals to pull Mikania along the fence, 
but it was not a group effort. Ghaghara also hired people to burn (not confirmed by the 
governance committee), but this was not organized across the community forest. 
 
Major Problems 
There was substantial variation in the problems mentioned by interviewees in the 
different forests. All interviewees were asked about flooding, wildlife, invasive species, 
and community forest resources. Industrial pollution was mentioned without prompting 
in Gandaki; in this case three interviewees discussed an industrial facility that had water 
discharges onto their field. All community forests discussed having lack of community 
forest resources in some capacity, but in Koshi the forest has been completely shut down 
except for one collection day a month due to forest health and wildlife issues (rhino 
attacks). In Koshi, the Nepali army is within the forest and attempting to protect the 
people from rhinos. The forest is closed because of the wildlife, but also because it is 
degraded. 
 
Table B.2. Major problems in each case study CF 
  Tamur Ghaghara Trishuli Koshi Gandaki 
Flooding       
Wildlife: Rhinos       
Wildlife: Elephants      
Wildlife: Tigers      
Wildlife: Deer and boar      
Mikania and Lantana      
Stressed/Limited CF resources      
Industrial pollution      
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Interview Details 
Table B.3. 2014 interview details  
Interviewed:  Tamur Ghaghara Trishuli Koshi  Gandaki  Non-CF 
Community 
forest 
governance 
committees 
(CFGC) 
 CFGC 
president, 
male  
CFGC 
president; 4 
CFGC 
members (all 
male)  
CFGC 
president, 
male 
CFGC 
president, 
male 
CFGC 
president, 
male 
 
National park, 
district forest 
officials, buffer 
zone 
committee 
      2 Chitwan 
National Park 
officials in 
the Buffer 
Zone section; 
male; 
Brahmin; 2 
male officials 
in the buffer 
zone 
committee 
office 
  
Community 
forest 
members 
5 
individuals 
as focus of 
interviews; 
overall: 10 
females,  6 
males; 
female age 
range: 23-
50, male 
age range: 
20-44 
5 individuals 
as focus of 
interviews; 
overall: 10 
females, 7 
males; female 
age range: 18-
45, male age 
range: 19-57 
5 
individuals 
as focus of 
interviews; 
overall: 10 
females, 10 
males; 
female age 
range: 20-
60, male 
age range: 
20-60 
5 individuals 
as focus of 
interviews; 
overall: 6 
females, 7 
males; 
female age 
range: 20-44, 
male age 
range: 18-71 
5 individuals 
as focus of 
interviews; 
overall: 7 
females, 7 
males; 
female age 
range: 22-50; 
male age 
range: 20-60 
 
NGOs       Officials from 
two 
conservation-
oriented 
NGOs. Both 
male.  
Non-family 
organizations 
      Tourism 
organizations 
were not 
interacting 
with the case 
study forests. 
*Interviewees were only counted in the larger sample if they actually spoke during the 
interview. There were many young women with small children who sat in on the 
interviews, but did not actually participate.   
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Table B.4. Historical population and livelihood information (prior to 2005) used to 
inform the 2014 case study fieldwork described in chapter 2.  
  Tamur Ghaghar
a 
Trishuli Koshi Gandak
i 
Population (households) 341 832 1035 200 1833 
Dalit 45     unknown 566 60 550 
Janajati 130     unknown 100 60 367 
Non-member  unknow
n 
           5200 225 25 3000 
Notes   Non-
member 
data is 
likely 
inaccurate. 
Large         
Janajati   
community  
    Non-
member 
data is 
likely 
inaccurate 
  
          
Livelihoods           
Percentage with cattle 81-
100% 
81-100% 61-80% 81-100% 81-100% 
Percentage collecting 
forage  
81-
100% 
41-60% 61-80% 0-20% 0-20% 
Grass/fodder (tickets) 341   400 Bidding 
system 
  
Grass/fodder (bhari) 8000   35000     
Grass/fodder (days)     60     
Last timber sale year  2009 2006 2008 2009 
Timber sale (cubic feet)   1000   200 3125 
Fuelwood sale year  2009 2009       
Fuelwood sale (tickets)         2500 
Fuelwood sale (cubic feet)   2496       
Notes Wood 
sale 
some 
years; 
no 
timber 
sale. No 
data on 
amounts 
Every year 
have same 
amount for 
sale 
Highly 
variable ticket 
sales/collectio
n days 
Timber 
sales 
infrequent
; no wood 
sales or 
tickets 
Every year 
same 
number of 
tickets for 
fuelwood 
and 
amount of 
timber 
 
Historical Population Information  
There are big differences in ethnic and caste makeup of the member households, as well 
as differences in the number of non-member households in the larger community. 
Trishuli has a large Dalit population (54% of member households), while Tamur (38%) 
and Ghaghara (based on participant observation) have large Janajati populations.  In 
Koshi and Gandaki, Dalits are approximately 30% of the member household population, 
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while Janajati are 30% and 20%, respectively. In Trishuli 82% of eligible households are 
members while in Koshi 88% of eligible households are members. Historical data for 
Ghaghara and Gandaki are likely underreported, but in Ghaghara 14% of eligible 
households were estimated as members and in Gandaki 38% were members. Gandaki is 
much more urbanized than the other areas, so a relatively low membership of 38% may 
have been accurate, but it is likely that the Ghaghara figures are historically accurate. 
 
Historical Livelihood Information  
With regard to livelihoods, most households in these communities own cattle with 81-
100% of households in Tamur, Ghaghara, Koshi, and Gandaki and 61-80% in Trishuli 
owning cattle.  There is variation in the reliance of households on the community forest 
for forage collection. At the low end in Gandaki and Koshi only 0-20% of households 
collect fodder from the community forest. During an interview in Gandaki, a woman 
stated she doesn’t currently collect forage from the community forest (and hasn’t for five 
years), but she wanted to maintain membership just in case she might need it in future 
years. In contrast, collection is limited in Koshi because of wildlife conflict and 
degradation.  Currently, Koshi is guarded by the Nepali Army, with troops stationed 
within the forest to protect the community from rhinos. Because of this resource 
collection is severely curtailed.   
 
Additionally, in Koshi, the forest conditions are such that the community must rely on 
external sources of forage because it is unavailable within the forest, which stands in 
contrast to Gandaki where most people are accessing outside resources even though 
community forest resources are available. In Ghaghara 41-60% of members collect 
forage from the forest, in Trishuli 61-80% collect, and at the high end 81-100% of Tamur 
members collect.  During interviews, in Trishuli respondents stated that goats are 
purposely grazing in the forest to deal with Mikania. In Tamur, respondents indicated 
there was grazing within the forest, but only along the fence line. Additionally, in Tamur 
the community members discussed how there were few outside economic opportunities, 
so households were more dependent on the forest due to their remote location further 
from urban areas. 
 
Timber and fuel wood sales in these community forests varies, as well. Gandaki has an 
annual timber and fuel wood sale with 3125 cubic feet of timber sold and 2500 fuel wood 
collection tickets sold.  Ghaghara also has an annual sale with 1000 cubic feet of timber 
sold and 2496 cubic feet of fuel wood. Tamur has infrequent fuel wood sales, but no 
timber sales. Trishuli and Koshi have infrequent timber sales.   
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ENGLISH AND NEPALI INTERVIEW GUIDES 
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Semi-structured interview guide: Governance structures and invasive plant management 
in five Chitwan community forests  
Interview mode: In person 
A. Respondent information  
Male Female 
Age:  
Women's user group member: Yes  No  
Community forest member: Yes   No  
Governance committee member: Yes  No 
Governance committee leader: Yes  No 
Chitwan national park official: Yes  No 
Other:  
B. Interviewer information  
Place of interview:  
Community forest:   Size of community forest: Large  Medium  Small  
Interview date: 
Interviewers: Abigail Sullivan and ______________ 
Interview time: Start time:    End time:    Total time: 
Interview number:  
C. Mikania and chromolaena invasive plant questions 
*Questions may be altered and other questions may be asked depending on the respondent's 
answers 
If respondent is a community member or a governance committee member, 
continue to question 1. If respondent is a Chitwan National Park official, skip to 
section D.3. 
1. Are you aware of any invasive plant species in your community? What do you think about 
them?  
 
  205 
Respondent viewed them as a problem or negative: Yes  No 
Species respondent mentioned: Mikania  Chromolaena   Other:_______  
 
If respondent does not mention any invasive species: Have you heard of Mikania or 
Chromolaena plants in your community or others?  
Do you have a farm? Yes  No  
 
If respondent farms: Have you seen these [species they described] in your fields? If so, have you 
done anything to remove them?  
 
2. Where do you get information to make invasive plant management decisions?  
• Have you worked with other NGOs?  
 List NGOs mentioned, if any:  
 
• Have you taken part in any educational programs? When did these take place? 
 List programs, if any:  
 List dates, if any:  
 
• What do you think about these [previous programs taken part in or NGOs worked with]? 
o Do you see these as successful? Why or why not?  
 
If respondent is an individual community member, ask question 3 and continue to 
question 4. If respondent is a governance committee member, skip to question 4.  
 
3. Has the presence of [any invasive plants mentioned] changed the time you spend looking for 
forest resources?  
 
Increased time: Decreased time:  Time was not changed:  Other: 
 
• Has the presence of [invasive plants mentioned] changed any of your habits or goals? 
For example, do you purchase wood and fodder instead of collecting it?  
  
 Habits changed:  
 
• If the respondent farms: Has the presence of [invasive plants mentioned] impacted your 
farming decisions? Have the resources you invest in farming changed?  
o If your investment in farming has shifted, what have you shifted these resources 
to? (For example, education) 
 
 
4. Have you or anyone in your community organized a group to weed/clear the [invasive plants 
mentioned]?  Yes No 
 
If yes, have you participated? Yes  No  Other: 
 
Could you estimate how many people participated with you?  
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If respondent is a governance committee member ask question 5 and continue to 
question 6. If respondent is a community member skip to question 6.  
 
5. Has your community considered creating wetlands to attract fauna?  
•  If so, for what reasons?  
•  If not, why? Did the presence of invasive plants in your community contribute to your     
decision? 
 
6. Have you ever seen or heard of burning or tree cutting in your community forest? 
If so, do you know if it was to remove [invasive plant species mentioned] or for another reason?  
 
D. Migration, urbanization, and governance interactions  
We just asked you some questions about invasive plants in your community; now we would like 
to ask a few questions about your community in general.   
D.1 Questions for community forest governance leader or members. If community 
member, skip to section D.2  
1. Does your governance committee tend to follow your formal management plan for making 
management decisions, or do you have other unwritten agreements for management 
decisions?  
2. How do you decide what issues are most important in your community? Do you hold 
hearings with your community members or do community members bring issues to the 
committee?  
3. What issues have been prominent in your community?  
Did the respondent mention: Wildlife dangers: Women's access to resources: Other: 
4.   Do you interact with Chitwan National Park officials?  
If no: Does your community have interest or need to interact with them more?  
If yes: 
• How do you communicate with them? In person or via email, for example?  
• How often do you communicate with them?  
• What topics do you usually discuss?  
• Do you feel your interactions are frequent enough?  
5. Do you interact with the buffer zone committee?  
If no: Does your community have interest or need to interact with them more? 
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If yes: 
• How do you communicate with them? In person or via email, for example?  
• How often do you communicate with them?  
• What topics do you usually discuss?  
• Do you feel your interactions are frequent enough?  
6. Do you interact with District Forest officials? 
If no: Does your community have interest or need to interact with them more? 
If yes: 
• How do you communicate with them? In person or via email, for example?  
• How often do you communicate with them?  
• What topics do you usually discuss?  
• Do you feel your interactions are frequent enough?  
7. Do you interact with the Village Development Committees?   
If no: Does your community have interest or need to interact with them more? 
If yes: 
• How do you communicate with them? In person or via email, for example?  
• How often do you communicate with them?  
• What topics do you usually discuss?  
• Do you feel your interactions are frequent enough?  
8.  How do you view migrants to Chitwan? Does your community forest accept new members?  
9.  Has your community forest been affected by increasing urbanization in Chitwan? If yes, how 
so?  
D.2 Questions for individual community members:  
1. Has anyone in your household ever migrated outside of Nepal? If yes, why? 
• If yes, has your household received additional income?  
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• Has this additional income changed your perspective of your community forest 
membership in any way?  
2.  Has your household been affected by increasing urbanization? If yes, how so?  
D.3 Questions for National Park Officials  
1. Are you aware of any invasive plant species in the park or buffer zone? What do you think 
about them?  
 
Respondent viewed them as a problem or negative: Yes  No 
Species respondent mentioned: Mikania Chromolaena   Other:_______  
 
2. Where do you get information to make invasive plant management decisions?  
• Have you worked with other NGOs?  
 List NGOs mentioned, if any:  
 
• Have you taken part in any educational programs? When did these take place? 
 List programs, if any:  
 List dates, if any:  
 
• What do you think about these [previous programs taken part in or NGOs worked with]? 
o Do you see these as successful? Why or why not?  
 
Now we would like to ask some more general questions about your interaction with 
other groups outside your colleagues.  
 
3. Do you interact with any of the community forest governance committee members or 
leaders? 
If no: Does your community have interest or need to interact with them more? 
If yes: 
• Which community forests do you interact with?  
• How do you communicate with them? In person or via email, for example?  
• How often do you communicate with them?  
• What topics do you usually discuss?  
• Do you feel your interactions are frequent enough? 
4. Do you interact with the buffer zone committee?  
If no: Does your community have interest or need to interact with them more? 
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If yes: 
• How do you communicate with them? In person or via email, for example?  
• How often do you communicate with them?  
• What topics do you usually discuss?  
• Do you feel your interactions are frequent enough?  
5. Do you interact with District Forest officials? 
If no: Does your community have interest or need to interact with them more? 
If yes: 
• How do you communicate with them? In person or via email, for example?  
• How often do you communicate with them?  
• What topics do you usually discuss?  
• Do you feel your interactions are frequent enough?  
6. Do you interact with the Village Development Committees?   
If no: Does your community have interest or need to interact with them more? 
If yes: 
• How do you communicate with them? In person or via email, for example?  
• How often do you communicate with them?  
• What topics do you usually discuss?  
• Do you feel your interactions are frequent enough?  
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview.  
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OVERVIEW, DESIGN CONCEPTS, AND DETAILS PROTOCOL 
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Overview  
Grimm et al. (2006) are the creators of a protocol that seeks to standardize the description 
of agent-based models (ABM) and provide a tool with which to think about designing an 
ABM. Since its inception, the protocol has been widely accepted and applied in both the 
ecological and social science literatures. It was updated in 2010 (Grimm et al., 2010), but 
the basic elements of the protocol were largely unaltered. In this appendix, I follow the 
ODD, with a few modifications and additions for coupled human and natural systems 
(CHANS) based on An, Zvoleff, Liu, & Axinn (2014), to present a detailed version of the 
agent-based model presented in chapter 5.   
 
Table D.1. Grimm et al. 2010 Overview, Design Concepts, and Details Protocol 
Elements of the ODD protocol   
Overview 1. Purpose 
 2. Entities, state variables, and scales 
 3. Process overview and scheduling 
Design concepts  4. Design concepts 
 Basic elements Adaptation 
 Observation  
Emergence  
Objectives  
Prediction  
Learning  
Sensing  
Stochasticity  
Interaction  
 Collectives  
Details 5. Initialization 
 6. Input data 
 7. Sub-models   
 
Purpose 
This model is intended to explore how different institutions, or rules and norms, change 
over time in a social ecological system facing rapid change. I explore two perspectives of 
institutional change, rational choice and cultural diffusion, and how these in turn 
influence a social-ecological outcome. In particular, this model is informed by data from 
locally governed community forests in Chitwan, Nepal and seeks to understand how 
shared management norms and strategies influence the spread of a rapidly growing 
invasive plant, Mikania micrantha. The primary purpose of this model is to explore 
which theoretical perspective of institutional change is most plausible in Chitwan and 
draw insights about institutional change that are relevant to any social-ecological system 
facing global environmental changes. Thus, although the model is informed by data 
specific to Chitwan, I make an effort to keep the model as general and simple as possible 
such that it can be altered in the future to explore different aspects of the Chitwan system 
or other social-ecological systems. In line with the theoretical intent of the model I do not 
incorporate some spatial elements like land use maps and topography that might decrease 
the generalizability of the model (Gimblett, 2002); this is one avenue for future work. 
This model is intended to identify theoretically relevant patterns in managing common 
pool resources facing global changes (like invasive species) and it is my position that 
such advancements in the theory can be useful in informing relevant future policy and 
stakeholder conversations.  
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Entities, State Variables, and Scales 
The model is constructed in NetLogo, where spaces are represented as “patches.” Agents 
are randomly placed on a landscape composed of individual spaces, called patches in 
NetLogo, and each patch represents one 5ft2 plot within a forest. The landscape is 
represented by a two dimensional grid, consisting of 1024 patches (see table D.2 here and 
“set up” section in accompanying manuscript for more details). I present both patch, 
agent, and global variables in table D.2.  
 
The lowest level agent in the model is a household and the model can be initialized with 
100 to 1000 households, which are randomly distributed on the landscape; the baseline is 
100 households. Each patch represents an area of community forest land. The patch can 
either be highly productive to an agent, or completely degraded. Each patch is invaded by 
percentage of Mikania, which varies depending on the set up (gradient distribution versus 
random distribution; see table D.2). Many of the values in the model are abstract and 
based on logic or literature to explore underlying processes. The ranking/ordering of 
some of the parameters was determined from ethnographic fieldwork conducted in 
Chitwan in 2014 (see Yang & Gilbert (2008) for a related discussion). The model runs 
indefinitely (no stopping condition), but all simulations were stopped after 100 time steps 
because outcomes stabilized at this point.  
 
Table D.2. Variables included in the model  
Variable  Features Explanation   
Agent_removed Initialized to 0 for 
every agent 
Changes to 1 if agent removes Mikania 
Num_HH 100-1000 in 
increments of 50 
The number of agents in the model  
Mikania_cover Patch variable; 
initialized between 
0 and 1  
A value of zero corresponds to zero percent 
Mikania, a value of 1 corresponds to 100 
percent of the patch being covered with 
Mikania.  
Only used in cultural diffusion 
sub-model 
  
Number_of_regions Initial value varies 
depending on 
number of features 
and traits selected  
An outcome variable; the number of distinct 
cultural regions currently in the model 
Regions_list  A list of identifiers for each region  
Closest-person Equals the closest 
agent to the 
current agent 
based on agents’ x 
and y coordinates 
Used to determine who the agent will evaluate 
if they interact  
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Feature_nhb  After two agents have interacted, this is used 
to copy the value of one of the agent’s features 
to the active agent 
Overlap  The overlap between two agents, i.e. their 
similarity. This determines whether the agents 
will interact and adopt traits 
Chosen-feature  The feature that will be adopted by the active 
agent  
New-trait  The feature adopted from the active agent’s 
neighbor  
Feature Initialized as a 
string of length N 
(N = 1 to 20; 
number of traits)  
Abstract numerical list of the cultural features 
(including shared strategies and norms) of 
each agent  
Region_id  The region an agent belongs to  
Institution_type Equals 0, 1, 2, 3, 
or 4, 
corresponding to 
the first item in the 
feature list  
Used to track the management strategy the 
agent has adopted  
Featval0 Equals the value of 
the first item in an 
agent’s feature list 
(0, 1, 2, 3, or 4) 
Used to model the 5 different Mikania 
management norms and the change in their 
composition over time  
Number_of_traits  Ranges from 1 to 
20 
 
Number_of_Features Ranges from 1 to 
20 
 
Mutation_rate Ranges from 0 to 
0.1 in increments 
of 0.0005 
The rate of mutation, via random change in 
features. Turned to zero for all model 
analyses; Is an area for future exploration 
Random_interaction  Ranges from 0 to 
100 percent 
Turned to zero for all model analyses; Is an 
area for future exploration 
Only used in rational choice 
sub-model  
  
Productivity_value  Patch variable; 
randomly 
initialized between 
0 and 1  
A value of 0 indicates the patch is completely 
degraded/not useful to the agent; the lower the 
value, the less likely an agent will remove 
Mikania from the patch  
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Value_threshold Each agent is 
randomly assigned 
a value between 0 
and 1  
Used in the cost-benefit analysis; if the value 
is greater than 0.5, the agent randomly selects 
a method other than the least costly method  
Removal_cost Initialized at zero, 
changes as agents 
make management 
decisions  
Keeps track of the current management 
strategy an agent has adopted  
Removal_list List containing the 
possible Mikania 
removal costs (0.2, 
0.3, 0.35, 0.5) 
Each removal strategy corresponds to a cost  
Three_removal_list List containing the 
Mikania removal 
costs, less burning  
Used when excessive burning fee is 
implemented (can only be implemented when 
“monitor_and_sanction_burning?” is turned 
on); agent selects alternative removal method 
if engaging in removal  
Times_burned 0 when simulation 
begins; updated 
after agent burns  
Count of times agent has burned; used when 
“monitor_and_sanction_burning?” is turned 
on 
Num_bp Ranges from 0 to 1 Slider in NetLogo; used to set the initial 
percentage of agents employing the best 
practice strategy  
Num_nothing Ranges from 0 to 1 Slider in NetLogo; used to set the initial 
percentage of agents not engaging in removal  
Num_pull Ranges from 0 to 1 Slider in NetLogo; used to set the initial 
percentage of agents employing the 
mechanical removal strategy  
Num_pull_bury Ranges from 0 to 1 Slider in NetLogo; used to set the initial 
percentage of agents employing the pulling 
and burying strategy  
Num_burn  Ranges from 0 to 1 Slider in NetLogo; used to set the initial 
percentage of agents employing burning  
Monitor_and_sanction_burning? True, False Button in NetLogo. Turns on/off the monitor 
and sanction burning procedure  
Observe?  True, False Button in NetLogo. Turns on/off the observe 
procedure; not included in model analysis  
 
Process Overview and Scheduling 
Figure D.1. presents a view of the sub-models and scheduling. In each time step, an agent 
makes decisions about which Mikania management strategy to adopt (including doing 
nothing). An agent will either enter the rational choice or cultural diffusion sub-model to 
make this decision depending on which is turned “on” in NetLogo (the sub-models can be 
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controlled using a “button” in NetLogo. The agents will enter the sub-model 
(rational_choice? or cultural_diffusion? that is “on”). The agents only enter one of the 
decision making sub-models at a time. After making management decisions, the next sub-
model updates the amount of Mikania in each patch based on the agents’ selected 
strategies.    
 
 
Figure D.1. Processes and scheduling  
 
Design Concepts 
Basic elements. 
The model draws on theory from common pool resource and collective action literature, 
as well as literature on cultural dissemination, cooperation, and social learning (An, 2012; 
Axelrod, 1997; Mathew & Perreault, 2015; Ostrom, 1990). Changes in institutions 
(shared strategies and norms for Mikania management) influence the amount of Mikania 
in a given patch, which influences the cost of the agent’s actions and future management 
decisions/institutional change.   
  
Adaptation. 
In the cultural diffusion sub-model, agents can adopt another agent’s Mikania removal 
strategy if the similarity of their feature lists equals or exceeds the threshold. Other 
adaptation could be possible in future models, but is not currently present. For instance, 
agents can change their behaviors (their selected removal strategy) in response to others 
and the environment, but the parameters that determine these behaviors are currently 
fixed. For instance, an agent’s “value threshold” in the rational choice sub-model does 
not change over time.  
 
Observation. 
Data are collected for testing and observation using the BehaviorSpace extension in 
NetLogo (see https://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/docs/behaviorspace.html and 
https://www.openabm.org/book/3138/how-use-behavior-space). I observe two primary 
outcomes: the change in Mikania over time and the change in composition of 
management strategies over time. The model allows for additional observation of other 
factors including the impact of observation in the rational choice case and the impact of a 
  228 
mutation rate and random interactions in the cultural diffusion case. However, these are 
not explored in this analysis of the model.  
 
Emergence. 
Changes in the composition of norms and strategies emerge over time based on low-level 
agent interactions and decisions. The agents’ interactions and decisions are governed by 
the sub-model features, either rational choice or cultural diffusion (see Table 2 and 
process overview section).  
 
Objectives.  
The objective of the agents depends on the behavioral/institutional sub-model. In the 
rational choice sub-model, an agent’s goal is to maximize their utility subject to their own 
set of preferences (modeled in the value-threshold). In the cultural diffusion sub-model, 
agents do not seek to maximize an objective; they may adopt other similar agent’s 
strategies and norms on the basis of interactions.  
 
Prediction.  
Agents do not use prediction in their decisions. 
 
Learning.  
One feature in the rational choice sub-model that is not analyzed in the accompanying 
chapter is “observation.” Agents observe their closest eight neighbors when the “observe” 
feature is turned on and may change their behavior to the most common behavior. In the 
cultural diffusion sub-model, the implicit mechanism of exchange of norms and strategies 
between similar, interacting agents is social learning or imitation.  
 
Sensing.  
Each agent knows their own set of preferences in the rational choice sub-model. Each 
agent is assumed to know the productivity of each patch (the “productivity-value”). 
These each inform agent decisions in the model. The agents do not know the total amount 
of Mikania in the world (global information).  
 
Interaction. 
In the rational choice sub-model, agents can check the behavior of other agents if the 
observe or monitor features are turned on. In the cultural-diffusion sub-model, agents 
have the opportunity to interact with each other at each time step. If they are similar 
enough, an agent will meet with its closest neighbor and possibly exchange cultural 
information.  
 
Collectives.  
In Chitwan, households belong to a specific community forest user group, but these 
groups are not explicit in the model. Rather it is assumed that some of the variation in the 
model (such as the agents’ sets of preferences) stems from different institutions within 
each community forest group.  
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Initialization 
See table D.2 for the values all agents and patches are initialized with. The baseline 
scenario in the rational choice sub-model does not include the 
monitor_and_sanction_burning feature. In the cultural diffusion sub-model, the initial 
percentage of agents adopting each management norm can be systematically altered to 
explore the impact on outcomes over time.  
 
Input Data 
No input data is used in this model.    
 
Submodels 
Both the rational choice and cultural diffusion sub-models are theoretically driven and are 
informed by previous literature. The parameters for the cost of each of the management 
strategies in the rational choice sub-model were ranked based on ethnographic fieldwork. 
The model code is thoroughly commented and available at 
https://github.com/asulli/ABMwork.  
 
CHANS Characteristic Features  
Human-environment systems have been known to exhibit features such as time lags, 
resilience, heterogeneity, and feedback loops (An et al. 2014). This model exhibits 
resilience to Mikania reduction beyond specific thresholds (once Mikania takes over the 
world, it is very difficult to remove or control). There is heterogeneity in the management 
strategies adopted over time. One of the feedbacks observed in the rational choice sub-
model includes the relationship between the selected strategy, Mikania redistribution, and 
subsequent impacts on agents’ strategy selection. For example, an agent may select 
burning as their removal strategy; burning is associated with the highest rate of Mikania 
increase in the agent’s current patch after removal. If an agent continues to select burning 
as their removal method due to its low cost, the amount of Mikania in the patch will 
continue to increase and there will be an additional removal cost to the agent in patches 
with a density greater than 0.5; if the cost of removal becomes greater than the 
productivity of the patch the agent may decide to stop removing Mikania (a “do nothing” 
strategy) depending on their “value threshold.”  
 
Verification and Validation  
Model validation is discussed in the accompanying chapter 5 manuscript and sensitivity 
analysis and extreme value tests, part of verification, are discussed below.   
 
Simulation experiments and sensitivity analysis.  
Below are results from sensitivity analyses and extreme value texts.  
Table D.3. Extreme value tests: Rational Choice  
Parameters  Default value Min, Max Mikania cover:  
min, max  
Initial-people 100 100, 1000 542.3, 1080.7 
Monitor_and_sanction_burning? False False, True 542.4, 528.5 
Observe?  False False, True 542.3, 541.4 
At t=100, average of 30 runs  
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Table D.4. Extreme value tests: Cultural diffusion  
Parameters  Default value Min, Max Mikania cover:  
min, max  
Initial-people 100 100, 1000 524.2, 1061.3 
Num_bp 0 0, 1 507.8, 524.3 
num_burn 0.15 0, 1 527.2, 538.1 
Number_of_Features 5 1, 20 546.2, 529.3 
At t=100, average of 30 runs  
 
To calculate the sensitivity Sx, below, the following formula was used (An et al., 2005; 
ten Broeke, van Voorn, & Ligtenberg, 2016):  
Sx = (ΔD/D)/(ΔI/I) where I is the value of the independent variable, ΔI is the change in I, 
D is the value of the dependent variable, and ΔD is the change in D in response to the 
change in I. 
Table D.5. Sensitivity analysis for selected model parameters: Rational Choice  
Variable  Default 
value 
Perturbation + 
50% 
Change in Mikania cover  
(number of patches with >50% 
cover) 
Sensitivity  
Initial-people 100 150 4.6 0.006 
Initial-
mikania 
0.3 0.45 2.8 0.004 
At t=100, average of 30 runs  
 
Table D.6. Sensitivity analysis for selected model parameters: Cultural diffusion  
Variable  Default 
value 
Perturbation + 
50% 
Change in Mikania cover 
(number of patches with 
>50% cover) 
Sensitivity  
Initial-people 100 150 1.1  0.001 
Initial-mikania 0.3 0.45 1.8  0.002 
Num_bp 0 0.05 0.1  0.0001 
num_burn 0.15 0.25 2.3  0.003 
Number_of_Features 5 8 5.9  0.007 
At t=100, average of 30 runs  
1number_of_features and number_of_traits were rounded to the nearest whole number 
since half features are illogical 
 
